Move Toward Normalization of Relations, October 1974–July 1975

88. National Security Study Memorandum 212[1]

Washington, October 8, 1974.

TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of China

The President has directed a study of U.S. policy on the transfer of American military equipment to the Republic of China over the next three to five years. The study should define relevant U.S. interests and objectives, and should be based upon the following assumptions:

—That the process of normalization in U.S.–PRC relations will continue.
—That there will be no radical change in the Sino-Soviet conflict.
—That the U.S. defense commitment to the Republic of China will continue.[2]

The issues to be examined in the study should include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following:

—The threat to the security of Taiwan over this period.
—The roles of U.S. and ROC forces in deterring and defending against a possible PRC attack on Taiwan and the Pescadores.

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSSMs and NSDMs, 1974–77, NSSMs File, Box 2, NSSM 212. Top Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS.

[2] Kennedy, Smyser, and Solomon promoted this study as a way "to gain control over the transfer of U.S. arms and military equipment to the Republic of China," but they disagreed on the assumptions that should underlie it. Kennedy and Smyser argued in favor of the three assumptions stated in the NSSM. Such a study, they contended, would be "bureaucratically preferable since it deals with a limited set of contingencies and is less likely to raise questions—public or private—about where we are going," and would also likely avoid a "massive requirements estimate." Solomon, in contrast, asserted that the study should address a broader range of possible scenarios. (Memorandum from Smyser and Solomon to Kissinger, September 24; ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–32, NSSM 212, U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of China)

—In light of these roles, the principal deficiencies in ROC defensive capabilities.

—In light of these deficiencies, and taking into account the constraints posed by the continuing normalization of U.S.–PRC relations, the study should define and evaluate policy options for further transfers of U.S. military equipment to the ROC. The evaluation should include consideration of the ROC's economic and technological ability to support the acquisition and maintenance of new weapons systems, and should consider the possibility and feasibility of the ROC developing alternative sources of supply.

The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia, which should be chaired by a representative of the Department of State. The study should be submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs no later than November 1, 1974, for consideration by the Senior Review Group prior to consideration by the President.

Henry A. Kissinger

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89. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency[1]

Washington, October 1974.

[Omitted here are the title page and table of contents.]

THE SHIFT TO HARSHNESS IN PEKING'S POLICY TOWARD THE US

Principal Judgments

Since mid-1973 progress in normalizing Sino-US relations has slowed markedly. The Chinese in the past year have expressed dissatisfaction with the US, both privately and publicly; they have hinted to the US that it should commence formal diplomatic disengagement from Taiwan; and they have been less concerned about avoiding clashes of interest with the US.

The impetus for Peking's shift has come from Mao himself, supported—probably reluctantly—by Chou En-lai. The Chinese leaders

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[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Job 80–M01048A, Communist China, 280174–151174. Secret; Exdis; No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. On October 26, William Colby sent this paper to Kissinger under a covering memorandum stating that a senior analyst in the Office of Political Research of the Directorate of Intelligence had prepared it. (Ibid.)

had anticipated a *phased American disengagement* from formal diplomatic ties with the Chinese Nationalists. Mao's personal disappointment with the pace of US moves in respect of Taiwan has been genuine and crucial to the change in Peking's policy.

Other apparent reasons for the shift have been:

—decreased fear of military attack by the USSR, permitting Peking to argue (unconvincingly) that the US needs China more than China needs the US;
—new perception of the Third World as the area from which Peking can obtain the most political help for those policies it directs against both superpowers; and
—Mao's wish to synchronize foreign policy with the sharp leftward movement in Chinese domestic policies, particularly the intensification of the anti-Confucian campaign.

The most striking features of the shift have been:

—assertions by Chinese officials that Peking has been "deceived" about American policy, and that American "words" were satisfactory, but actions were not with respect to severing ties with Taiwan;
—decreased concern about risking public clashes with the US, e.g., in the UN and in special international conferences;
—reaffirmation by Mao himself that China will continue to assist "liberation" movements (expressed most importantly in increased material aid to the Communist insurgents in Cambodia); and
—a political swing to the Third World, identifying China more closely than ever before with the less developed countries and supporting them in a policy of increasing prices on oil and other raw materials.

Peking can be expected to prod the US harder to speed its disengagement from Taiwan. Specifically, what Peking seems to desire most now is for Washington to upgrade the US liaison office in Peking to an embassy while downgrading the US embassy in Taipei to a liaison office or consulate-general (roughly following the Japanese example). Peking will probably suggest this during the forthcoming high-level Sino-American talks.

The USSR will remain the "main enemy" for Peking, even if the US rejects the anticipated Chinese proposal. This basic fact sets limits on the degree of pressure the Chinese are willing to exert on the US; a visibly high degree of pressure would give aid and comfort to the Soviets. On the other hand, so long as Chinese fear of a Soviet attack remains low, as it is now, the Chinese will probably try to carry on with three not entirely harmonious lines of action:

—to continue the Sino-American détente as a long-term deterrent to the Soviet threat, while insisting that US disengagement from Taiwan must be a part of such a détente;
—to continue to selectively support "liberation" movements, most importantly in Cambodia; and

—to exploit the Third World against both the USSR and the US (immediately, on the oil-pricing issue), if this can be done without alienating the US to the point that the US is no longer interested in a new relationship with Peking.

[Omitted here are the evidence and analysis for the principal judgments.]

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90. Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Regional Group for East Asia and the Pacific[1]

Washington, November 12, 1974.

U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of China

[Omitted here are the title page and table of contents.]

THE SETTING

Introduction

The changed context of U.S. China policy requires a new look at the question of providing military equipment to the ROC. Political and psychological considerations will have to play an increasingly important role in Taiwan's security if we are to find the narrow ground on which the contradictory objectives of advancing normalization with the PRC while assuring the security of the ROC can be successfully pursued.

Assumptions:

The assumptions governing this study are:

1. U.S.–PRC normalization will continue;
2. There will be no radical change in the Sino-Soviet dispute;
3. The U.S. defense commitment to the ROC will continue;
4. Over the next three to five years, the political and psychological importance of the U.S. supply of weapons to the ROC will be greater than the objective military importance of the weapons themselves.

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[1] Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–32, NSSM 212, U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of China. Top Secret; Sensitive. This study was prepared in response to NSSM 212, Document 88. Scowcroft received the study under a November 12 covering letter from Habib, who chaired this interdepartmental group. (Ibid.) On January 10, 1975, Jeanne Davis sent it to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of State, and Director of Central Intelligence. The Chairman of the JCS also received a copy. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0059, China (Nats), 1975, 091.3, 10 Jan 1975)

Interests and Objectives

The basic U.S. interest is a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese themselves. Progress toward a peaceful settlement will depend on many factors, but because of the great disparity between PRC and ROC capabilities some form of U.S. involvement in Taiwan's security will continue to be important to inhibit the possibility of force being used to resolve the issue.

The *U.S. objectives* governing the supply of arms to the ROC are to:

—avoid actions which the PRC would interpret as inconsistent with "normalization" or which the ROC might interpret as a weakening of our commitment in the Shanghai Communiqué to normalize relations with the PRC.

—maintain confidence on the part of ROC leaders and public that Taiwan is sufficiently secure to minimize the dangers of domestic instability or desperate acts that would hinder U.S.–PRC normalization, including a possible ROC attempt to involve other parties in its fate.

—avoid actions which might lead the PRC to conclude that we no longer have an important interest in the security of Taiwan.

Arms Supply and Taiwan's Security

Along with the deterrent effect of the U.S.–PRC relationship, the U.S. security treaty and the remaining U.S. force presence on Taiwan, ROC access to U.S. military equipment is a major element in Taiwan's sense of security. As our China policy evolves, the relative importance of these elements will change. Access to U.S. arms will become increasingly important to the ROC to the extent that other elements of Taiwan's security equation appear uncertain in its eyes. Specifically, the eventual withdrawal of all U.S. troops or changes in the nature of our security commitment would have that effect.

ROC willingness to rely less on military factors in assuring Taiwan's security has evolved to some extent as a result of the conditioning effects of our policy, but the evolution has been heavily dependent on the assumption of our continued commitment to Taiwan's defense. Somewhat grudgingly the ROC has come to appreciate the deterrent value of the PRC's preoccupation with the Soviet Union and the PRC's related interest in détente with the U.S. The ROC has thus shown increasing resignation to the inevitability of a growing PRC military superiority and has accepted reduction in U.S. force levels on Taiwan, MAP phase-out and FMS cuts, and non-supply of F–4s. Nevertheless, the view which will continue to permeate ROC society for the foreseeable future is that the PRC remains an unregenerate enemy and that the island's survival is dependent on possession of a credible military deterrent and a continued U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security.

A Political Approach to Arms Supply

Current circumstances necessitate an even more political approach to decisions on supply of arms to Taiwan. The nature and level of our arms supply will obviously affect normalization of our relations with the PRC, but it will also have a major impact on the ROC's tolerance of a changing political and security environment. To date the pattern of our arms supply, while posing no major problems with Peking, has contributed significantly to the flexibility with which the ROC has adjusted to rather drastic changes in its status. As our relations with the PRC evolve, however, the ROC may ask for more weapons to help compensate for the weakening of its political and security situation.

Dangers of Sharply Changed ROC Access

Significantly Higher Access—Although a higher level of supply, which satisfies most ROC weapon requests, could ease ROC adjustment to further changes in the ROC–U.S. relationship, the upward direction would disturb Peking. It could also convey the wrong impression to Taipei about our intent to pursue normalization (i.e., that we were no longer moving further in that direction) and could encourage an inflexible ROC approach to the politics of the Taiwan issue.

Greatly Reduced Access—Severely reduced access to U.S. equipment leading to an unmistakable deterioration of ROC military capabilities would risk the danger of setting off a train of developments on Taiwan seriously harmful to our (and possibly PRC) interests. This would be particularly true if it coincided with other changes in our China policy. Our performance would be interpreted on Taiwan as clear evidence that we were washing our hands of the Taiwan problem. The ROC political and military leaders would be the quickest to arrive at such a judgment, but the issue is of such fundamental importance that the rest of Taiwan's society, including Taiwanese oppositionists, would not be far behind in arriving at a similiar conclusion. The resultant erosion of confidence could lead to political dissension which would threaten the stability of the current leadership, to severe repression of popular unrest by a shaky government, or even to the ultimate disintegration of social order on Taiwan. A panic-stricken government's efforts to deal with a deteriorating situation could lead to desperate attempts to change Taiwan's juridical status or involve others in its fate. The readily perceived direct U.S. responsibility for this state of affairs would confront us with serious problems at home and abroad.

Effect of ROC Military Nuclear Program—Loss of confidence in the U.S. could lead the ROC to intensify efforts to acquire a military nuclear capability. To date these efforts have been effectively inhibited by our firm and explicit opposition and by an unwillingness to jeopardize Taiwan's rapidly growing civilian nuclear power program which is

hostaged to the U.S. because no other country can legally supply reactors to the ROC. Nevertheless, the ROC has not abandoned its covert military nuclear energy research program and it probably possesses most of the technological know-how for the development of a nuclear device. It has a small safeguarded Canadian heavy water reactor (similar to that used by the Indians), but was blocked by us from acquiring a chemical separation facility necessary to extract plutonium.

The inhibitions which have kept the ROC in line could be swept aside by a ROC calculation that a nuclear capability was required as an effective substitute for the vanishing U.S. security commitment. However, it would still take the ROC considerable time to fabricate a nuclear device.

Peking's Viewpoint

We do not know with precision the extent to which at any given time our military relationship with the ROC is an obstacle to normalization of relations with the PRC. Peking keeps careful track of ROC millitary capabilities, but it does not appear to conduct this assessment in isolation from other political factors. U.S. arms supplies are only one variable in a more complicated equation in which other aspects of the relationship between Washington on the one hand and Taipei and Peking on the other, as well as the overall international situation in East Asia, are all factors.

Peking obviously does not desire that U.S. support for the ROC should be offered at a level that might cause the leadership in Taipei to conclude that it is essentially invulnerable to pressures. On the contrary, it would like to see an attenuation in the U.S. military relationship with the ROC sufficient to demoralize the ROC to the point where it would be receptive to political accommodation. Nevertheless, there have been indications from Peking that it does not wish our presence in Taiwan—of which arms supply is an aspect—to be withdrawn so fast that others would be tempted to intervene or that uncontrollable changes on the island become likely. In any event, our military involvement with the ROC will be monitored by a PRC suspicious about our ultimate intentions on Taiwan. Insensitivity in our handling of this issue could undermine the position of those within the PRC who advocate normalization or lead them to a change in attitude.

Particular PRC Sensitivities—Given these various and somewhat conflicting considerations, it seems reasonable to conclude that Peking would be bothered by an indefinite and formal U.S. military involvement with Taiwan. In this general context, the following U.S. actions would appear to be particularly bothersome to Peking:

—The introduction into Taipei's arms inventory of weapons which were *clearly offensive* in nature (e.g., strategic bombers, long-range missiles, or modern amphibious equipment);

—The creation in Taiwan of a *domestic capacity to produce*—or co-produce—sophisticated weapons (e.g., advanced aircraft or major missile production capabilities);

—The provision on a high priority basis of the *most advanced weapons in the U.S. inventory* (e.g., F–15 aircraft, TV guided bombs, advanced ECM systems);

—The rapid introduction of *large quantities* of weapons into Taipei's inventory (e.g., an Enhance Plus type of program).[2]

An additional factor relating to *delivery schedules* ought also be considered. Given the long lead time before various weapons systems which presently interest the ROC would be available for delivery, the actual arrival of such weapons on the island—even if agreement on delivery were made well in advance and even if Peking became aware of such an agreement—might occur in a somewhat changed international environment resulting from further progress in normalization of relations with Peking. At that time the PRC might react strongly to the introduction of the weapons on the island, even though the agreement with the ROC for the supply of the weapons had been reached under different circumstances.

Room for Maneuver Narrowing

We will continue to be confronted with ROC demands for weapons which are unacceptable given our policy toward the PRC, as well as displays of PRC displeasure over our having any military dealings with the ROC. To date both sides have not evidenced a serious expectation of complete satisfaction of their respective positions because they judge their overall interests require concessions to U.S. views on the Taiwan problem. As normalization proceeds, we will have less room for maneuver in dealing with the issue of arms supply to the ROC, especially as we complete substantial withdrawals of our forces from Taiwan and as the focus shifts to other elements of our security relationship with the ROC.

Third Country Sources

Under prevailing international circumstances there is little prospect of the ROC finding reliable third country sources of major weapons. It is doubtful, for example, that any of the few nations capable of producing advanced aircraft would risk endangering their relationship with the PRC by providing such a high profile weapon to the ROC. However, some weapons would be available to the ROC from third country sources which, within limits, could spare us problems with the PRC that might arise if we provided such weaponry. Israel and possibly Italy are prepared to supply surface-to-surface missiles to the ROC and Taipei apparently would not have much difficulty in

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[2] See footnote 3, Document 73.

obtaining patrol crafts from European sources. Moreover, through packages comprised of various third country components the ROC could probably satisfy some of its electronic and naval requirements. Light arms would be readily available to the ROC on the international market, although at a cost to logistical efficiency. Nevertheless, third country channels will represent limited and unreliable sources of supply for the ROC and will not appreciably reduce our key role in maintaining a credible ROC military deterrent.

Technological and Economic Factors

The ROC has had no serious technological difficulties in handling the present levels and sophistication of U.S. equipment and would be technologically capable of absorbing any of the weaponry contemplated under the options presented later in this paper. Present projections indicate that Taiwan's economic resources would be sufficient to permit purchase of certain new weapon systems even in the event of drastically reduced FMS and Excess Defense Articles availabilities. Over the next five-year period, however, the capability of the ROC economy to support continued increases in defense spending at past rates will diminish. Moreover, the ROC would have to greatly reduce the size of its bloated army and would have to sacrifice much of its current economic infrastructure program if it were to try to greatly improve its current military capabilities vis-à-vis the PRC. (A discussion of ROC Economic Capabilities is presented in Annex A.[3])

II

PRC Military Threat to Taiwan

Although political factors will play an even greater role in determining our position on supply of military equipment to the ROC, the strictly military aspects of Taiwan's security and the ROC's preoccupation with these must be considered. The PRC military threat to the ROC as summarized below and discussed in Annex B assumes that there will be no change in the PRC–USSR confrontation; that the PRC will neither use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons in invading Taiwan; and that the U.S. will not intervene at least initially in the event of a PRC attack:

1) The Sino-Soviet border confrontation is a major constraint on Chinese military resources. This confrontation will continue to tie up more than 40% of the PRC ground and air forces and the strongest of its three naval fleets—the North Sea Fleet—for an indefinite period. Nevertheless, the remaining available PRC forces would be sufficient to overcome ROC defenses.

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[3] Annexes A–C are attached but not printed.

2) The PRC Air Force could gain air supremacy over the Taiwan Strait in a period of perhaps two or three weeks although only by accepting extremely high losses to the more sophisticated but considerably smaller ROC Air Force. Such losses would gravely compromise Peking's air arm. This assessment assumes the completion of the ROC's co-production program of 100 F–5Es and the provision of adequate hardening and anti-aircraft artillery and missiles for key ROC air defense assets.[4]

3) The PRC, utilizing only units of its East Sea Fleet, would establish naval supremacy in the Taiwan Strait. If control of the air had been gained, this could be accomplished in short order, perhaps in a matter of days. Once such supremacy is established, PRC naval forces could isolate the off-shore islands and effectively blockade Taiwan's ports.

4) Either prior to or concurrent with the establishment of air and naval superiority, the PRC could assemble, load, dispatch, and assault beaches on Taiwan with an amphibious force of some 30,000 infantry troops with equipment plus an additional 75,000 lightly equipped troops by using some 500 small landing craft. (These landing craft, which are largely 60–90-foot LCN's and which are normally devoted to non-military uses, are all that the PRC is known to have, and thus would have to be mobilized country-wide.) These forces could probably maintain a beachhead for several days—long enough to be reinforced in strength, if air and naval superiority had been established.

5) In three to five years, the PRC's capability for a successful attack could be improved through acquisition of air-to-air missiles and additional more advanced aircraft.

III

ROC Force Composition

The ROC's inability to withstand a determined PRC attack on its own has necessarily required military contingency plans under the Mutual Defense Treaty for active participation of U.S. air and naval forces in Taiwan's defense in the event of such an attack. Such planning, however, assumes that the ROC would have to meet the first four to five days of a PRC attack with its own forces, giving us time to resort to

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[4] On January 14, 1975, Davis distributed a memorandum that asked recipients of the study to insert a footnote that reads: "USAF and DIA believe that the initial PRC air assault against Taiwan would be carried out with sufficient forces to overwhelm the ROC AC&W system, thus negating the ROC advantages in equipment and training, reducing PRC losses, and insuring the early attainment of PRC superiority." (Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–32, NSSM 212, U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of China)

diplomatic efforts to end the conflict and to assess the need and extent of U.S. involvement in the defense of Taiwan.

Given Taiwan's location, the nature of the PRC threat, and role ROC forces would have to play in the island's initial defense, the optimum structure of the ROC military force would be:

—an Air Force designed primarily for air-to-air capability against fighters, bombers and airlift forces, and for countering a PRC naval attack;
—a navy capable of withstanding attacks by PRC submarine forces and missile-equipped surface craft and of countering PRC amphibious forces in coordination with the ROC Air Force;
—a relatively small but mobile and well-equipped ROC Army, including surface-to-air missiles for air defense, backed by a trained reserve force.

ROC Deficiencies

Existing major ROC deficiencies in achieving such a military force are as follows:

Air Defense—The replacement of older aircraft with 100 F–5E aircraft under the current co-production program will provide the ROCAF with a strong air combat capability for the next few years. Completion of this program, however, will still leave the Air Force with over 100 older aircraft (F–104's and F–100's) which should be replaced in the early 1980's. In addition, the ROCAF will presumably continue to require at least some all-weather interceptors, a role now filled by 36 F–104G's. These also will need to be replaced within the next five to ten years. Depending on PRC capabilities, the ROC may require a follow-up aircraft such as the YF–16 or 17 for the 1980's.

ROCAF facilities on the ground remain vulnerable to PRC bombardment, and improvements are necessary. An aircraft shelter program, introduction of two battalions of the improved Hawk surface-to-air missile, one of which has already been approved by the USG, and acquisition of modern anti-aircraft artillery such as the Vulcan system would help correct these deficiencies. In addition, improved command and control equipment for the ROC air defense system, including improvements in the air operations center, are necessary.

Defense Against Naval/Amphibious Attack—The Navy is probably the weakest of the ROC services, and has the most immediate deficiencies. Not only is it greatly outnumbered by PRC naval forces, but its ships are inferior. Its most critical deficiency is the limited defense against the PRC's high speed patrol boats equipped with Styx anti-ship missiles. The Navy is also hampered by a limited anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. Finally, incompatible communications between the Navy and Air Force, and questionable Air Force capabilities against surface ships result in serious naval defense deficiencies.

Improved electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment on ROC ships would reduce their vulnerability to attack by the PRC's Styx missiles, but the most effective counter would be for the ROC to obtain its own anti-ship missiles such as Harpoon. These would best be mounted on high-speed patrol boats; construction of five such craft under a co-production arrangement has already been approved by the USG. The ROC's deficiencies in ASW are of less immediate importance. These could be remedied with improved aircraft (16 S–2E ASW aircraft were recently approved for sale to the ROC), improved sonar and improved torpedoes for the ROC's destroyers. Finally, a compatible communications system for ROC ships and aircraft and improved anti-ship munitions for the ROCAF, perhaps laser guided bombs, would add considerably to the ROCAF's ability to participate in defense against an amphibious attack.

IV

OPTIONS

Introduction

The options presented below relate the question of supply of military equipment to the ROC to our overall China policy objectives. They range from handling the issue in a manner designed to minimize arms supply as an obstacle to U.S.–PRC normalization to one designed to maximize ROC confidence in the U.S. security commitment.

The options were developed on the assumption that over the next three to five years the political and psychological importance of U.S. supply of weapons to the ROC will be greater than the objective military importance of the weapons themselves. Both the ROC and PRC will view our handling of this issue as an indicator of the relative importance the U.S. attaches to each. Nevertheless, their reactions to what we do in this sphere may be asymmetric. As an example, the ROC would regard a significant restriction on its present access to weapons as a serious matter while the PRC response might not be equivalently favorable.

It is also worth reiterating that ROC arms access cannot be considered in isolation from the other elements of Taiwan's security: the deterrent effect of U.S.–PRC relationship, our defense commitment and the remaining U.S. force presence. Not only are these elements inextricably bound up, but their relative importance can—and will—shift markedly depending on events.

Option I, *Complete Cut-Off of Access to U.S. Equipment*, would completely terminate ROC access to U.S. arms, either immediately or gradually over the next three to five years. Option II, *Freezing ROC Access to Current Types and Levels*, would restrict ROC access to replacement of items already in its inventory (e.g., the F–5E program would be completed and could be extended to replace additional obsolescent aircraft on a one-for-one basis); no new weapons systems would be authorized.

Option III, *Limited ROC Access to New Weapons*, would at its lower range permit ROC access to some additional and new weapons which we would judge as unlikely to be provocative to the PRC (e.g., improved air-to-air missiles and possibly Harpoon missiles); at its upper range, we would permit access to new weapons which run a higher risk of provoking the PRC if we thought such weapons were necessary to shore up ROC confidence or to counter a growing PRC capability (e.g., Harpoon missile and ASROC). Option IV, *Substantial ROC Access to New Weapons*, would permit ROC access to a broad range of new weapons systems (e.g., large number of laser-guided bombs and YF–16 or 17 aircraft as follow-on to F–5E). Under all of these options, even Option I, we would not interfere with ROC purchases from third countries, unless under exceptional circumstances; in some cases we might encourage such ROC purchases.

We have considered these options in light of the following criteria:

1) the impact on our objective of reducing the military component of Taiwan's security;
2) the effect on U.S.–PRC normalization;
3) the effect on Taiwan's confidence and stability;
4) the deterrent effect against a PRC use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue;
5) the effect on chances of ROC–PRC political accommodation;
6) the ROC's economic and technological capabilities.

Option I. Complete Cut-Off of Access to US Equipment

This option would seek to eliminate or minimize to the greatest extent possible the issue of U.S. arms supply to Taiwan as an obstacle to normalization of relations with the PRC. At the lower range of the option, ROC access to U.S. arms would be terminated abruptly. At the upper range, ROC access would be phased out over the next three to five years. In either case, the cut-off would be complete: no additional equipment or spare parts would be authorized for sale to Taiwan.

Advantages:

—would promote normalization of U.S.–PRC relations;

—would impose least economic burden on the U.S. and ROC;

—upper range of option could ease PRC pressure for an abrupt arms supply cut-off, while offering ROC transitional period to adjust to new reality;

—could be used as bargaining chip in negotiations with Peking;

—although at the risk of chaos on Taiwan, would increase pressures on ROC to seek accommodation with the PRC.

Disadvantages:

—would cause deep erosion of ROC confidence, leading to possible disintegration of social order or desperate acts which could com-

plicate rather than ease U.S.–PRC relations; our direct responsibility for such consequences would confront us with serious problems at home and abroad;

—could cause PRC to miscalculate our intentions with respect to Taiwan, tempting it to use, or more likely to threaten to use, force as Taiwan's defense capabilities rapidly deteriorate;

—would result in a severe decline in our influence with the ROC;

—so long as security treaty remained in effect, would necessitate earlier and more substantial U.S. role in meeting our defense commitment in event of PRC attack;

—might prompt accelerated ROC efforts to develop nuclear weapons;

—could cause serious concern in other Asian nations dependent on the U.S.;

—would endanger U.S. investment on Taiwan.

Option II. Freezing ROC Access to Current Types and Levels

This option would place new limitations on arms supply to the ROC in order to improve the climate for U.S.–PRC normalization. Over a three to five-year period it would involve an unmistakable deterioration of ROC military capabilities relative to the PRC. Under this option we would permit continued access to spare parts, replacement of equipment or items already in the ROC inventory and certain improved models made necessary by phase-out of weapons in the U.S. inventory (e.g., F–5Es, improved Hawk missiles). Under this option no new weapons systems would be authorized. An illustrative list of the kinds of equipment which could be provided under this option is at Annex C I.

Advantages:

—could for a time at least reduce arms supply as obstacle to normalization of U.S.–PRC relations;

—would for the next few years maintain a credible ROC military deterrence;

—would preserve some elements of our arms relationship with the ROC as a bargaining chip for later use with Peking;

—would reduce U.S. economic burden;

—could over time help convey to the ROC our interest in its seeking accommodation with the PRC.

Disadvantages:

—as departure from present practice would erode ROC confidence in U.S. support, possibly leading to instability on Taiwan or to ROC moves which could complicate our relations with the PRC;

—could over time tempt PRC to threaten the use of force since disparity in relative military power in the Taiwan Strait area would gradually increase;

—to extent ROC's self-defense capability is limited, would imply earlier and more extensive US role in the event of PRC attack;

—might prompt accelerated ROC efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

Option III. Limited ROC Access to New Weapons

This option is divided into a lower and upper range. Under the lower range the ROC would not be permitted to obtain "controversial" new equipment; under the upper range we would permit limited acquisition of such equipment. We would define "controversial" as any major, new weapon which would be seen by the PRC as providing the ROC clear technological superiority or altering the current relative military "balance". Since we cannot be confident in assessing Peking's views, we would also have to take into account the role in the U.S. inventory, and popular "image" of the weapon.

Under the lower range, we would permit the ROC to replace or modestly increase existing equipment (including F–5E aircraft), and would also permit it to obtain new equipment which is not "controversial" (e.g., anti-tank missiles, certain kinds of ECM equipment, improved command and control systems for air defense; the Harpoon missile to counter the rapidly growing PRC Styx missile boat threat would be a borderline case). We assume the ROC would turn where possible to third-country sources for "controversial" weaponry and we would not interfere. Our objective under this lower range of equipment supply would be to maintain a balance between accommodating PRC sensitivities and fulfilling ROC needs for psychological confidence in its security. An illustrative list of the kinds of equipment which could be provided under this lower range option is at Annex C II.

Under the upper range, we would permit the ROC to replace and modestly increase existing equipment, including a limited number of new equipment items the PRC might consider "controversial", but which would help to maintain ROC confidence in U.S. intentions and in its ability to deal with what it perceives to be serious and growing PRC capabilities. However, if there were alternative sources of such "controversial" equipment available to the ROC, we would not feel compelled to supply our equipment. The objective would be to give, within limits, greater emphasis to ROC psychological concerns over its security, while accepting some risk of PRC displeasure over our actions in the arms supply area. We would have to make a careful case-by-case examination of all ROC requests keeping in mind that the extent to which any weapons system is "controversial" might well change, either over time or because of other changes in the relationships between

the U.S. and the two Chinese parties. Under this option we would provide the Harpoon missile or laser guided bombs. An illustrative list of the kinds of equipment which could be provided under this upper range option is at Annex C III.

Advantages:

—should be sufficiently reassuring to ROC (particularly at upper range) to prevent instability on Taiwan or acts of desperation; would cushion the impact of any further changes in the ROC's political environment;

—provides flexibility to deal with weapons supply in the context of evolving U.S. China policy and probable changes in other elements of Taiwan's security;

—would maintain credible, though gradually deteriorating, ROC military deterrent;

—would inhibit PRC temptation to use force;

—would provide the U.S. with a bargaining chip in later negotiations with the PRC.

Disadvantages:

—particularly at upper range could give rise to both PRC and ROC doubts about our interest in normalization and peacefully resolving the Taiwan problem;

—might involve modest risk to ROC (particularly at lower range) by acquiescing in a gradual deterioration of ROC defense capability relative to that of the PRC;

—provides the least precise practical guidelines for judging specific items of military equipment;

—at upper range would place strain on ROC economic capabilities;

—long lead times for many new weapons systems may lead to misunderstanding of U.S. intentions by PRC when weapons delivered.

Option IV—Substantial ROC Access to New Weapons

Under this option we would permit the ROC to attempt to maintain or enhance its military capabilities relative to those of the PRC. The ROC would be permitted to increase its inventory of weapons systems already held, and also obtain new weapons systems in significant numbers. The distinction between "controversial" or "non-controversial" equipment would be minimized, but not ignored, and we would continue to prevent the ROC from acquiring a serious offensive capability for use against the PRC. Our objective under this option would be to use arms supply as a means of enhancing ROC confidence in its security and of minimizing the effects of any other changes in our security relationship with the ROC. Under this option we would provide

both Harpoon missiles and laser guided bombs and eventually YF–16 or 17 follow-on aircraft. An illustrative list of equipment which would be provided under this option is at Annex C IV.

Advantages:

—by maximizing ROC confidence, would entail least risk of ROC instability or acts of desperation and would cushion the impact of any further changes in its political environment;

—greater ROC capability might reduce need for more direct U.S. involvement in Taiwan security.

Disadvantages:

—would hinder normalization of U.S.–PRC relations and the wider U.S. objectives associated with it;

—would mislead ROC about U.S. interest in achieving a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem in keeping with Shanghai Communiqué;

—strain in U.S.–PRC relations would reduce the political deterrent against a PRC attack;

—would place maximum burden on the ROC economy, and would require substantial new U.S. financial assistance;

—PRC would be likely to view this course as an increased threat to it, and might augment its own forces in the area;

—long lead times involved would mean deliveries into late eighties of approvals within this period.[5]

[Omitted here are Annex A on ROC economic capabilities, Annex B on the PRC military threat, and Annex C of illustrative lists of equipment under various options.]

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[5] A memorandum prepared by the NSC staff reported the various departmental views: State favored Option III in its lower range; Defense supported Option III in its upper range; CIA took no formal position but asserted that Options II or III, singly or in combination, were the most realistic means to maintain the U.S. relationships with the PRC and the ROC while preserving stability in Taiwan. The authors of the memorandum agreed with State that Option III in its lower range provided the best broad policy guidance. (Memorandum from Solomon, Granger, and Froebe to Kissinger, May 23, 1975; Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–32, NSSM 212, U.S. Security Assistance to the Republic of China)

91. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Liaison Office in China (Bush) to Secretary of State Kissinger[1]

Beijing, November 18, 1974, 0740Z.

91. Subject: China's Internal Scene on the Eve of Your Visit.

1. In hopes that it might be helpful to you, we have prepared the following assessment of China's internal scene on the eve of your visit, as it looks to us in Peking.

2. The ideological campaign which was just gathering steam at the time of your last visit now seems to be drawing to a close. Almost identical reports from three cities in China describe a recent Central Committee directive which quote no less than Chairman Mao as saying that eight years of the Cultural Revolution is enough. It appears that a National People's Congress could be convened at any time, a step which would mark further movement toward the creation of a leadership structure to take China into the anticipated succession period. Mao Tse-tung continues to remain outside Peking, however, and has now been gone at least four months, a fact which injects some uncertainty into any projection of PRC political developments. Mao's return to Peking could, as has happened in the past, signal entirely new directions in Chinese policy, although this does not appear likely.

3. What was accomplished by the recent political campaign? In our view, a variety of issues, all parts of which is perhaps Mao's last effort to shape China in his image, were at stake. They include the role of China's military and its relationship to the party, the degree of central control over China's massive regional and provincial bureaucracies, the Middle Kingdom's relationship with the barbarian states, most importantly the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and last but not least, a genuine effort to eradicate traditional, Confucian thought and behavior patterns among the Chinese people. While it is impossible to measure with anything like precision the regime's success in resolving these issues, we suspect the results have been mixed at best, and many questions have been compromised but not solved.

4. Perhaps the most important changes have taken place in the military field. Early in the campaign eight of China's eleven regional military commanders were wrenched loose from their long standing power bases in a massive shift the impact of which remains unclear. Whereas they previously had occupied both military and political positions, usually as provincial party first secretary, most have now

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[1] Source: Ford Library, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, China Exchanges, Box 4, Unnumbered items (6). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only; Immediate; Via Voyager Channel.

been stripped of their political functions. The apparent debate over military priorities and strategy also seems to have been resolved in favor of the Maoist position stressing convential over nuclear preparedness, and in addition emphasizing economic development over massive military budgets. In our judgment, however, these issues, while resolved for the present, will continue to be a major focus of debate as China moves into the uncertain period of succession.

That the issue of central versus local control remains unresolved was illustrated by series of authoritative articles in the November issue of *Red Flag*. Implicit in the articles was allegation that provincial and local authorities had substituted their authority for that of the party central, and once again the role of the revolutionary committees is in some doubt. The problem of creating a governmental structure in China which is responsive to Peking's authority, a problem as old as China, remains unsolved.

The debate over China's relationship with the West was expressed in the field of culture through the polemics over the Antonioni film and the attacks on Western music.[2] In the fields of commerce and technology, the debate has centered on self reliance as opposed to the import of foreign goods and advanced techniques. The problem in both cases is to what extent can China move into the modern world and widened contacts with the West without its people being overwhelmed by outside influences. We suspect that in the course of the debate a compromise position has been reached which, for the present at least, has satisfied Chinese leaders that they can move toward greater contact and exposure to the West while maintaining the essential principle of self reliance and a uniquely revolutionary-tinged Chinese culture.

Finally, the centerpiece of the present campaign, the attack on Confucius and the weight of traditional thought on the Chinese populace has, in our view, had the least impact of all. While it is impossible to document, it is our impression based on our exposure to the Chinese bureaucracy and the man on the street that little has changed in the Middle Kingdom. Materialism rather than revolutionary ideology remains the most important impetus in Chinese society, which also retains an innate conservatism.

In the process of attempting these changes and reaching a new consensus, however, new turmoil and uncertainty have been generated in China. The calls for struggle and "going against the tide" reopened old wounds of the Cultural Revolution and aroused the ambitions of those who rose to positions of power during that movement only to be relegated to obscurity when order had to be restored. New factional fighting and poster attacks reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution erupted

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[2] See footnote 2, Document 69.

during the spring and summer, but were quickly curtailed by directives from the center. Apparently it was agreed that China could not afford another Cultural Revolution at this time. Although factional disputes and poster attacks continue, it is our estimate that these represent a minority fighting a forlorn campaign in an effort to reestablish the role of "mass representatives" created during the Cultural Revolution.

At the center, it appears that a minimum consensus has been reached on the basic issues confronting China. The overriding succession issue has both intensified the maneuvering for power and reinforced the impetus for unity. Teng Hsiao-ping now seems clearly to have moved into the Acting Premier's role. This plus the recent announcement of Chiao Kuan-hua's appointment as Foreign Minister indicate that some basic issues have been resolved probably including China's continuing relationship with the U.S. Our assumptions in this regard are strengthened by what we feel is markedly more relaxed atmosphere in our dealings with our Chinese hosts at all levels since the fall of this year. Your visit will, of course, provide a much clearer insight into the balance of forces in China.

To sum up, it seems to us that the direction of Chinese policy remains very much in the hands of the same establishment which first decided to permit the opening of the present U.S.–PRC relationship, even if the active cast of characters within this establishment has changed somewhat. Chinese actions, both internal and external, also remain essentially unchanged even if they are portrayed for purposes of gaining the widest possible support in more radical or "revolutionary" terms. Domestically, attention is focussed upon building up the national economy while maintaining a sufficient degree of political unity to take the country through a transition in leadership; in international affairs China is following an essentially defensive philosophy (despite the attacks on superpower hegemonism and support for the Third World) which does not commit the country to any initiative not immediately linked to China's own national interest.

92. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, November 26, 1974, 10:20–11:02 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office, Washington
Lin P'ing, Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chu Ch'uan-hsien, Director, Protocol Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tsien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRC Liaison Office, Washington
Ting Yuan-hung, Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chang Han-chih, Translator
Lien Cheng-pao, Notetaker

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the Preident for National Security Affairs
Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Ambassador George Bush, Chief of the United States Liaison Office, Peking
Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
William H. Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
John H. Holdridge, Deputy Chief, United States Liaison Office, Peking
Oscar V. Armstrong, Director, People's Republic of China and Mongolian Affairs, Department of State
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
Robert C. McFarlane, National Security Council
Karlene Knieps, Notetaker

SUBJECT

Introductory Tour d'Horizon: Japan; Bilateral Relations and Normalization

[*Note:* The discussions began with members of the American press party traveling with the Secretary in the room. Some of Vice Premier Teng's remarks seemed oriented to this press presence.]

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Advisor, Kissinger Reports, Box 2, November 25–29, 1974, Kissinger's Trip. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. All brackets are in the original.

Vice Premier Teng: I would like to take this opportunity to once again express our welcome to the Doctor on his seventh visit to China. I might also say this is the third time we have had the opportunity to exchange views this year. And we hear that the Doctor has made a trip around the globe recently. So we are happy to have this opportunity to have an exchange of opinions again with the Doctor and all the other friends on your staff—to provide us with the opportunity to exchange views not only with old familiar friends, but with new friends like, for instance, Mr. Rumsfeld.

Secretary Kissinger: I want to thank you on behalf of my colleagues for the very warm reception we have received here. We have, as you said, had three exchanges this year with you and with the Foreign Minister, and we always progress in our relationship.

Vice Premier Teng: It probably would be good if one day we would be able to exchange views in Washington.

Secretary Kissinger: I hope we can do that very soon—

Vice Premier Teng: I think it is a common desire, and that is good.

Secretary Kissinger: —because your Foreign Minister always refuses my invitations.

Vice Premier Teng: It is difficult for him to come now. What will he do if he meets the Chiang Kai-shek Ambassador in Washington?

[*Note:* At this point in the conversation the press is ushered from the room.]

Secretary Kissinger: I thought he wanted to wait until the Ambassador's [Huang Chen's] residence was fully furnished. I think we can arrange a visit so that there is no danger of his meeting anybody there he wishes to avoid.

Vice Premier Teng: It might be difficult.

Secretary Kissinger: That we could arrange, and we are prepared on this visit to discuss the whole question of normalization.

Vice Premier Teng: That is good. We have just received news that Tanaka has resigned.[2]

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I think I told your Foreign Minister last night that we knew he would resign this morning. Our indications are that there will now be a rush of consultations in which—. All the candidates are in favor of consultation because they think they will emerge as the Prime Minister. I think there will be an election around December 9. We think that Ohira is the most likely to succeed him, and if he doesn't make it then Shiina will probably become the successor.

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[2] Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka resigned November 26, 1974.

Vice Premier Teng: What about Fukuda?

Secretary Kissinger: We don't think Fukuda can make it now, and therefore if they want Fukuda they will first put in Shiina as a transitional figure.

Vice Premier Teng: But you should also know that Fukuda would be voted for by the Soviet Union too.

Secretary Kissinger: This I frankly would not know.

Vice Premier Teng: Their relationship is growing closer day-by-day.

Secretary Kissinger: Between Fukuda and Shiina, or between the Japanese and Soviets?

Vice Premier Teng: No, between Fukuda and the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger: This I was not aware of.

Vice Premier Teng: Would you vote for Ohira?

Secretary Kissinger: I, personally? Ohira personally is a good friend of mine. And we would be very content with Ohira. And we are certainly not supporting Fukuda.

Vice Premier Teng: So we would have similiar opinions.

Secretary Kissinger: We have no difficulty at all with Ohira. He would support the policy we are familiar with.

Vice Premier Teng: That is so, and we also feel that one of the characteristics of Ohira is that what he says counts. And perhaps, in this respect, if he carries out a certain policy he might be even more firm than Tanaka.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, he is more experienced than Tanaka. In any event, we think that in all probability Ohira will be Prime Minister. And if for any reason he should not be, which we do not expect—but it isn't certain where it could line up. My student [Nakasone] has not yet declared himself. He has his uses. But if there should be some other Prime Minister, you should know that the U.S. believes that the Japanese foreign policy is continuing, and we will encourage them to maintain the course they have begun, particularly regarding China.

Vice Premier Teng: Even if Fukuda should be Prime Minister, we don't think it would be of any great consequence. Perhaps there might be some twists and turns because in the development of events there are always difficulties.

Secretary Kissinger: We think Japan would have to be very careless to come closer to the Soviet Union. It is a very dangerous course for Japan.

Vice Premier Teng: But no matter whoever comes to office, they still have a fundamental issue they cannot solve. This issue we dis-

cussed last night. The question of the Northern Territories [the four northern islands which Japan wants the Soviets to return].[3]

Secretary Kissinger: We will know in ten days, which is more than you can say of most international events. Perhaps after the Prime Minister is selected, if there is an unexpected development, we can exchange ideas.

Vice Premier Teng: So how do you think we should carry on our talks?

Secretary Kissinger: I think perhaps we can make a few observations now of a general nature, and then we might work in smaller groups. One set of views should concern our usual review of the international situation, and then discussion of continuing the process of normalizing relations. The second set of views covers more technical issues, which we should have discussed among our experts.

On the bilateral issues, if I could perhaps say one word before the experts get carried away with their enthusiasm: Such issues as the bilateral exchanges and cultural agreements are essentially a symbolic aspect of our foreign policy, of our political relations, and therefore we will deal with them in this context. Frankly I am indifferent as to whether there is a million dollars more or less in settling the question of blocked accounts, or whether one group more or less goes back and forth between the United States and China. We should use these as a symbol of our overall relationship. So when you want to settle them [the claims/asset problems] you let us know, and we will find a way of settling them.

We believe that, hopefully conditions are favorable to show some advance in our relationship. We think this is, would be, a fulfillment of the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué as well as some of the discussions we had when we made our first visits to China. We think it is desirable in terms of the overall international situation, so that there is no misunderstanding about the evolution of our relationship in the eyes of other countries.

So we are prepared. On the other hand, we won't press you, and you let us know at what speed you want to proceed on these technical bilateral issues. The advantage of discussing them while I am here is that the complexity of the issues tends to increase by the size of my staff, and on this basis you and I and the Foreign Minister can talk and we can cut through the complexities somewhat more rapidly.

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[3] According to the memorandum of conversation of the November 25 meeting, 7:33–7:50 p.m., the islands dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union was not discussed during Deng's welcome of Kissinger. (Ford Library, National Security Advisor, Kissinger Reports, Box 2, November 25–29, 1974, Kissinger's Trip.) The subject was apparently discussed during the ensuing banquet hosted by Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua.

To return to the more decisive issues I spoke about with the Foreign Minister in New York in October:[4] With respect to our general views on normalization, and this is one of the topics we can discuss with greater precision when we meet in smaller groups, I simply wanted to say that we are prepared to discuss seriously and in an attempt to meet the time limit we previously discussed in my past meetings with the Prime Minister [Chou En-lai].

The second category of problems is our usual detailed review of the international situation. The press always asks me before I come here whether I am coming to reassure the Chinese. They also always tell me that our relationship has deteriorated. But you cannot reassure serious people by words. What we have done, as you know and as all our friends who have been at these meetings [know], is to give you as detailed a description of our intentions and strategy as is possible—and I would say more detailed than with any other country. As you know—I think you may have learned that our word counts, and that you have not been surprised by any foreign policy moves we have made. I think that during the course of the last year things have evolved about as we discussed when I was here [in November, 1973]. And we are prepared to do this [review] again for the near future.

This would seem to me to be the most useful way we could spend our time, but we are open to any suggestions as to approaches that you would suggest.

Vice Premier Teng: That's all?

Secretary Kissinger: It is one of my shortest speeches. [Laughter] I also have a fifty minute version, as your Foreign Minister knows.

Vice Premier Teng: As for the way of holding the talks, we are in agreement that some questions can be discussed in smaller groups as you suggested. And in the Doctor's discussions with the Foreign Minister this October, you laid stress on both bilateral and especially international issues. And we welcome the words expressed by Dr. Kissinger in his toast yesterday[5] to the effect that you would foresee further progress on the issue of normalization along the lines of the Shanghai Communiqué. Outside there are many opinions in the world and a lot of talk saying that our relations have chilled and our speed has slowed down. But in the essence I believe that both sides hold that the progress of our relations has been normal.

But we should also say it is not correct to say that there is no ground whatsoever for such talk. For instance, the Doctor mentioned

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[4] See Document 87.

[5] Kissinger's and Qiao's exchange of toasts on the evening of November 25 is printed in Department of State *Bulletin,* December 23, 1974, pp. 905–907.

yesterday and also in October in his discussions with the Foreign Minister that our cannon are sounding more frequently.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and also becoming more accurate.

Vice Premier Teng: And it is only natural that there should be some speculation and talk when you send an Ambassador to Taiwan,[6] and when they increase the number of their consulates in the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: Especially since you will never believe that some of our actions are the result of stupidity and not planning. I never knew about the consulates until it had been done.

Vice Premier Teng: As for our views on the question of normalization, I believe the Doctor and other American friends are familiar with these: that is, the Japan way. And in this aspect, you have expressed the desire that we on our side should put forward specific mode of how we should do it. But actually we have given our opinion long ago: that is, the Japan way. On our side we would also hope that you on your side can move forward a few steps.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. [Vice] Prime Minister, the point in reflecting about what you said—you have given us a general idea, which is the Japan way. But it is always said the Japanese imitate us. Now you are forcing us to imitate the Japanese. This is a new style. But we can accept that basic principle. But we have a number of special circumstances which the Japanese do not have. And at various stages of our relationship we have found means, which were consistent with your principles, which also took into account our necessities. It is perhaps not proper to ask you to make a specific proposal on an issue that is of such profound principle to you.

I remember when we drafted our first communiqué, on my very first visit, when I did not have the pleasure of knowing the Foreign Minister—I was still being treated gently by the Chinese. But Ambassador Huang Hua, with whom I was drafting the communiqué, before we started working on the text said let us have a frank talk about what we must have, each of us, and when we do we can find the words. And it worked out that way.

And I think that within the framework of the Japanese model we should have a frank talk of some of our necessities consistent with your principles, and then see whether we can find some way to reach our goal. After this then we can put forward a specific proposal.

Vice Premier Teng: We perhaps can go into more detail in the smaller groups.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree.

Vice Premier Teng: But I must first fire a cannon.

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[6] See footnote 2, Document 76.

Secretary Kissinger: At me?

Vice Premier Teng: Well, empty or full, as you like. That is, on this issue, as we see it, you owe us a debt. We don't have to discuss it now.

As for the bilateral issues, as we have said many times, and as Chairman Mao has said and also as Premier Chou En-lai has said in the past, we can sum up our views in two sentences: According to our wishes, we would like this matter to come more quickly; but secondly, we are not so much in a hurry. That is to say, if we are able to reach a point acceptable to both sides in a relatively quicker period of time, we would welcome this.

But Chairman Mao has also said in his talk with the Doctor that we pay special attention to international issues. And therefore we agree with the Doctor that it would be good to do as you proposed; that is, to exchange views on international and bilateral issues in smaller groups.

So we can nominate some people on both sides to discuss the more technical issues and bilateral matters.

Secretary Kissinger: On our side, Secretary Habib and Mr. Armstrong, and maybe one or two others, will be having our discussions. And Mr. Holdridge from the Liaison Office.

Vice Premier Teng: On our side we will have Director Lin P'ing and Mr. Tsien Ta-yung from our Liaison Office, and also a few others. Would you agree?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Vice Premier Teng: See how easy it is to reach an agreement. [Laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: Our first agreement. We should make a special announcement.

Vice Premier Teng: So do you think that is about all for this section of our discussion?

Secretary Kissinger: We can now go into smaller groups.

Vice Premier Teng: And we can leave it to that group to decide themselves when they would like to meet and what they would like to discuss. Good.[7]

Secretary Kissinger: Good.

Vice Premier Teng: So would you want to rest?

[The meeting adjourned at 11:00 a.m.]

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[7] A memorandum of conversation of these counterpart discussions, which took place on November 26, 2–3:15 p.m., is in Ford Library, National Security Advisor, Kissinger Reports, Box 2, November 25–29, 1974, Kissinger's Trip.

93. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, November 26, 1974, 11:15 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Huang Chen, Chief of PRC Liaison Office, Washington
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lin P'ing, Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs
Chang Han-chih, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs
Chu Tsien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRCLO, Washington
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. George Bush, Chief, U.S. Liaison Office
Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard Solomon, National Security Council Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff
Karlene Knieps, Department of State (notetaker)

Teng: So how should we commence? I suggest we listen to the Doctor first, because you have traveled to so many lands.

Kissinger: Perhaps we should have a general review of events since we last met. I'm deciding whether to read the black [briefing] book, which has 400 pages, or the green book, which has 200. [Laughter]

Teng: It is up to you.

Kissinger: Let me review the international situation as we see it, as it has developed during the year.

I agree with the analysis of Chairman Mao that we should make progress in normalization, but also that there is an international environment which brought us together in the first place and which determines in many respects our relationship.

In this respect, the factor in which we both have an interest, and which has produced some common fronts, is your ally and northern neighbor. In this respect, our assessment has not changed since last

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Advisor, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, November 25–29, 1974, Kissinger's Trip (1). Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. All brackets are in the original.

year. We believe Soviet purposes are still essentially hegemonial. We don't think it is particularly fruitful to debate in which direction the primary thrust is going, because in whichever direction it goes, the ultimate consequences will be the same. And therefore, we believe the principal necessity is to keep in mind the overall objectives and the means to prevent them from being realized.

In this respect, we have to keep in mind—and I'm being very frank with you—a very complicated domestic situation. For the United States to take strong actions in crises, it is necessary to do so from a position of having demonstrated to our people that we have exhausted every avenue for peace. I think Chairman Mao, last year, said the United States plays complicated games, and China too plays complicated games, but more energetically. [Laughter]

Teng: I think he had discussed actually the difference between shadow-boxing and boxing in the Sha-lin style, which is more energetic.

Kissinger: Yes, shadow-boxing. But it was a profound observation. We have to do a lot of shadow-boxing to get into a position to take action when we are in a crisis. I say this only so you will distinguish between appearances and reality. We will not permit a strategic gain for Soviet power. We will attempt to reduce Soviet power where we can. We do not, however . . . At the same time we go through many stages which create either diplomatic obstacles to the extension of Soviet power or psychological and political obstacles against Soviet military action. We do not intend to create a condominium with the Soviet Union, because such a policy—by removing all obstacles to Soviet expansion—would eventually, with certainty, turn against us.

So events of this past year fitted this pattern. We have made a number of agreements with the Soviet Union on limiting arms competition to some extent, and certain technical cooperation on specific subjects. But this has enabled us, at the same time, to prevent any further extension of Soviet power. If we were in a position of open confrontation with the Soviet Union it would create the domestic situation I have described. And in addition, in each European country, the European left would be able to polarize the political spectrum by labeling us as the source of world tensions. Our present policy forces the Communist parties of Italy and France to support NATO, and [this is] despite their domestic battles on purely domestic issues.

We will have a separate session, I suppose, in which we can go into greater detail on the recent discussions in Vladivostok, than I can now in a general review. On that occasion I will give you the exact figures that were agreed upon. But you know now that the Soviet Union agreed upon equal numbers without counting our overseas based systems, which means in effect that we have a substantial advantage. And, in addition, we will have a very substantial advantage in warheads for

the entire period of the agreement. I will explain this when I go through the figures with you.

So we believe the agreement in Vladivostok demonstrates the Soviet Union is not as strong as it sometimes pretends, or they would not have agreed to that—at least vis-à-vis us. Perhaps during our discussions we can set aside an hour for detailed discussion of the Soviet situation.

In other parts of the world, our relations with Western Europe have substantially improved since I was last here. Relations between France and the United States are much better, and the discussions of last year have resulted in greater cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance along the lines we pointed out [to you in previous discussions].

In the Middle East, since I was here last year we have brought about two agreements, between Egypt and Israel and between Syria and Israel. Let me explain our Middle East strategy to you: The Soviet Union attempts to produce a comprehensive solution rapidly. And every time I see your ally Gromyko he gives me a list of 10 principles, 20 main points, 40 points, 160 sub-sub paragraphs which he would like me to agree to. [Laughter] There is only one thing wrong with their proposals—the United States has to do all the work, and the Soviet Union will get all the advantages. That we are not prepared to do.

For us, quite candidly, the problem of Israel is an issue which has profound domestic consequences. If we do not behave carefully, we can produce a situation within the United States in which a very serious domestic problem is created in the Middle East which will affect our overall foreign policy. And this China should keep in mind as well. So we have to divide the problem into parts, each of which can be handled separately, and each of which can be managed domestically. And this is why we are proceeding step by step.

[Teng bends over and spits loudly into his spittoon.]

Our press, which has a great desire to see American setbacks, is always seeing stalemates. The fact of the matter is we are now proceeding by methods different from the spectacular methods of last year. We are now proceeding by the methods of the Vietnamese negotiations and our early contact with you, and we are confident we can produce another step within the next 3 or 4 months. But we would like to have it culminate a little closer to Mr. Brezhnev's visit to Egypt, so they'll have something to celebrate when he comes there. So those negotiations are going on quietly. And we are announcing today that the Israeli Foreign Minister is coming to Washington next week and you should assume this will be an integral part of our approach.

With respect to the Palestinians, this is an issue on which the last word has not yet been spoken. We would have preferred it if negotiations had taken place between King Hussein and Israel, and then subsequent negotiations between the Palestinians and Hussein.

T'ang: First between Hussein and Israel?

Kissinger: Yes, [negotiations] which could have restored the West Bank to Arab control, and then with the ultimate disposition settled between the Palestinians and Hussein.

Teng: You mean by returning the West Bank to the Arabs, returning it to Jordan?

Kissinger: Our idea, specifically, was—and it is a tragedy—we had achieved agreement that the West Bank, or a substantial part of the West Bank, with two-thirds of the population, would go technically to Jordan, but under U.N. supervision, so we would have been in a position to have discussions in the U.N. in another year or so as to the ultimate disposition. From this point of view, the Rabat decision was premature.

Now we need a period on this issue of some moderation and cooling off, to allow both sides to adjust to the new circumstances.

It is, in any event, important to keep the following in mind: The Arabs cannot win a war in the next 5 years. Historically they may be stronger, but in the short term they are certainly not the stronger. Therefore, any political progress has to come through the United States. There is no other way. The only interest we have in the political process is that it appear that our decisions are made at our own free will. If we are pressed [by the Arabs] we will resist long enough to demonstrate that pressure cannot possibly succeed. And if we are pressed by the Soviet Union, we will simply do nothing and we will tell the Soviet Union to produce progress.

I think President Asad, whom I like very much, visited you last year.

Teng: No, it was their Vice President, Shafei. Asad or Sadat?

Kissinger: Asad.

Ch'iao: He didn't come here. He went to North Korea.

Kissinger: Oh!

Ch'iao: He didn't come from the South.

Kissinger: I think you would like him. He gets many arms from the Soviet Union, but he is a realist. At any rate, I mention him only because even he has understood that under conditions of pressure the United States diplomacy will not operate. And he has now agreed to the extension of the United Nations forces in Syria, and we are going to ask Austria to introduce a resolution which he has worked out with us, and which, for your information, Israel has already accepted. So, we hope you will not veto it. [Laughter]

This isn't known yet. We have negotiated it for the last week with Syria. I don't think the Soviet Union knows about it yet. They made very many threatening statements about Syria in Vladivostok.

I mention it only to indicate that even good friends of the Soviet Union in the Arab world have to understand our policy.

Our policy is to produce progress that returns Arab territory to Arab control, but gradually at a pace that doesn't produce paralysis of our foreign policy because of the domestic reaction. And we will not do it under Soviet pressure at all.

Eventually, there will be a return to the Geneva Conference, but that will produce a certain stalemate.

In the area of Iran, I think things have gone approximately as we foresaw.

Teng: May I insert a question here?

Kissinger: Certainly.

Teng: Have you decided with the Soviet Union when the Geneva Conference will be convened?

Kissinger: No.

Teng: I think the Soviet Union thinks it should be quicker and they will be attending.

Kissinger: Yes, we spent 4 months preparing for it, and then it met one day, after which we closed it. [Laughter] The Soviet Union always urges us to hold it. Eventually, it will have to take place. I don't think it can possibly be before March.

As long as the Arabs think they are making progress outside the Conference, they will be in no hurry to get there. No one wants it except the Soviet Union. They have an Ambassador in Geneva, Vinogradov, who spends all his time waiting for a conference that doesn't take place. We occasionally send Ambassador Bunker once every two months to keep him company there doing nothing. But we have not agreed on a resumption date. The earliest I could foresee would be March—unless there is a total breakdown in the secret discussions now going on between Egypt and Israel and the other Arab countries and Israel through us. And I don't foresee such a breakdown.

On Iran, as I have said, things have developed in the direction of my discussions with Chairman Mao and the Prime Minister last year.

[Refreshments are brought in]

I was getting worried. No food was coming in for 20 minutes. [Laughter] I didn't see how I was going to live through it. [Laughter] [to Rumsfeld] See, I have gained 5 pounds here on every visit.

We can discuss that in great detail too. I mean about Iran, not about food. [Laughter]

In other parts of the world: I took a trip to India, as you know, As I explained to your Ambassador, my primary purpose was contributing giving India another opening except [besides] total reliance on the Soviet Union. Our assessment is India's intentions in Southeast Asia

are hegemonial, and that they would like to reduce all neighboring countries to the status of Bhutan, and that we are not prepared to accept.

Ch'iao: May I insert something here? As I recall it, the Doctor made a speech to some scholarly association in which he said about the leading position of India on the sub-continent.

Kissinger: No, I said that India, as the strongest country on the subcontinent had a special obligation for restraint. And the intention was to point out the necessity for restraint. At any rate, we intend during the first half of next year to resume some cash arms sales to Pakistan which will restore some relationship. I will probably have to shoot half of Mr. Lord's staff before we can execute this.

But that is the direction in which we are moving. We have invited Prime Minister Bhutto to Washington, and within a few months after that we will do it.

Now, two events that have happened since last year that we did not discuss are the internationalization of the problem of energy, and the problem of food.

We are prepared in principle to discuss these issues with you, and to explain our views to you. They are areas in which we know you are sensitive to some statements that have been made by us. We are not indifferent to cannons that are fired at us with respect to these issues. And I think we should attempt to avoid unnecessary confrontations, because we have to solve the energy problem, not for ourselves, but because if it continues in its present form it will lead to the political disintegration of Western Europe. We can solve it for ourselves easily—relatively easily. And this cannot be a matter of indifference to the People's Republic. It has for us nothing to do with the Third World against the industrialized world, and we don't think it should be approached from a strictly theoretical point of view. But while I am here I am prepared to discuss it in greater detail.

So this is the general situation. I have spoken for 50 minutes, which is what doctors do. I would propose, as we continue our discussions—in addition to normalization, we could pick an area for discussion in greater detail—the Soviet Union, the Middle East.

There is another issue which I leave it up to the Chinese side whether it wishes to discuss, and that is the problem of Cambodia. We don't insist on discussing it. I have the impression that whenever it is raised it creates a degree of irritation on the Chinese side, which is uncharacteristic—and in addition to being uncharacteristic is out of proportion to the intrinsic importance of the subject being raised. From this I conclude the Chinese side considers us more than usually stupid on the issue of Cambodia. [Laughter] And that you must have the impression we are missing some point that should be perfectly obvious. So I thought, if you want to, we could give you our analysis.

Because in one respect we are really not in disagreement. We are not opposed to Sihanouk. We have no interest in Sihanouk returning to Cambodia as a figurehead for Hanoi. But we would have no objection to him if he could head a truly independent government. And if you want to, we could have an exchange of views on this subject—if you promise me not to get irritated.

Ch'iao: I don't think we have ever become irritated.

Kissinger: No, not personally. No, we understand your interest in Sihanouk and we are prepared to discuss it.

So this is the international scene as we see it, quickly. And then in our subsequent discussions we will go into more detail on each area.

[They confer]

Teng: Yes, it seems we don't have very much common language when it comes to the question of agriculture and energy. But we can exchange views.

Kissinger: I actually think we should have some common interests.

Teng: As for China itself, the food problem and energy problem do not exist for us, in that sense.

As for the Cambodian issues, I think you should be clear about our views, that is, both Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and the resistance forces within the country are neither puppets of Hanoi nor puppets of China as some people say. Figureheads.

Kissinger: We agree they aren't figureheads of China.

Teng: Nor of Hanoi.

Kissinger: That we are not sure of.

Teng: We can assure you. They are entirely figureheads for the independence of their own country and nation. Actually why does the United States have to get itself involved in this issue? Because from the beginning it was their own problem. Let them solve their own problem.

Kissinger: The United States is already involved in the issue. It can't make the decision whether to get involved.

Teng: Since you have the power to decide whether to get involved, you also have the power to decide not to be involved.

Kissinger: That may be partly true, but for the U.S. to simply abandon people with whom we have been working has a larger significance and it is not a habit we should acquire lightly.

Teng: It should also be true to say you have worked with Sihanouk for an even longer period of time.

Kissinger: We don't exclude Sihanouk. We think we should find a formula for a negotiation to get started, the outcome of which would, in all probability be Sihanouk.

Teng: On this issue you would know we support Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and the resistance forces within the country and we support their position. And to put it frankly, we think if the United States is to place its hopes on Lon Nol or on any force you think would replace Lon Nol, that is not reliable.

Kissinger: We think it is possible to produce a negotiation, at the end of which Sihanouk could quite possibly emerge as the controlling factor. We think it is in his own interest not to be totally dependent on one force. He should have many forces, factors to play with.

Teng: That is your idea.

Kissinger: It is our idea that it is possible to achieve a solution in Cambodia in which Sihanouk could emerge as the dominant force, yes.

Teng: As you wanted to discuss this specifically, we can.

Kissinger: All right.

Teng: But I think that is all for this morning.

Kissinger: That is probably right.

Teng: How should we proceed this afternoon?

Kissinger: It is up to you. We have not discussed normalization and we are prepared.

Teng: Perhaps we will invite you this afternoon to discuss what you didn't finish: bilateral relations and normalization. Because we will only have half an hour this afternoon. Tomorrow morning we can continue with our views.

Kissinger: That will be fine. That will be important.

Teng: 3:30 p.m. this afternoon.

Kissinger: At the Guest House?

Teng: Yes. It might be more convenient for you.

Kissinger: It is very courteous.

Teng: The same people?

Kissinger: The same numbers. I will probably add Mr. Gleysteen and drop somebody else.

Teng: That is your decision.

Kissinger: But the same numbers.

Teng: An agreement on quantity and not quality! [Laughter]

[The meeting ended]

94. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, November 26, 1974, 3:45–5:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung, PRC Vice Foreign Minister
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office, Washington
Lin P'ing, Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tsien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRC Liaison Office, Washington
Ting Yuan-hung, Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chang Han-chih, Translator
Notetaker

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Ambassador George Bush, Chief of the United States Liaison Office, Peking
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Peter Rodman, Staff Member, National Security Council
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
Karlene Knieps, Notetaker

SUBJECT

Normalization

Secretary Kissinger: They outnumber us today.

Vice Premier Teng: Some more on our side are coming. I don't think you will ever outnumber us because we have 800 million.

Secretary Kissinger: My children and my wife very much appreciated the tour of the Forbidden City this morning. It was very nice.

Vice Premier Teng: Did they like it at all?

Secretary Kissinger: Very much.

Vice Premier Teng: How is the health of your wife? I hope it is better.

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, November 25–29, 1974, Kissinger's Trip. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. All brackets are in the original.

Secretary Kissinger: It is much better.

Vice Premier Teng: If you need any medical help you just let us know.

Secretary Kissinger: You are very nice. She is going to watch acupuncture.

Vice Premier Teng: Well that medical technique of China is almost as old as the Great Wall of China. A few hundred years later than the Great Wall. It was created at the time of the Han Dynasty.

Secretary Kissinger: On one trip I brought a doctor along who was very skeptical of it and after he saw it he was very impressed.

Vice Premier Teng: It goes as far back as about two hundred years after Christ. During the time of the three kingdoms. It was during that time people were able to have an operation with acupuncture.

Secretary Kissinger: It is interesting to reflect how it could have been invented. Because as I understand it, to this day nobody understands the theory, why it works, just that it works.

Vice Premier Teng: I think mainly it was through practice.

Secretary Kissinger: Who got the first idea to stick a needle into somebody?

Vice Premier Teng: It was combined with the use of herb medicine.

Secretary Kissinger: Who would have thought if you stick a needle into somebody it would help him? No other civilization thought about that.

Vice Premier Teng: Shall we come back to our subject? We will listen to the Doctor. All right?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me discuss the subject of normalization. I understand that Mr. Habib has already had a talk on the bilateral relations.[2]

I am confident that our side can keep multiplying the complexities as long as your side can. It is something we are very good at.

Let me speak about the normalization problem.

When we met the first time, in our first two meetings [in 1971] we discussed completing the process during the second term of President Nixon.

We said that we would reduce our military forces on Taiwan, and we repeated that in the Shanghai Communiqué. We said we would not support any two Chinas solution, or a one China–one Taiwan solution, or any variation.

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[2] A memorandum of conversation of this counterpart discussion, which took place on November 26, 2–3:15 p.m., is ibid.

And we would not encourage other countries to pursue such a policy.

We have substantially maintained these commitments.

We have reduced our forces on Taiwan from over 10,000 to about 3,200 today. We encouraged the Japanese movement towards the People's Republic. This is in fact why you can speak of a Japanese solution. We have given no encouragement to a two Chinas or one China–one Taiwan solution; quite the contrary.

Now the problem is how we can complete the process. I would like to divide it into a number of parts:

—There is the problem of the diplomatic status of Taiwan, and of course of the diplomatic relations between us.
—There is the problem of our military forces on Taiwan.
—And there is the problem of our defense commitment to Taiwan.

Our problem is different from the situation of Japan, or for that matter from the situation of any other country with which you have normalized relations, in two respects:

First, there is a formal defense relationship. Secondly, there is a rather substantial group in the United States that historically has been pro-Taiwan.

Together with your cooperation we have been able to neutralize the pro-Taiwan element in the United States by moving step-by-step in a very careful manner. But what we have to keep in mind for our common interest is to prevent Sino-American relations from becoming an extremely contentious issue in the United States.

It is not in your interest, or in that of the United States, to have emerge a Senator or Senatorial group which does to Sino-American relations what Senator Jackson has attempted to do to United States-Soviet relations.

I am speaking very frankly to you so that we understand each other exactly. After I have put my considerations before you, you will of course give me yours. Then we will see if we can solve the problem. I am here to remove obstacles, not to hide behind them.

We believe, as I have said, that while cannons have been fired—mostly in one direction—we have also had common fronts.

As the Premier said yesterday, they were mostly produced by the "polar bear."

We do not want to jeopardize that possibility [of developing common fronts with the PRC] given the dangers that may be ahead, and keeping in mind what Chairman Mao said to me last year of the two strands—normalization, and the international environment.

Now having said this, let me go back to the specific issues between us.

First, on the issue of the diplomatic status: We are prepared to solve this on substantially the Japan model; and with the one variation that it would be easiest for us if we could maintain a liaison office in Taiwan and an embassy in Peking. Except for that we would follow the Japan model.

With respect to the presence of [U.S.] troops on Taiwan, we are prepared to remove all our troops from Taiwan. We would like to agree with you on a schedule, a time-frame within which this will be accomplished—by which we would reduce the forces by half by the summer of 1976, and the remainder to be removed by the end of 1977.

Incidentally, what I am discussing is not something to which we want to agree—we can agree to it here, but it should not be announced until the end of 1975, the agreement we make. But we want to come to an understanding about it now, that this is what would happen.

Now that leaves the last problem, which is our defense relationship to Taiwan. And this is a problem to which, in all frankness, we have not come up with a good answer.

Our problem is this: on the face of it, it is of course absurd to say one has a defense arrangement with a part of a country one recognizes, that is, which belongs to that country.

Secondly, we obviously have no interest in maintaining a strategic base on Taiwan after we have established diplomatic relations with Peking and recognized Peking as the legal government of all China.

But as I told the Foreign Minister in New York, we need a formula that enables us to say that at least for some period of time there are assurances of peaceful reintegration which can be reviewed after some interval in order to avoid the difficulties which I have described.

If we can, this would mean that we would have accepted Peking as the [legal] government [of China]. We would have withdrawn our recognition from Taiwan, we would have broken diplomatic relations with Taiwan. We would have withdrawn our troops from Taiwan. All that would remain is that we would have some relation to peaceful reintegration.

Speaking here frankly and realistically, the political and psychological effect of breaking relations is that our defense relationship will be eroded by the act of recognition. But we need a transition period for our public opinion in which this process can be accomplished without an excessive domestic strain.

These are our basic considerations. If we agree on the principles, we can then see what formula can then be worked out.

Vice Premier Teng: Is that all?

Secretary Kissinger: This is the essence, yes.

Let me emphasize one point. To us the question of the defense commitment is primarily a question of the way it can be presented politically. It is not a question of maintaining it for an indefinite period of time.

Vice Premier Teng: Well, actually this law was formulated by yourselves. Is that so?

Secretary Kissinger: Which law?

Vice Premier Teng: You are the ones who make the law. That is, the law of that defense commitment you have with Taiwan. That was fixed by yourselves.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course. That is absolutely true.

Vice Premier Teng: Well, since you can formulate a law, naturally you can also do away with it.

Secretary Kissinger: That is also true. Our point is not that it could not be done. Our point is that for reasons I have explained to you, it is not expedient to do—well, the act of recognition in itself will change the nature of that arrangement because you cannot have a defense treaty with part of a country.

Vice Premier Teng: I have noticed the consideration which the Doctor has just mentioned. And I understand that all of these imaginations the Doctor has discussed with the Foreign Minister while he was in New York in October.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Vice Premier Teng: And I believe in principle the Foreign Minister gave you the answers on our side concerning the principal matters. In essence your imaginations—your considerations—cannot be considered as being in accord with the Japan model.

And we feel that in essence it is still a variation of one China and one Taiwan.

Secretary Kissinger: Why is that?

Vice Premier Teng: Well, this is primarily that you just reverse the position, change the position of the liaison office. The present situation is that we have established a liaison office in Peking—we have established our liaison office in Washington and you have established one in Peking. And you keep an embassy in Taiwan. This in itself indicates there has not been the necessary conditions for the normalization of relations.

In other words, if you change this order, that is, to have an embassy in Peking and a liaison office in Taiwan, it is not the way to correct the problem.

People will come to the conclusion that it is actually a variation of one China and one Taiwan. Therefore, we find it difficult to accept this formula.

And just now you touched upon the question of the defense treaty. That is, the defense treaty which you have with Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan. Of course, if we are to achieve the normalization of relations between our two countries and abide by the course set in the Shanghai Communiqué, then the treaty you have with Taiwan must be done away with.

The reasons actually have been given by the Doctor yourself just now.

Secretary Kissinger: The defense treaty can have no international status after the normalization of relations.

Vice Premier Teng: But still it has a substantial meaning.

So it appears that time is not ripe yet to solve this question, because according to your formula, it would not be possible for us to accept this method of normalization. It still looks as if you need Taiwan.

Secretary Kissinger: No, we do not need Taiwan. That is not the issue. I think that it is important to understand. That would be a mistake in understanding the problem.

What we would like to achieve is the disassociation from Taiwan in steps, in the manner we have done until now. There is no doubt that the status of Taiwan has been undermined by the process which we have followed. And this process would be rapidly accelerated by the ideas which we have advanced.

Vice Premier Teng: And the other question is the way [method] to solve the Taiwan problem. As for solving the Taiwan question, suppose you have broken diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Then the Taiwan question should be left with us Chinese to solve among ourselves.

As to what means we will [use to] solve the Taiwan question, I believe Chairman Mao Tse-tung made it very clear in his talk.

Secretary Kissinger: Chairman Mao, if I understood him correctly, made two statements: One was that he believed that the question would ultimately have to be solved by force. But he also stated that China could wait for one hundred years to bring this about, if I understood him correctly.

Vice Premier Teng: That was true. He did say that.

Of course, the number of "one hundred years" is a symbolic one.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, I understand this. I was going to say that in one hundred years I will not be Secretary of State. I have to say this occasionally to give some hope to my associates. I understood it was symbolic. I understand also that after normalization that any attributes of sovereignty in the relationship between Taiwan and the U.S. have to be eliminated.

Vice Premier Teng: Chairman Mao Tse-tung made it very clear that the solving of the Taiwan problem is an internal affair of China, and should be left to the Chinese to solve.

Just now Dr. Kissinger said that on the Taiwan issue you wish to have a peaceful reintegration.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Vice Premier Teng: And I believe you mentioned something like a wish of the U.S. in having some part in this guarantee relationship.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me explain what is our concern. We have not worked out a legal formula. We believe that it is—what I am saying is capable of misinterpretation. Let me explain our position exactly.

When I came here in 1971, it was clear that we were starting a process that would lead to the gradual erosion of the position of Taiwan.

You would certainly not have been admitted to the United Nations in 1971—eventually it would have happened, but not in 1971. It would have taken longer. And the normalization with Japan would not have been accomplished so soon. We fully cooperated in this, and we established principles that sooner or later have been implemented. And we did this in all seriousness.

You know we have made no effort with any country to keep them from establishing relations with you and breaking them with Taiwan.

The problem we have is the impact internationally of a sudden total reversal of an American position on other friendly countries, and even perhaps on countries that are not friendly to either of us.

Vice Premier Teng: But on the other hand, if we agree to your formula we will also be creating an impact internationally that we have agreed to the formula of one China–one Taiwan.

Secretary Kissinger: No, we will work to make it clear that it is not this type of situation. We will not now accept a solution which we have both rejected.

We have, it seems to me, two basic choices. There are two roads we can now follow: We can continue the present process, which is tolerable, and gradually withdraw our forces from Taiwan, which will continue in any event—whatever you decide here. We will increase our relationship with you as we have done in the past three years, and wait for the opportune time to complete the process with one decision.

Or, we can do a process in which we complete the political part of our relationship quickly and make it clear that we are solving the issues of sovereignty—of one China and one Taiwan—at once, and find a formula in which the symbolic thought of Chairman Mao is expressed. An effort of peaceful reintegration over a reasonable period of time.

We do not want a voice in the discussion on peaceful reintegration. That should be left to the Chinese. We do not want to participate in that process.

Chang Han-chih: I'm not clear about the first part of your statement.

Secretary Kissinger: The Vice Premier said that of course the one hundred years is symbolic. I understood the symbolic nature of Chairman Mao's statement about a hundred years. I understood it to mean that you are willing to give the peaceful process time to work—that while philosophically the resolution will probably come about by force, you are prepared to give the peaceful road a long opportunity.

We do not want to participate in the process of reintegration. And we have no difficulty affirming the principle of one China. So our issue is not one China, one Taiwan.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: If I understand correctly, I see what you mean is that you are for one China, but the one China you want is a one China which is achieved through peaceful means.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly. For at least a reasonable period of time. We want to avoid a situation where the United States signs a document which leads to a military solution shortly after normalization. But we do not want a commitment which maintains the separation. What we have in mind—we may not know the formula, but what we have in mind seems compatible with what Chairman Mao says in terms of the process.

Vice Premier Teng: We have just now checked on what Chairman Mao exactly said when he talked with Doctor, and we understand what he said is, "I don't think the normalization of relations between China and the United States will take one hundred years." So from this we understand that it does not mean that from what Chairman Mao says, that we do not wish to complete a process of the normalization as quickly as possible.

I think concerning the Taiwan question that at the same time it is also a question of the normalization of relations between China and the United States.

There are three principles to which we cannot give other consideration, which we cannot barter away. The first principle is that we insist—that we should insist on the Shanghai Communiqué. That is, we refuse any method which will lead to the solution of "two Chinas," or "one China, one Taiwan," or any variation of these two.

The idea of setting up an embassy here in Peking and a liaison office in Taiwan is a variation on "one China–one Taiwan," which we cannot accept.

The second principle is that the solution of the Taiwan question is an internal issue of the Chinese people, and it can only be left to the

Chinese people themselves to solve. As to what means we will use to finally solve the Taiwan question—whether peaceful methods or non-peaceful methods—it is a matter, an internal affair, which should be left to the Chinese people to decide.

The third point, which is also a principle to us, is that we do not admit that there can be another country which will take part in the solution of the Taiwan question, including the United States.

So it looks as if there is quite a distance between our two sides concerning this question. As I said just now, it appears that you still need Taiwan. If you still need Taiwan we can wait. We can wait until the time is more ripe for the solution of the question.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me comment on the three points. Then let me say one other thing.

Vice Premier Teng: We were checking with the records we have about what Chairman Mao said last year and we feel our understanding is correct. What Chairman Mao said last year is that we should separate the two things, that is, the relations between the United States and us and the relations between Taiwan and the United States. These two things should be separate.

Then the Chairman went on to say that if you break your diplomatic relations with Taiwan, then it will be possible to solve the issue of diplomatic relations. That is to say, like what we did with Japan. We understand that refers to the Japan model.

And then the Chairman went on to say that, as for the relation between Taiwan and us, we do not believe in peaceful transition.

Then the Chairman said we can do without Taiwan—we can wait for one hundred years to solve the problem. And the Chairman also said, "As for the relation between you and us, I do not think that will take one hundred years to solve."

I think from this conversation the meaning is clear.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. This is exactly my recollection of the conversation. From this I also made certain deductions, produced by my brain which is somewhat slower than that of the Chinese. I have never had a Chinese contradict me on my statement (laughter).

I remember once Prime Minister Chou En-lai made the comment that I was intelligent, and I said by Chinese standards you mean I am of medium intelligence. He did not contradict me either (laughter).

But let me say what I deduce from this conversation; because my understanding is exactly the same as what the Vice Premier has said.

I deduce from it that the precondition for normalization of relations is breaking diplomatic relations with Taiwan. That we are prepared to do. And I believe we can find a mutually satisfactory formula for this.

The second conclusion I draw from the statement of the Chairman was he believes diplomatic relations could be established, and after that there might be a time interval until the real integration [of Taiwan into the PRC] is complete—in his perspective of history.

Now of the three principles you have mentioned, Mr. Vice Premier, the first is, in our judgment, no problem. We will work out a solution that leaves no doubt there is no "one China–one Taiwan." This is a soluble problem—much easier than many other problems we have solved before.

Vice Premier Teng: But it won't do if you establish a liaison office in Taiwan, or for that matter a consulate.

Secretary Kissinger: I still believe this is a problem to which we can find a solution. I see the Ambassador [Huang Chen] has a very proprietary interest in the concept of a liaison office. He is the head of the only liaison office in the world which is headed by a Chinese Ambassador.

Huang Chen: My understanding about the nature of a liaison office is according to the ideas which Chairman Mao gave—the nature of a liaison office.

Secretary Kissinger: I repeat, I believe we can find a solution to the first problem. Although we are not now in a detailed consultation. I believe we can find a solution to it.

The second question: We do not wish to participate in any way in the process of reintegration, or in the process of realization of reintegration.

The third problem is the one I have put to you: How we can avoid the impression that we have simply jettisoned people with whom we have been associated without giving—as in the passage you read to me, how we can have a period of time to give this process a chance to work.

Namely, that diplomatic relations can be established before the process of reintegration is completed—how this can be expressed in our agreement. This is the serious question.

It seems to me we have two roads we can take, and we are prepared to take either.

One road is that we, the United States, proceed unilaterally to reduce its standing on Taiwan, the way we have been doing. We will do this by withdrawing troops. And at the appropriate time before 1976 [reducing] the seniority of our diplomatic representation.

The other is that we begin a negotiation on the three points which we have discussed here. I do not believe our differences need be insurmountable.

Vice Premier Teng: I believe we can continue our discussion on this issue. I do not think we have too much time this afternoon for the

question. It looks as if probably it is difficult for both sides to reach any agreement on this visit of yours.

We have another consideration about the relations between our two countries. That is, as I have said before, some people have been saying the relations between our two countries have been cooling down. The Chinese Government is therefore extending an invitation to you. That is to say, the Chinese Government wishes to extend a formal invitation to the Secretary of Defense of the United States, Mr. Schlesinger, to visit China. We think this would be a good answer to all these opinions which are going on in the world.

Secretary Kissinger: It will produce a Politburo meeting in the Kremlin.

Vice Premier Teng: We don't mind. Well, actually, it is our wish that they have a Politburo meeting there. But we really extend this invitation with all seriousness.

Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate this, and let me think about it. Let me say, however, one thing in principle. We believe from our side it is highly desirable to show that our relationship has not chilled and that we should continue to show not only that it has not chilled but that it is continuing to improve. And whatever the decision on this particular invitation, I am certain we can between us find methods of showing a substantial improvement in our relationship.

Vice Premier Teng: We will be waiting for your answer then—from your government.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We understand Mr. Bush is going to give a reception this afternoon.

Ambassador Bush: My wife has spent most of her time waiting, so don't worry about that.

Vice Premier Teng: We suggest 9:00 tomorrow morning [for the next meeting].

Secretary Kissinger: I suggest that at the beginning, for perhaps one-half hour, we have a very small group. On your side it is up to you. I will bring only three people, including me. You can have as many as you want.

Vice Premier Teng: We shall decide the number of our participants according to the percentage of our whole population (laughter).

Secretary Kissinger: In relation to ours! So you will have 12. It will not take very long.

95. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, November 27, 1974, 9:45–11:32 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Amb. Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office, Washington, D.C.
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs
Lien Cheng-pao (Notetaker)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. George Bush, Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office, Peking
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Bonnie Andrews, Secretary's Office (Notetaker)

SUBJECT

President's Visit; Nuclear War; SALT; Yugoslavia

Kissinger: When the Foreign Minister spoke at the United Nations,[2] his most violent attacks were not understood by most Americans.

Teng: You mean including the interpreters?

Kissinger: Oh no, they understood.

Teng: Oh yes. And before I forget, the Marshal [Yeh Chien-ying] asked yesterday evening that I send greetings to the Doctor and his wife.

Kissinger: I appreciate that very much; he is an old friend.

Teng: And he also asked me to say that because of his busy schedule, he will not be able to meet with you. I think he has met you several times.

Kissinger: I understand. He greeted me on my first visit.

Teng: Actually, on our side, he is the Minister of National Defense and Chief of the General Staff. And that is why he is very happy that our government has extended the invitation to your Secretary of Defense.

Kissinger: Yes. I wondered if that meant he would speak only to the Secretary of Defense and not to the Secretary of State.

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, November 25–29, 1974, Kissinger's Trip. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at Guest House 18. All brackets are in the original.

[2] Kissinger is likely referring to Qiao's October 2 speech at the United Nations; see footnote 2, Document 87.

Teng: I don't think it means that. It means that the U.S. Secretary of Defense is invited to Peking and in that event I don't think it would be very easy for people to say that our relations have become even more cold.

Kissinger: That's true. Let me make a few observations if I may. First, we agree on the desirability of demonstrating not only that our relations have not become colder, but in fact our relations are becoming warmer. We think that is in the interest of both of our countries. And we are prepared to do this not only symbolically, but substantively.

Now, in the security field, I had some discussions with the Prime Minister on my last evening here last time and I want you to know that those principles we still maintain.[3]

Now, about the invitation of the Secretary of Defense. This presents us with a problem. The Soviet leaders have repeatedly invited our Secretary of Defense to Moscow and have asked for a reciprocal exchange of visits between our Secretary of Defense and their Minister of Defense. And we have consistently refused. And then they proposed meetings of military commanders in Europe, and we have turned that down too. So if we begin using our Secretary of Defense for diplomatic travels, he will begin going to places that I don't believe are desirable.

But we have two possibilities. First, we would approve a visit by any other Cabinet member to Peking. And secondly, I believe also that we could consider an invitation to President Ford if that were considered desirable. So it is not a lack of interest in demonstrating a close relationship.

Teng: So, as the Doctor just now mentioned this, if President Ford desires a possibility to come to China, we would welcome him.

Kissinger: I suppose we could envisage it for the second half of next year. Or, what are your ideas?

Teng: Anytime would be all right for us.

Kissinger: We don't have to fix an exact date. When I was here the first time, we did not fix a date—only a certain time period.

Teng: It can be decided upon on a different time.

Kissinger: Let us agree then in 1975.

Teng: I think that is all right.

Kissinger: And I think that would be an important event.

Teng: So then we can later on go into specific dates, because we don't have to settle now.

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[3] On November 13, 1973, Zhou and Kissinger discussed policies for dealing with the Soviet Union. See Document 59.

Kissinger: We don't have to settle now. What is your idea? Should we announce the invitation and acceptance at the end of my visit?

Teng: What would you think?

Kissinger: I think it's a good idea. We should have a communiqué at the end of my visit—which we would perhaps publish Saturday or Sunday[4]—in which we should announce this, yes.

Teng: So then we will consider the announcement and communiqué and discuss it with you later.

Kissinger: I think there is an advantage to relating it to my visit here. When it should be published—Saturday or Monday—we are open-minded. Or later even.

Teng: So we will leave it to the Foreign Minister to work out the wording of the announcement with you.

Kissinger: Must I work it out with him? We spent a week one time. He is a very tough negotiator. It will be a great pleasure.

Teng: You are both philosophers.

Ch'iao: But we two must quarrel each time we meet because we belong to two different schools of philosophy.

Kissinger: That is true. But they are related.

Ch'iao: Both linked and related.

Kissinger: Like our relationship.

Teng: But you don't have to go into such length at these meetings. Just have some more mao tai. [Laughter]

Kissinger: OK. The Foreign Minister and I will discuss what should be said in the communiqué.

Teng: It should be like a press communiqué.

Ch'iao: Brief; not long, taking two weeks.

Kissinger: Yes, one page. Not like the Shanghai Communiqué.

Teng: I don't think we have anything else very much now to say.

Kissinger: You mean in the communiqué. We could reaffirm a few general principles and then make the basic announcement.

Teng: I'll leave it to you to quarrel about.

Kissinger: We could do it in German!

Teng: They say that is a very difficult language to read.

Kissinger: Yes. In German you know a man is on the stairs. But it may take two pages to know if he is going up or down. [Laughter]

Teng: And about the invitation to the Secretary of Defense. We request that your government continue to consider the invitation.

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[4] November 30 or December 1.

Kissinger: Maybe after the President visits we can arrange this. But we are prepared to do similar things in that area. If you are concerned about concrete things, we are prepared to do them.

Teng: Actually our invitation to your Secretary of Defense isn't mainly to discuss any specific issues. The meaning is in the invitation itself.

Kissinger: We understand.

Teng: As for the discussions of problems, it is probably still up to the Doctor and the President.

Kissinger: The last time we were here, we had to arrange a whole set of negotiations of extreme delicacy—that will not be necessary this time—between your Foreign Minister and ours. We will consider the invitation to our Secretary of Defense and if we can both determine the right moment to do it, we will certainly do it. We will be glad if there is any other Cabinet member you think would be desirable to have here. We can arrange it very quickly. But it is entirely up to you.

Teng: So this request is still for the consideration of your government.

Kissinger: Yes, and we will keep it between your Ambassador and me. That is on the assumption that he comes back soon.

Now, I wanted to tell you one other thing that I have already mentioned to your Ambassador for your information: When I was in Moscow in October, Brezhnev made a proposal for a new treaty to us and repeated it in more detail to President Ford in Vladivostok. And it is a rather novel and ingenious proposition. The proposal is as follows: The U.S. and Soviet Union should make a treaty with each other in which they will defend each other against any attack by any other country or they will defend each other's allies against nuclear attack from any other country.

[Meeting temporarily interrupted by Chinese girl opening outer door.]

Kissinger: I have people in the other room but they will join us for the later discussion.

Translator: They must be able to hear me because of my loud voice.

Kissinger: We asked for a practical explanation of how this would operate. The practical explanation is that in any use of nuclear weapons, regardless of who initiates it, in a war between the Soviet Union and another country or between the U.S. and another country, or between an ally of each, then the U.S. and Soviet Union would have to help each other, and if physical help is not possible, then they would have to observe benevolent neutrality.

We think it has two, well three, general purposes. The first is to undermine NATO, because it would specifically oblige us to cooperate with

the Soviet Union against our allies if nuclear weapons were involved. Secondly, it would force those Arabs who are afraid of nuclear weapons being used by Israel into an alliance relationship with the Soviet Union. And third, I think, China. Those seemed to us the three purposes, together with the general impression of condominium.

We did not accept a serious discussion of this proposal. Nor will we.

Ch'iao: Actually your treaty on preventing nuclear war could be interpreted in this way also.

Kissinger: No, absolutely not.

Teng: Because your consultations know no bounds.

Kissinger: First of all, that treaty has never been invoked. We have used that treaty and intend to use it to get a legal basis for resistance in areas that are not covered by treaty obligations. The only time that treaty has been used was by the U.S. during the October alert.

Secondly, that treaty deliberately says that to prevent nuclear war, one has to avoid conventional war. And, therefore, by the reverse, to resort to conventional war involves the danger of retaliation by nuclear war. The new Soviet proposal separates nuclear war. It makes no distinction about who uses the weapons first, and it is directed at a kind of nuclear condominium.

In the October alert, we warned the Soviet Union that if they used force in the Middle East it would be in violation of Article 2 of the Treaty on Prevention of Nuclear War, which says that the use of conventional weapons implies the risk of nuclear weapons, and we used it as a warning to the Soviet Union.

But I agree with the Foreign Minister that the Soviet intention in their draft to us on the Treaty to Prevent Nuclear War was to achieve what they are now proposing in this new treaty.

Teng: Their goals and purposes have been constant all along.

Kissinger: And their diplomacy clumsy and obvious.

Teng: But their purpose is also very clear. And their goals are clear. And we think their purposes can only be these: First of all, to utilize the signing of such an agreement with you to develop their own nuclear weapons to standards either equivalent to yours or surpassing yours. And the reason they are expressing such interest in signing such an agreement naturally shows that they have tasted a sweet taste out of such agreements. If I recall things correctly, you signed your first treaty pertaining to nuclear matters in July 1963. At that time I was in Moscow carrying on negotiations between our two parties, and on the very day I was leaving you signed that treaty.

Kissinger: We were not informed about all your movements at the time. [Laughter]

Teng: And it must be said that at that time the level of Soviet weapons was lagging a considerable distance behind yours. But in the eleven years since, I must say they have been able to reach a level about the same as yours.

Kissinger: That is not exactly correct, and I will explain that to you. It is inevitable that a large industrial power will increase the numbers of its nuclear weapons. And it is the characteristic of nuclear weapons because of their destructiveness that beyond a certain point superiority is not as effective as in conventional weapons.

But in numbers, diversity, accuracy and flexibility, our nuclear weapons will be considerably superior to the Soviet Union for the whole period of the arrangement which we signed in Vladivostok. And I will explain that to you if you want, or some other time while I am here. That is true both in numbers and characteristics.

Ch'iao: I would like to add a few words if possible. We thank the Doctor for telling us of Soviet intentions, but as we have said many times, we do not attach such great importance to such treaties. We still have a treaty with the Soviet Union that has not been outdated yet and now they have now proposed to us a new treaty for mutual non-aggression. Of course, how we will deal with this new treaty will have to be seen. But on the whole, we do not attach such great importance to such matters. And the decisive fact is not any treaty but a policy, the principles and the lines.

Teng: But I haven't finished now. I have only mentioned the first goal of the Soviet Union. The second is, as Dr. Kissinger mentioned, to try to divide the U.S. from its allies, which you have discovered or perceived. But it seems that although you have revealed this point, they will never give up this goal, whether in the past, present or future. And the third purpose will be to maintain the monopolistic status of your two countries in the field of nuclear weapons.

And they will try to use this point not only to compare with your country but also intimidate countries with only a few nuclear weapons and thus reach their aim of hegemony.

So our overall view of such treaties is that we attach importance to their political significance, and as always our attitude toward such matters is that we believe they are not of much consequence, and we are not bound by any such treaty or agreement. And as the Doctor has repeated many times, your aim is not to bind others either.

Kissinger: In every meeting with the Soviet Union in discussing proposals directed against China such as nuclear testing and nuclear proliferation, we have always avoided formulations whose purpose is directed against third countries.

Teng: But even if they were so, even if they succeeded, what role would those treaties play? They would not be able to play much of a

role. And if they signed such agreements, they would still be waving their baton, and if they don't sign they would still have nuclear weapons. As for our nuclear weapons, as Chairman Mao says, they are only so much [gesturing with fingers].

Kissinger: We have never discussed nuclear weapons with you from our side.

Teng: That is right.

Kissinger: We inform you of Soviet overtures not because you should pay attention but because if they should ever tell you, you will know what is happening. And also we have an understanding with you not to do anything with the Soviet Union without informing you. And so we inform you of things with them whether you attach significance to them or not. And we are not asking you to do anything about it.

There is one other matter that came up in Vladivostok that I wanted to mention to you. The Soviet proposed to us to have consultations on Japanese-Chinese relations and to prevent them from becoming too close. We have refused this, and we have told the Japanese in a general way about this, and have told the Japanese about our refusal.

Teng: So from this too we can see the aims of the Soviet Union. You know, their Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, has a characteristic of which we were told by Khrushchev in 1957 when Chairman Mao went to Moscow. Khrushchev introduced Gromyko to us, and he told us that Gromyko had a lot of things in his pocket. And Khrushchev told us that this fellow Gromyko could produce this formula today, and tomorrow, and he has so many things he can produce that that is his major trait—that was Khrushchev's introduction to Gromyko. And it seems that Brezhnev has learned that trait from Gromyko and has a lot of things in his pocket too.

As for our dealings with the Soviet Union, we do not rely on our nuclear weapons. And we don't have very much skill other than digging tunnels and having rifles. As for your signing such agreements, we do not attach such great significance to them. Maybe we won't even comment.

Kissinger: That is entirely up to you. The agreements we sign have nothing to do with China except the one on preventing nuclear war which to us gives us legal possibilities. But the agreement, or the tentative one in Vladivostok, we consider very favorable in the overall strategic balance. It is up to you if you comment or not. It has nothing to do with the People's Republic of China.

Teng: I would like to raise a question. We have heard the Doctor say that the recent meeting and the recent signing of such an agreement was a great breakthrough. Was it really so? To be more specific—

how reliable can it be—how reliable are the prospects for ten years of détente and a cease of competition in the military field?

Kissinger: First of all, you have to understand that we have to fight on many fronts. And our domestic strategy is to isolate our left, if that is a proper thing to say in the People's Republic.

Teng: We like those on the right!

Kissinger: The ones on the right have no choice but to be with us anyway. The ones on the right are no problem with us.

Teng: Isn't Mr. Heath of Great Britain a well-known man on the right?

Kissinger: Oh, yes.

Teng: And wasn't Mr. Adenauer of your former father-land a well-known man of the right? And in France, De Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard, Tanaka, and Ohira are famous men on the right. We like this kind, comparatively speaking.

Kissinger: We send our leftists to Peking.

Bush: I don't think I understand that.

Kissinger: The Ambassador is a left-wing Republican. No, he is here because he has our total confidence.

But it is important in the U.S. to isolate and paralyze those who would undermine our defense program and who generally conduct what I consider a stupid policy. And we can do this by pursuing policies which adopt this rhetoric.

And to answer your question, I do not believe that this guarantees ten years of détente—not for one minute. But I do believe that if détente breaks down, or when it does, we will be better able to mobilize our public opinion having made every effort to preserve peace rather than being accused of having provoked them.

Teng: On our side we don't believe it is possible to reach détente—still less maintain ten years of détente. And we don't think there is any agreement that can bind the hands of Russia.

Kissinger: No, but there is no way they can violate this agreement without our knowing it. I don't think it was a very intelligent agreement for them. They have two choices: they can either respect the agreement, in which case we preserve a certain strategic advantage, or they can violate the agreement, in which case we have the psychological and political possibility of massive breakout ourselves, which we would not have otherwise for domestic reasons.

Teng: As we see it, it is still necessary to have vigilance.

Kissinger: There is no doubt about that for us.

Teng: That would be good.

Kissinger: I once studied the foreign policy of Metternich, and he said the trick to dealing with Napoleon was to seem to be a fool without

being one. There is no question—in terms of our domestic situation, it is, strangely enough easier to get Congress to give funds for limits in agreements than to get funds for the same amounts without an agreement. [To Bush:] Do you think so, George?

Bush: Yes, I do.

Teng: There is something else I would like to ask about your SALT agreement. Does it mean strategic arms? Does it apply only to nuclear arms?

Kissinger: Yes, and only those with an intercontinental range.

Teng: That means that only those strategic weapons are included, not others.

Kissinger: According to the definitions of the agreement.

Teng: But outside of that agreement, what is meant by strategic weapons? For example, conventional weapons have been considered strategic?

Kissinger: No.

Teng: Then we differ a bit here. Because here is the question of whether a future war would be a nuclear war.

Kissinger: What do you think?

Teng: We don't think so necessarily.

Kissinger: I agree. But I would like to say, as I said to the Chairman and Prime Minister, we would consider any sign of expansion of the Soviet sphere—either to the West or East, whether countries were covered by treaty or not, as a threat to our long-term security. It has nothing to do with our affection for the countries covered but strategic reality. Secondly, we don't care if that expansion comes with conventional or nuclear weapons.

Teng: You know there is a story, after Khrushchev came to Peking. He came to Peking in 1954, and he gave us this reasoning: During that visit, aside from boasting of his corn planting, he also boasted about the uselessness of naval vessels. He said that in the missile era naval vessels were nothing other than moving targets and they would be finished off at once. And the Soviet Union actually ceased to build their Navy for two or three years. But they very quickly rectified that. And since then, while energetically developing their nuclear weapons, they are at the same time continuing to build their conventional weapons and their navy also.

Kissinger: That is true, but we don't think that they have a strong navy.

Teng: But they have increased their numbers.

Kissinger: They have increased their numbers, but according to our observations—we may be wrong—in each Middle East crisis their navy maneuvered with very great clumsiness and we judge they would

be a very easy target. We thought their panicky behavior in each crisis suggested that this is true.

Teng: But no matter what, in the past the Soviet Union had no naval forces in the Mediterranean or Indian Oceans and their activities were confined very close to their Pacific shores. But now they go everywhere, even Latin America. During the subcontinent crisis their vessels moved with greater speed than yours.

Kissinger: They are after ours.

Ch'iao: But anyway, that time your naval vessels moved too slowly.

Kissinger: Be that as it may, but in conventional land strength, we do not underestimate the Soviet Union. They are very strong in conventional land strength. In naval strength they are absolutely no match for us. We have hysterical admirals who, when they want money, say that no matter what country we are in war against, including Switzerland, that we are going to lose. But in reality, the only way the Soviet Union could hurt our fleet in the Mediterranean is with their land-based aircraft. And if they did that, that would be a general nuclear war. But if it is a naval battle, our carriers can strike theirs with so much greater distance and force, that there is absolutely no possibility for them to survive.

Teng: But from our discussions with some Europeans, they seem much more worried than you—not just on naval forces but on the whole question of conventional forces.

Kissinger: On the question of conventional forces, everyone has reason to worry. On the question of naval forces, I believe we are far superior.

Teng: But the Soviet Union develops itself with greater speed. If the Soviet Union launches a war, it might not be a nuclear war; it might quite possibly be a conventional war. Under this condition, conventional weapons should not be neglected.

Kissinger: I completely agree. That is a problem the western countries do have, not in naval forces but ground conventional forces. But you will notice that we have increased the number of our divisions recently. But it is a problem. There is no question.

Teng: But your increase is proportionately much smaller than the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: That is true. But I think it would be extremely dangerous for the Soviet Union. First of all, in Europe, the Soviet Union could not achieve a decisive victory without a very large battle and in those circumstances we would use nuclear weapons.

Teng: But under those conditions, where the Soviet Union has the same destructive strength as you, would it be easy for you to make up your minds?

Kissinger: The Soviet Union does not have the same destructive force as we.

Teng: Not even enough strength for a first strike?

Kissinger: No. Let me explain the composition of the forces to you because there is so much nonsense written in the U.S. by people with specific purposes in mind that there is a very misleading impression created.

We have 1,054 land-based missiles, 656 sea-based, on submarines. 435 B–52 bombers, 300 F–111 bombers which are never counted for some reason. This is just in the strategic forces. In addition, we have over 500 airplanes in Europe and over 700 airplanes on aircraft carriers. Starting in 1979 we are going to get at least 240 new missiles on submarines—the so-called Trident submarine.

Teng: Aren't you violating the treaty?

Kissinger: No. I will explain the treaty in a minute. And at least 250 new bombers, the B–1. But the number 240 and 250 are only planning numbers. Once we begin producing, we can produce as many as we want.

Now of those missiles, the only ones that will eventually become vulnerable to attack are the 1,000 land-based ones. This cannot happen before 1982. I'll explain to you why in a minute. And before that can happen we will be producing the Trident missile which will be in serial production by 1979. And we don't have to put it on a submarine; we can put it on land if we want to.

So the Soviet Union would have to be insane to attack 1,000 missiles when we would have 1,500 and more left over even if they destroy all the land-based missiles—which they also couldn't do.

Teng: So for either side to use nuclear weapons against the other, it is a matter for great care by both sides.

Kissinger: That is without question. I was answering the question about the Soviet Union being able to make a first strike. My argument is that that is impossible.

Let's look at the reverse. The U.S. has about 30% in land-based missiles, the rest either at sea or on airplanes. I would also like to tell you, we are planning to put long-range missiles into our airplanes—something the Soviet Union cannot do because they don't have airplanes large enough to do that. The Soviet Union has 85% of its force in land-based missiles. And its sea-based missiles, up to now, are very poor. And it has only 120 airplanes that can reach the U.S., and we don't think they are very well trained. In fact, under the agreement they have to reduce their numbers. They can compose their forces any way they want—but the level we have agreed on is 2,400 for both sides. It is below their level and above ours—if you don't count overseas

weapons. So they will have to reduce their forces. We think they will get rid of their airplanes, but we don't know.

Teng: But they will not violate the agreement when they improve qualitatively.

Kissinger: Yes, but neither will we.

Teng: So you still have your race then.

Kissinger: But we have planned our forces for the 1980's and they have planned their forces for the '70's. By the early 1980's, both land-based forces will be vulnerable. And 85% of theirs are land-based while only 35% of ours are land-based. Secondly, they are making all their improvements in the most vulnerable forces, namely in the land-based forces. We are making ours in the sea-based and air-based forces—which are not vulnerable, or much less vulnerable. For example, on their submarines, they have not begun to test a multiple warhead—which means they could not possibly get it before 1980 into production. Which means, in turn, we will be, in accuracy and technical procedures, 10 to 15 years ahead of them.

Teng: We are in favor of your maintaining a superiority against the Soviet Union in such aspects.

Kissinger: And I repeat that if we launched a first strike against them we could use overseas forces which are added to the strategic forces that I gave you.

Teng: I thought what we were exploring today was the position of nuclear and conventional weapons.

Kissinger: I just wanted to answer the Foreign Minister's statement that they could first attack us. But it is true that it is more difficult to use nuclear weapons today than 15 years ago. This is without question true.

Ch'iao: What I was saying was this: At present if the Soviet Union should launch an attack with conventional weapons on not necessarily a large scale, on a medium scale, for you to use nuclear weapons under those circumstances would be a difficult thing to make up your minds about.

Kissinger: It is more difficult now than 10 to 15 years ago. It depends on where the attack takes place.

Ch'iao: As we discussed in New York, if there are changes in Yugoslavia—they need not make a direct attack, but if they incite pro-Soviet elements to bring in the Soviet armed forces—what would you do?

Kissinger: Yugoslavia? I went to Yugoslavia after our talk and talked to Marshal Tito and his colleagues about exactly this problem. For one thing, we will begin selling military equipment to Yugoslavia

next year. We are now studying what to do in such a case. We will not let it happen unchallenged. It will not be like Czechoslovakia or Hungary. We have not yet decided on the precise measures. But we believe that if the Soviet army is permitted to move outside its sphere, it will create appetites that might not stop. This is why we reacted so violently when they mobilized their airborne divisions during the Middle East crisis. Because it was our judgment that once permitted to operate far from their territory in foreign wars, not in internal quarrels, there would be no end to their appetites.

Teng: In our opinion, not only the Middle East is explosive but also the Balkan Peninsula. And this is an old strategy of the Czar.

Kissinger: For your information, if there is a European Security Conference in the spring, which is, as you know, something we have never wanted, if the President attends, he plans to stop in Bucharest and Belgrade to help make clear the American interest in the independence of these two countries. But we have not announced this, obviously.

Teng: We have no reason to be in disagreement.

Kissinger: It was no accident that on my recent trip I stopped in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and Romania, and made speeches in each about an independent foreign policy.

Teng: So we have been exploring some strategic issues today.

Kissinger: Yes.

Teng: Do you have anything else you want to discuss in this group?

Kissinger: No.

Teng: So, maybe after a short rest, do you want to bring in the others?

Kissinger: Yes.

[The meeting recessed at 11:32 a.m. and then reconvened in a larger group at 11:40.]

96. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, November 27, 1974, 11:40 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office, Washington
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tsien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRC Liaison Office, Washington
Ting Yuan-hung, Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chang Han-chih, Translator
Lien Cheng-pao, Notetaker

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador George Bush, Chief of the United States Liaison Office, Peking
Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
William H. Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
Bonnie Andrews, Notetaker

SUBJECT

Sino-Soviet Relations; Europe

Vice Premier Teng: This evening I invite you to a Peking meal.

Secretary Kissinger: Thank you.

Vice Premier Teng: Mr. Bush has had it [this type of meal].

Ambassador Bush: In Peking and in Canton!

Vice Premier Teng: But Peking—there are two best meals here. One is Peking Duck, and the other is the Hot Pot.

Secretary Kissinger: I have never had a Peking Hot Pot before. I look forward to it very much. Thank you very much. Did you say in a restaurant?

Vice Premier Teng: Yes, it is tasteless anywhere else.

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, November 25–29, 1974, Kissinger's Trip. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at Government Guest House 18. All brackets are in the original.

Secretary Kissinger: I have never had a meal in a restaurant here.

Vice Premier Teng: Then tonight we invite you to a restaurant.

Secretary Kissinger: You know I remember receiving a call after one of my trips here. A singer wanted to perform in a night club [in Peking]. I told her there were none. She couldn't belive it. Now I turn these calls over to the Ambassador [Huang Chen]. He convinces them there is no China. [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: Shall we continue? We would like to thank the Doctor for telling us about your global trips—or, to use a Chinese phrase, about your "travels to various lands."

I would like to give a brief summary of our understanding of some issues. I should think the first matter that the Doctor would be concerned about is the Soviet Union and Sino-Soviet relations.

Secretary Kissinger: I will adopt your method and say it is up to you. [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: You know that the differences between the Soviet Union and China are profound. And you know that after Brezhnev left Vladivostok, he flew to Ulan Bator to attend the anniversary of the People's Republic of Mongolia, and he made a speech. I read the press reports—the part relating to Sino-Soviet relations, and he was boasting a little about the agreements you reached in Vladivostok.

Secretary Kissinger: I explained those to you.

Vice Premier Teng: He still repeated the old words about China and the Soviet Union. The most important [of these] was that he said between China and the Soviet Union there does not exist any border dispute. And by "disputed area" he wasn't even speaking of the larger part—the one and one-half million kilometers. He only mentioned the smaller, spotted area along the border. So the content of the so-called "non-aggression" treaty, non-use-of-force, doesn't even include the essence of the border dispute.

Secretary Kissinger: Our analysis is the same. I noticed he praised the Foreign Minister. This I approve of highly.

Vice Premier Teng: Which one?

Secretary Kissinger: His, and ours! [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: That means that the very issue the two sides are negotiating about doesn't exist at all. That means also that the provisional agreement reached by the Prime Ministers, reached between our two countries in 1969, is gone with the wind. It also means that the words they mouth about improvements in relations are all empty. Of course, they pay lip service to "improving relations." And over the years the postures they have struck have many aspects, varied forms, including mediation by the Cubans and the Romanians. I recall that Chairman Mao discussed this with you. And you will also recall that

Chairman Mao made the concessions of 2,000 years and said that no further concession would be made.

Secretary Kissinger: We will explain that to our Ambassador. It will give him courage. (The Secretary quietly explains the story to Ambassador Bush.)

Vice Premier Teng: So we can see from that that the recent talk about the publicization of the telegram we sent to the Soviet Union on its National Day is not quite in accord with facts.

Secretary Kissinger: Did you publish it, or did they?

Vice Premier Teng: We did not. But they deleted a bit [from the Chinese text] when they did. Actually, we put congratulations in the cable, we put in just the content of the agreement reached between the two Premiers in 1969, we just mentioned the essence of the agreement between the two Premiers: that we should maintain the status quo on the border; prevent armed conflict and avoid clashes on the border; and it has what they put forward about an agreement on non-aggression and non-use-of-force.

Secretary Kissinger: This is new?

Vice Premier Teng: It is not new. It was also part of the understanding of 1969.

Secretary Kissinger: But if they should succeed—it will be the first such non-aggression treaty among allies.

Vice Premier Teng: Their proposals were put forward under the circumstances that the treaty still exists, our treaty of mutual assistance still exists. So it seems that the Soviet policy of hostility against China has not changed. And, of course, this doesn't exclude more tricks, such as asking this person or that person to come and mediate, but it doesn't change the essence [of China's dispute with the Soviets]. The methods that they continue to use are military threat and subversion. And they will continue their tricks such as the Asian Collective Security system. That also was something mentioned [by Brezhnev] in Ulan Bator.

Secretary Kissinger: Apparently, he discussed that with Bhutto, but he rejected it. Brezhnev also discussed it with the Shah in Moscow.

Vice Premier Teng: It was the same old theme. Others expressed a certain degree of favor for it, but—

Secretary Kissinger: The Shah will not go along with it.

Vice Premier Teng: That is also our opinion. Even India hasn't dared to openly accept it. Actually the Asian Collective Security system, although in name is directed against China, it is really aimed at dividing and controlling the countries of the area. This is the same [tactic] as the European Security Conference. It is to help Soviet forces [gain access] into the Indian Ocean and Pacific.

Secretary Kissinger: I think by now the Soviets—the European Security Conference is ridiculous. It can no longer achieve anything significant.

Vice Premier Teng: And the Chairman asked Mr. Heath when he was in China if he thought the European Security Conference would be a success. He replied that rather than ask if it would be successful one should ask "when will it be finished?" What is your assessment of the conference? Will it be a success, or will it be concluded?

Secretary Kissinger: It cannot be a success. Our view is that it should be concluded. We feel that if it goes on it will create the impression of success, which is not warranted. This should be avoided. There will be no substantive agreement of any kind. They are discussing principles—one of the issues they are now debating is about the peaceful change of frontiers. The Soviets want to say that frontiers are inviolable. The Germans want to say that frontiers can be changed only by peaceful means.

The other issue is that the Soviets say that all principles should be equally applied. The Germans want to say that all [principles] have equal validity. I have tried to explain the difference [between these two formulations] to the President, but I do not understand it myself. This is the sort of thing they are discussing at the Security Conference right now.

Vice Premier Teng: It is very confusing to me.

Secretary Kissinger: The instructions to the members of our delegation are to stay out of such things. For this, one must have a German or Soviet mind.

Vice Premier Teng: One can probably only write this now in German.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right. But there is no possible conclusion now that can be called a success. You cannot change history by sentences in a treaty! However, I think it will be finished in the early part of next year.

Vice Premier Teng: As for the Soviet threat, as we have said many times, we don't pay much attention. We don't think those one million troops can be of much consequence. The Soviet military strength in the East is not just directed against China. It is also directed against Japan and your Seventh Fleet, your air and naval forces. And if they are going to attack China, as the Chairman has discussed [with you], it will be impossible to take over China with just one million troops. They will have to increase their troops by one million, and even that would not be sufficient because if they are going to make up their minds to fight with China, they will have to make up their minds to fight for 20 years. The Chinese have no great virtue, but they do have [the virtue of] patience.

Secretary Kissinger: They have a few other virtues.

Vice Premier Teng: They also have "millet plus rifles"—and tunnels.

Secretary Kissinger: I have never seen the tunnels.

Vice Premier Teng: Hasn't Ambassador Bush done this for you? He is shirking his responsibilities.

Ambassador Bush: Not yet. I am delighted to know that I can see them.

Vice Premier Teng: The next time you can write a report to the Doctor about the tunnels.

Secretary Kissinger: Don't encourage him.[2] Between him and the Ambassador in India [Patrick Moynihan] I have nothing to do but read cables—although the Ambassador in India publishes his in the newspapers.

Vice Premier Teng: So that is the order of relations between the Soviet Union and China. As for the strategic emphasis of the Soviet Union, we see it as "a feint toward the East to attack in the West"—to attack in Europe. It doesn't matter if we have different views, we can see what happens.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the strategic situation is the same. If they attack in the East it will be a threat to the West, and if they attack in the West it will be a threat to the East. The danger is the same either way. We don't need to decide this abstractly.

Vice Premier Teng: But this strategic assessment has its practical side, especially with the Western European countries. We have exchanged views on this many times.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't believe Europe could be indifferent to an attack in the East. I don't believe you could be indifferent to an attack in the West.

Vice Premier Teng: We agree to this view. An attack in any quarter is of significance to other areas too. But to establish a strategic point of view and preparations will be of significant importance, especially to your allies in Europe. Because without [these preparations], they will suffer. When we say the emphasis is in the West, it does not mean we will ignore our own defenses.

Secretary Kissinger: We agree, and we will add to our preparations too. Unfortunately, as you know, some of the leaders in Europe are not

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[2] At a meeting with Ford and Scowcroft on November 11, Kissinger said, "We will have to slow George Bush down. We need to keep things quiet there—he is saying we have been neglecting the Chinese." (Memorandum of conversation, November 11; ibid., Memoranda of Conversation, Box 7, October–December 1974)

the most heroic right now. You have met them and can form your own opinions. But we will do our best.

I might add something about the oil problem: The U.S. has two options. Economically, we can deal with the problem on our own better than in cooperation with others. But the reason I have made several specific suggestions and proposals is because I believe if Europe continues to suffer a balance of payments drain, they will lose so much confidence that they will not be able to resist Soviet pressures. And if they take money from countries like Libya and Algeria, this will continue the process of their political demoralization. So you should understand that the proposals I have made, and our policies, have nothing to do with economic considerations, because economically we would be better off making bilateral agreements with the Saudis, and we could leave Europe alone. We do this because we feel the defense of the West will be weakened if these countries are demoralized by their economic condition.

Vice Premier Teng: So, I think we spent quite a lot of time this morning. We must have something to eat, otherwise our stomachs will make revolution. Shall we meet again at 3:30 p.m. in the Great Hall of the People? In the Original Hall. All right?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know what the Original Hall is, but I am sure someone will take us there.

Vice Premier Teng: It is the Sinkiang Room.

Secretary Kissinger: Thank you.

[The meeting adjourned at 12:20 p.m.]

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97. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, November 27, 1974, 3:36–5:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office, Washington

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR; China, and Middle East Discussion, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports; November 25–29, 1974, Kissinger's Trip. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. All brackets are in the original.

Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lin Ping, Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tsien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRC Liaison Office, Washington
Ting Yuan-hung, Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chang Han-chih, Translator
Lien Cheng-pao, Notetaker

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Ambassador George Bush, Chief of the United States Liaison Office, Peking
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
William H. Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs
John H. Holdridge, Deputy Chief, United States Liaison Office, Peking
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council
Lora Simkus, National Security Council

SUBJECTS

Europe; Japan; Middle East; South Asia; Cambodia; Energy and Food; Normalization

Vice Premier Teng: I hope you're not too tired.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I'm in good shape.

I see the Vice Premier has a list here, which he hasn't completed [discussing] yet. [Laughter]

Europe

Vice Premier Teng: We touched upon the question of Europe this morning.[2]

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Vice Premier Teng: Actually we believe it is essentially the same with Europe as with Japan. We have often expressed the view that it is our wish that the U.S. keep its good relations with Europe and Japan.

Secretary Kissinger: In fact the Chairman scolded me last year for not having good enough relations with Europe. [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: This opinion of ours is based on consideration of the whole [global] strategy. Because now the Soviet Union is determined to seek hegemony in the world, if they wish to launch a world war and don't get Europe first, they won't succeed in achieving hegemony in

[2] See Documents 95 and 96.

other parts of the world, because Europe is so important politically, economically and militarily. And now that Europe is facing the threat from the polar bear, if they don't unite and try to strengthen themselves, then only one or two countries in Europe will not be able to deal with this threat [in isolation]. We feel with respect to the United States that when the United States deals with the polar bear, it is also necessary for the United States to have strong allies in Europe and Japan. With these allies by your side you will have more assurances in dealing with the polar bear.

Secretary Kissinger: We agree with you.

Vice Premier Teng: So it is always our hope that relations between the United States and Europe and Japan will be in a position of partnership based on equality. It is only on the basis of equality that you can establish real partnership.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with you. I always say that the People's Republic is our best partner in NATO. [Laughter] If you want to arrange seminars here for visiting European Ministers, I can mention a few who would benefit by it. [Laughter] You had a very good effect on the Danish Prime Minister, although his nerves may not be up to your considerations.

Vice Premier Teng: We had very good talks.

Secretary Kissinger: Very good, very good.

Vice Premier Teng: Actually, the Prime Minister of Denmark really fears war very much.

Secretary Kissinger: Anyone who plans to attack Denmark doesn't have to prepare for a 20-year war or build so many underground tunnels. [Laughter] But seriously, we know your talks with the European Ministers are very helpful and we appreciate them.

Vice Premier Teng: But we also fire some cannons. With respect to our attitude toward Europe, we also say that if Europe wishes to establish relations with the United States on the basis of real equality, they should unite and strengthen themselves. This is in your interest too.

Secretary Kissinger: We agree. The only thing we object to—and you should also—is if they try to unite on the basis of hostility toward the United States, because this defeats the strategy we are discussing.

Vice Premier Teng: It is not possible that Western Europe will separate itself from the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: That is our conviction.

Vice Premier Teng: From our contacts with people from Western Europe, we have this impression—including the Prime Minister of Denmark.

Secretary Kissinger: You will see. Last year we had a period of turmoil, leading to a higher degree of order. [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: I suppose you will start talking philosophy again. [Laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: The President will meet with the German Chancellor on December 5th, and with the French President in the middle of December—the 14th, 15th, and 16th. And I think you will see those meetings will be very successful.

Vice Premier Teng: The Doctor mentioned that the United States fears that the Left in Europe might get into power.

Secretary Kissinger: We have in France and Italy Communist Parties that are substantially influenced from Moscow.

Vice Premier Teng: That is true.

Secretary Kissinger: They are now performing a strategy—which is very intelligent—of appearing very moderate and responsible. On the other hand, I think it has been one of the successes of our foreign policy that they have had to show their responsibility by supporting NATO—at least the Italians.

Vice Premier Teng: But that is not reliable.

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely unreliable. Absolutely unreliable. When you analyze our foreign policy you have to understand we have to do certain things and say certain things designed to paralyze not only our Left but the European Left as well. But we are opposed to, and we shall resist, the inclusion of the Left in European governments. We shall do so in Portugal because we don't want that to be the model for other countries. And we shall do so in Italy. And of course in France.

Vice Premier Teng: In our view it is by no means easy [for them] to get into power.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

Vice Premier Teng: Even if they do get into power, and they wish to appear on stage and give some performances, it may not be a bad thing.

Secretary Kissinger: I disagree with you.

Vice Premier Teng: For example, in Algeria: The people in Algeria have had a very good experience with the so-called Communist Party of France. After the Second World War in France, with De Gaulle as head of the Government, there was a coalition in which the French Communist Party took part. Some Ministers were from the Communist Party. One of the Ministers who was Communist was the Minister of the Air Force. It is exactly this Communist Minister of the Air Force who sent planes to bomb guerrillas in Algeria. And from then, the Algerians had good [sufficient] experience with the Communists in France.

Secretary Kissinger: You should have no misunderstanding: If the Communists come to power in France or Italy, it will have serious

consequences first in Germany. It will strengthen the Left wing of the Social Democratic Party, which is very much influenced by East Germany.

Vice Premier Teng: We don't like this Left. It is not our liking that they should come into power. What we mean is, suppose they do come into power and given some performances, they will be teachers by negative example.

Secretary Kissinger: If they come into power, we will have to face it. But it will have very serious consequences; it will create a period of extreme confusion. It will have a serious effect on NATO. As long as President Ford is President and I am Secretary of State, we shall resist it.

Vice Premier Teng: That is right. It is true that, should they come into power, it will produce this effect, but even if it happens, it will not be so formidable. We don't really disagree.

Secretary Kissinger: No, you are saying that if it happens, we should not be discouraged, and it will not be a final setback. I agree.

Vice Premier Teng: This is what I wish to say about Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: One thing more: You know about the discussions on Mutual Force Reductions that are going on, and I know the Chinese views with respect to those.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In Vienna.

Secretary Kissinger: In Vienna. And I know the Chinese view with respect to them. It is probably true that troops that disappear from one area will not disappear from the world. We face here the irony that the best way for the United States to keep very substantial forces in Europe is to agree to a very small reduction with the Soviet Union, because this reduces pressure from the internal Left. I see no possibility of very rapid progress, and there is no possibility whatever for very substantial reductions. Right now the negotiations are stalemated, and it is not impossible—but this is based only on a psychological assessment—that before Brezhnev comes to the United States next year they may make some small reduction. There is no indication [of this at the present time]; it is my psychological assessment based on the way they work. But we are talking about only something like 20–25,000 people, nothing substantial. This is just my instinct; it is not based on any discussion [with the Soviets]. So through 1976 I do not see any substantial change in the military dispositions.

Vice Premier Teng: We have not read much of the comments from Western Europe about your Vladivostok agreements with the Russians. But from what we have read, it seems Western Europe is a little worried that the agreements you reached in Vladivostok might lead to a reduction of American troops in Western Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't seen these accounts, but they are ridiculous. We discussed this this morning: as nuclear war becomes more complex, we have to increase conventional forces, not weaken them. There is no understanding about reduction of American forces in Europe. We paid no price for this agreement in Vladivostok, of any kind, in any area.

Vice Premier Teng: Of course this is a question to be discussed among NATO themselves, and between you and your Western European allies.

Secretary Kissinger: I am going to Europe for the NATO meetings on December 12th, and our allies will understand, at least by that time, that the Vladivostok meeting was a sign of Soviet weakness and was not purchased at the expense of concessions in any other areas.

Vice Premier Teng: Next, I wish to say a few words about the Middle East.

Japan

Secretary Kissinger: You are finished with Japan? The same principles as Europe.

Vice Premier Teng: I believe we have touched on the things we wish to say about Japan. And we have on many occasions expressed our views concerning relations between the United States and Japan. We have made our position clear.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and we discussed this this morning, and with the Foreign Minister on a few occasions.

I haven't seen any new reports about a new government [to replace the Tanaka cabinet].

Vice Premier Teng: We can say it in one sentence, which is what we say to Japanese friends: That first, they should keep good relations with you, the United States; and second, with us. The Chairman said you should stay longer there. [Laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: That is right. He scolded me, and said I should spend as much time in Japan as in China. Actually, after the President's [recently concluded] visit to Japan, our relations are much steadier. And this is very important for Japan. And as I have said, we will do nothing to interfere with Japan's improvement of relations with the People's Republic of China. We have encouraged them to work with the People's Republic.

Vice Premier Teng: We understand that.

Middle East

Vice Premier Teng: About the Middle East. It is the most sensitive area in the world now.

We have the impression, starting from early this year, that you have improved relations with Egypt. This is so?

Secretary Kissinger: This is so.

Vice Premier Teng: Then why is the Soviet Union going back to Egypt?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think the Soviet Union is going back to Egypt. I think Egypt has to show, for domestic reasons, and for inter-Arab reasons, that it also has relations with the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union stopped military aid and has reduced its economic aid.

Vice Premier Teng: It is said you promised to give Egypt something but didn't keep your promise. Is this true?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know what you are referring to specifically. We promised Egypt $250 million in economic aid which Congress has not yet approved. But we expect Congress will approve it, hopefully by the end of the year.

Vice Premier Teng: Anyway, our views—as Chairman Mao said to you personally—are that you must use both of your hands. Of course, it is not possible for you to stop aiding Israel. But once you aid Israel, you should use both your hands [and assist the Arabs].

Secretary Kissinger: I completely agree. In addition to the $250 million [in economic aid], we have arranged another $250 million from the World Bank; so it is $500 million. And in addition we have arranged for 500,000 tons of grain, and we may give them more.

Vice Premier Teng: What about military aid? Weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: I think we had better have a small meeting again tomorrow. There were one or two things I neglected to mention.

Vice Premier Teng: Chairman Mao has made very clear our policy on the Middle East question. In the first place, we support the Arabs and the Palestinians in their just struggle; and secondly, we feel that a heavy blow should be dealt to the polar bear in this area. [Teng laughs.] We have this feeling recently—it may not be very accurate—that in the Arab world the Soviet Union has somehow gotten the upper hand on you.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't believe this will be true in three months. I think by February it will be apparent that further progress is being made as a result of American initiatives, and we will then see a repetition of last year's situation.

Vice Premier Teng: In the Middle East, the basic contradiction is Israel and the whole Arab world and Palestine. That is the basic contradiction in that area. And it is known to all that you are giving Israel an enormous amount of military aid as well as economic aid. As for the Arab world, since you are giving Israel so much aid, in order to resist Israel the Arab people will look to other people for aid, because if you don't give them some aid, others will. They aren't able to make

what they need. And the Soviet Union will say, "We have things for you." And by giving them what they need, the Soviet Union gains politically, and by selling arms to the Arab world they gain economic benefits. And you get yourself bogged down in the Middle East.

Secretary Kissinger: But the Soviet Union faces the contradiction that they can give military aid but they can't promote political progress. And in country after country, once they give arms, they get into difficulty. We are studying the question of giving arms to selected Arab countries now.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I have a question. Is it possible to encourage the European countries to give some arms to the Arabs?

Secretary Kissinger: Let's have a discussion of this tomorrow in a small meeting. We are aware of the problem, and we share your analysis. If you look at the Arab countries concretely—in Egypt I think it will be apparent in the next three months that there is no significant change. In Syria, it is my judgment Syria would be prepared to move away from the Soviet Union if Israel were prepared to make any concessions at all in the negotiation.

Vice Premier Teng: The key point is whether you are using only one of your hands or both.

Secretary Kissinger: We are using both our hands, but in a way to minimize our domestic problem. And in Iraq, it is our impression—as you may have noticed, there is some pressure in Iraq from Iran, and this has led to certain strains between the Soviet Union and Iraq. So much will depend on . . .

First of all, we agree with your basic principle, that we must have an even-handed policy. And I have to confess that because of the Presidential transition in the summer, we lost two months, two to three months. In June, July, and August we could not begin to operate as effectively as we might. After the Syrian disengagement we had to pause because of our domestic situation at that time. We are regaining this ground, although for various reasons we are now using spectacular methods.

Vice Premier Teng: I have also noticed your comment on the Rabat Conference.

Secretary Kissinger: Public comment? Here?

Vice Premier Teng: The comment you made here.

Secretary Kissinger: Oh yes, I remember.

Vice Premier Teng: I am afraid if you adopt an antagonistic attitude toward the Rabat Conference, it will not be conducive to your relations with the Arabs.

Secretary Kissinger: We will not adopt an antagonistic attitude. It is a question of timing.

Vice Premier Teng: The Arab question is not a question that can be solved in a few months. It will have to go on for a long period.

Secretary Kissinger: Therefore it is important to pick the right time. But you should remember the following principle, no matter how many cannons have to be fired: The United States will not yield to pressure in the Middle East, especially Soviet pressure. No diplomatic progress can be made without the United States. Therefore, everyone who wants progress in the Middle East will sooner or later have to come to the United States, no matter what they say in the interval. Thirdly, the United States is determined to bring about diplomatic progress, and it will succeed. The problem is how to do it so that we can handle our domestic situation in the meantime. But you will see on this matter that President Ford is determined.

We will keep you informed of our methods. But there will be ups and downs, especially when 15 Arabs get together in one room—because they can't always make a distinction between epic poetry and foreign policy.

I must tell the Vice Premier something about the Arab mentality. After one consultation with the Israelis, we wrote a letter to all the Arab Foreign Ministers, and one said to me, "We know you are not telling the truth." I said, "How?" "Because we compared letters. You told each of us the same thing. So we know it is not the truth." [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: But in our view, it is not right to underestimate the strength of our Arab people.

Secretary Kissinger: We don't underestimate it. We have one particular problem. If we propose grandiose schemes, we will be enmeshed in an endless domestic debate. We have to move a step at a time. As long as we move a step at a time, a solution is inevitable.

I have great respect for the Arabs, and have many friends there.

Vice Premier Teng: We believe the Arab people may not be able to win the war in a few months, but they are able to fight.

Secretary Kissinger: That is true. That is the change in the situation. No, we believe it is essential for Israel to make peace.

Vice Premier Teng: Our view is whether soldiers can fight or not depends on the principle for which they are fighting, whether they are fighting for the people. Here I will tell you a story. For the Chinese, it was a long-standing concept that the people of Kiangsi Province couldn't fight. But Ching Kang Shan Mountain was situated in Kiangsi Province. And at that time in the Red Army, led by Chairman Mao Tsetung, it turned out that most of the cadre were people from Kiangsi Province. I believe among our American friends here there are some who are very familiar with Chinese history and know it was a concept for many years that Kiangsi people couldn't fight. And it turned out

that when the people in Kiangsi knew what they were fighting for, they turned out to be the best fighters. And in America, people had the impression that people in Indochina couldn't fight. But it turned out that the people in Indochina fixed you up very hard. And the Cambodians—but they can fight too.

Secretary Kissinger: The only ones who have yet to prove it are the Laotians. [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: You have a point in that. What I mean is you should never underestimate the strength of the Arabs.

Secretary Kissinger: We don't. We have the practical problem of making progress—which we believe is necessary—in a way that makes further progress possible. And to do it fast enough so the Soviet Union doesn't reenter the area. We believe we can solve both of these problems.

Vice Premier Teng: Actually the position of the United States in the Middle East, the weakest point of the U.S. is that you support Israel against the Arab world, which has a population of 120 million, and on this point the Soviet Union is in a better position than you.

Secretary Kissinger: Except that impotence never gives you a good position. Israel is both our weakest point and our strongest point. Because when all is said and done, no one else can make them move. Because the Arabs can't force them, and the Soviets can't do it. And anyone who wants progress will have to come to us. And this even includes the Palestinians.

Vice Premier Teng: With the Russians, their habit is wherever there is a little hole, a little room, they will get in.

Secretary Kissinger: It is extremely dangerous for the Russians to start a war in the Middle East. They will rapidly face the same dilemma they faced in October 1973.

Vice Premier Teng: So much about the Middle East.

South Asia

Vice Premier Teng: The Doctor mentioned India and the question of the Subcontinent yesterday. On this issue I believe we have exchanged views on many occasions in the past and we don't have anything new to add. Recently you visited India, and after your visit you improved your relations with India, and we believe that this was a good move. Because if there is only the Soviet Union there [they will be the only ones with influence], it is better to have you in India than the Soviets alone.

Secretary Kissinger: That was the intention of the trip. And it also will make it easier to do things in Pakistan without being accused of an anti-Indian motivation. [Teng spits loudly into his spittoon beside his chair.] And as you know, we have invited Prime Minister Bhutto to Washington, and after that, there will be some concrete progress.

Vice Premier Teng: I think you said it would be possible for you to sell weapons to Pakistan. But will Pakistan be able to pay?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Vice Premier Teng: That would be good.

As for India, you mentioned earlier that India was hegemonistic.

Secretary Kissinger: It is my assessment. One of my colleagues said he was not only in favor of giving arms to Pakistan, but arms and nuclear weapons to Pakistan and Bangladesh. [Ambassador Huang laughingly leans across the table and wags his pencil at Mr. Lord.] Mr. Lord [laughter], head of our Policy Planning Staff.

Vice Premier Teng: There is something very peculiar about Indian policy. For example, that little kingdom of Sikkim. They had pretty good control of Sikkim. Why did they have to annex it?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a good thing India is pacifist. I hate to think [of what they would do] if they weren't. [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: Sikkim was entirely under the military control of India.

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't understood Sikkim. It is incomprehensible.

Vice Premier Teng: After the military annexation, their military position was in no way strengthened.

Secretary Kissinger: They had troops there already.

Vice Premier Teng: And they haven't increased their troops there. We published a statement about it. We just spoke up for the sake of justice.

Secretary Kissinger: Is it true that you have set up loudspeakers to broadcast to the Indian troops on the border? It makes them very tense. [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: We have done nothing new along the borders, and frankly we don't fear that India will attack our borders. We don't think they have the capability of attacking our borders. There was some very queer talk, some said that the reason why the Chinese Government issued that statement about Sikkim was that the Chinese were afraid after Sikkim that India would complete the encirclement of China. Well, in the first place, we never feel things like isolation or encirclement can ever matter very much with us. And particularly with India, it is not possible that India can do any encirclement of China. The most they can do is enter Chinese territory as far as the autonomous Republic of Tibet, Lhasa. And Lhasa can be of no strategic importance to India. The particular characteristic of Lhasa is it has no air—because the altitude is more than 3,000 meters. During the Long March we did cross the region of Tibet.

Secretary Kissinger: Really.

Vice Premier Teng: Not the Lhasa area, but the southern part. Our experience was that when we wanted to take one step futher, we couldn't.

Secretary Kissinger: It is a very dangerous area for drinking mao tai. [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: Frankly, if Indian troops were able to reach Lhasa, we wouldn't be able to supply them enough air. [Laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think their intention is with respect to Tibet; their immediate intention is in Nepal.

Vice Premier Teng: That is correct. They have recently been exercising pressure on Nepal, refusing to supply them with oil. It is the dream of Nehru, inherited by his daughter, to have the whole South Asian subcontinent in their pocket.

Secretary Kissinger: And to have buffer zones around their border.

Vice Premier Teng: It is not necessary.

Secretary Kissinger: It is like British policy in the 19th Century. They always wanted Tibet demilitarized.

Vice Premier Teng: I believe even the British at that time didn't make a good estimate of whether there was enough air. [Laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: I think an Indian attack on China would be a very serious matter that couldn't be explained in terms of local conditions, but only in terms of a broader objective.

Vice Premier Teng: There is no use in attacking Tibet, for the Indians. The most they can do is that the Indians give their troops to fight for a broader objective.

Ms. T'ang [helping with translation]: Provide manpower for a broader objective.

Secretary Kissinger: Very serious. There is no purely Indian objective that could be served.

Vice Premier Teng: We're not worried about that.

Secretary Kissinger: We're just analyzing the situation.

Cambodia

Vice Premier Teng: And next, according to the Doctor's order, is the question of Cambodia. On the question of Cambodia I also made myself clear, and I have nothing to add.

Secretary Kissinger: Your Ambassador [Huang Hua] fired a whole bunch of cannons [on Cambodia] yesterday, at the United Nations. [Laughter]

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: That's the routine work of our Ambassador. [Laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: But this time he hit a few fortified positions. [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: That proves these cannons are not so formidable—but cannons will have to be fired.

Secretary Kissinger: We understand.

Vice Premier Teng: It can't be imagined that we will stop supporting the struggle of the Cambodian people.

Secretary Kissinger: Can I give you our analysis? The United States has nothing to gain in Cambodia. Having withdrawn from Vietnam, we can have no interest in a long-term presence in Cambodia. On the other hand, as a question of principle, we do not simply abandon people with whom we have worked. But this is not the key issue right now. The key issue right now is, according to our conception, the best solution of the Indochinese peninsula is one in which easy country can realize its national aspirations. And therefore we believe that solutions in which each of the states in the area can maintain its national independence, without being dominated by one, is quite frankly—though you're a better judge—in your long-term interest. If Indochina was dominated from one center, an aggressive force, in the context of some of the schemes for Asian collective security, could cause you problems.

Therefore we prefer a national solution for Cambodia. We believe Sihanouk offers perhaps the best possibility for a national solution. We believe that for Sihanouk to act effectively he must be in charge of a balance of forces in Cambodia, similar to Souvanna in Laos. Souvanna Phouma.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: The situation is not the same.

Secretary Kissinger: It's of a different nature. I'm just being professorial; I'm not saying it can be achieved. If Sihanouk comes back as the head of the insurgent forces, he will not last long. He will just be a figurehead. And in our analysis the insurgent forces are under Hanoi's influence. So, curiously, we think it's in Sihanouk's interest to govern with some element of—not Lon Nol—but some other forces in Phnom Penh that he can use as a balance to help him preserve his position.

To be concrete, we would be prepared to cooperate in a peace conference whose practical result would be the return of Sihanouk, the transformation of the existing structure in Phnom Penh, and the participation of the resistance forces. And then Sihanouk could have a more balanced structure to govern.

Vice Premier Teng: I'm afraid that your information is not accurate. For example, there is talk that the Cambodian war is being fought by the Vietnamese. The accurate information which I can give you is that there is not a single Vietnamese soldier fighting in Cambodia.

Secretary Kissinger: That I believe, but the supplies come from Vietnam.

Vice Premier Teng: That's why I say your information is not accurate. You have to watch out, because the information supplied to you by Lon Nol is not accurate. And then you mentioned that the United States can't abandon those it has worked with. But, come to think of it, your relation with Lon Nol is only for four years.

Secretary Kissinger: I've told you we would be prepared to see a change in the structure in Phnom Penh as part of the solution. [Teng again spits into his spittoon.]

Vice Premier Teng: On this issue, Samdech Norodom Sihanouk has made many statements, and we support his statements.

Secretary Kissinger: With great passion.

Vice Premier Teng: That's true, and you don't lack passion either.

Secretary Kissinger: We have no emotional investment. And we don't oppose Sihanouk. He'll drive many people crazy before his political life is finished. [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: How is that possible? Who will be driven mad?

Secretary Kissinger: He's rather changeable, if you look at his history. But he's the biggest national figure in Cambodia, and as I said, we're not opposed to him.

Vice Premier Teng: Regardless of his changes, he's a nationalist.

Secretary Kissinger: We agree, and we consider him the leader of the nationalist forces. Perhaps after the UN vote there could be a further exchange of views.

Vice Premier Teng: Well, so much about Cambodia then.

Energy and Food

Vice Premier Teng: Next, the Doctor has mentioned on a number of occasions the questions of energy and food. On these two questions both sides are clear about the viewpoints of the other. We have heard a lot of talk and opinions from the Western world and Japan that the recent economic recession and inflation crisis are due to the recent rise of oil prices. Our view is that this is not the case. Before the rise of oil prices, there already existed a serious problem of inflation. And before the rise of oil prices, many of the products' prices had already gone up many times. Grain, for example, and many industrial products. With the rise of prices of many products, the losses suffered by the oil-producing countries were very great. And the time since the rise of oil prices is only about one year, starting from the Middle East war in October last year. Actually, the present situation is that the price of oil is falling down.

We agree with the view expressed by many Third World or oil-producing countries. They oppose the talk about the cause of inflation being the rise of oil prices. We agree this sort of talk has no grounds. As for the rising of oil prices itself, it was only after it went up that we

knew of that. We didn't encourage the rise in oil prices and didn't participate in planning it. But on the question of the Arab countries finding oil as a weapon for their struggle, we support that. Of course it's also the fact that at the present moment, following the rise of oil prices, the inflation and economic difficulties in consuming countries were also intensified. That's also true.

There are solutions for this question. One method is the method of confrontation and the other is the method of dialogue. And we noticed the method you've adopted is the method of confrontation. [Secretary Kissinger smiles.] Don't you agree?

Secretary Kissinger: It is contrary to every principle of mine. [Laughter] It is energetic shadow boxing. [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: I've read articles in your press regarding this question and I believe these reflect the views of the American government.

Secretary Kissinger: No, the views of the American government are reflected in my speech in Chicago. For example, many articles reflect criticism of the Shah. I am totally opposed to criticism of the Shah, because he is the crucial element of the strategy we've discussed.

Vice Premier Teng: I was not referring to that part of the press opinion that is against the Shah. They sum up only three methods: The first is psychological warfare; the second is the secret activity—

Ms. Tang: In *Newsweek* magazine.

Secretary Kissinger: *Newsweek* is my favorite fiction magazine.

Vice Premier Teng: The third is military intervention.

Secretary Kissinger: That's all nonsense. [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: Anyway, we feel the method of waving a big baton and the method of confrontation may not be conducive to a solution, but will only sharpen the contradiction betwen the consumers and the producers. So when we talk to our friends coming from Europe, we tell them we are in favor of dialogue.

Secretary Kissinger: Are you finished?

Vice Premier Teng: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me make two observations. First, concerning the Chinese attitude favoring the use of the oil weapon, I recognize the People's Republic stands for certain principles and these have to be followed. But at some point a contradiction develops between all-out support for this and the necessity of achieving a common front against the threats to international security. It is up to the People's Republic to decide where this point is reached. But if objectively Europe and Japan are reduced to a sense of impotence, this is something to which one cannot be indifferent from the point of view of international security. But this is a question for the People's Republic, and I will leave it.

Let me turn to U.S. relations with the producers. *Newsweek* is not distinguished for its support of the Administration, and it is the last magazine we would tell what our strategy is. Of the three methods they mention, military intervention on the question of oil prices is out of the question. In the case of a total embargo, that would be another matter, but on the question of oil prices, it is out of the question. Psychological warfare against the Arabs is something I'd like to see. I can't imagine what it would be like. Anyway, we have no capability for it.

Our policy is quite different.

Vice Premier Teng: Well, if we give another term to psychological warfare, it would be "threats."

Secretary Kissinger: We're not making any threats.

We agree there should be dialogue. But I think for leaders who were on the Long March, they will not believe that conversation in the abstract will solve problems. Before the consumers talk to the producers, we think it is important for the consumers to know what they want and to adopt a comparable position. So we're attempting to organize the consumers precisely so they can have a dialogue in which they can speak with something like a common voice.

We believe it is also important that Japan and Europe should not be left in positions where they feel their future is in the hands of forces totally outside their control.

But our basic approach to the producers will be conciliatory. And we will agree to the French proposal provided there is prior consultation among the consumers.

Vice Premier Teng: I don't believe we can give you good suggestions on this question.

Secretary Kissinger: But we want you to understand our position. There will not be American military moves on the question of oil prices—or military threats.

Vice Premier Teng: For us, China cannot be considered one of the producing countries, because the oil we produce is very little and we produce just enough for our own consumption. And we can't be considered an oil-consuming country. And even if we speak on this issue, I don't think the oil producers will listen to us.

Secretary Kissinger: We don't ask you to speak; we want you to understand. There may be an occasion when visitors come here, but we're not asking you.

Vice Premier Teng: Whenever visitors ask us, we give the same answer. We want the method of dialogue.

Secretary Kissinger: That is our approach.

Vice Premier Teng: As for food, we don't have anything to say.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think this is an issue between us.

Vice Premier Teng: The basic question is to encourage countries to go into production to produce enough grain for themselves.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

Vice Premier Teng: For countries not to produce enough and to look to the United States is not the right solution.

Secretary Kissinger: That is exactly right. And the debate that went on at the Rome Food Conference—whether the United States should give a million tons more or less—is irrelevant to the problem. The deficit can be closed only if the countries with a deficit produce more food. The United States alone can't close the deficit. But we are prepared to help with technical assistance and matters of this kind.

Normalization

Vice Premier Teng: Last time we talked a lot about normalization of relations, and I have only a few words to add to that. On this issue, the Doctor gave us some concrete formulas. And yesterday I summed up three points as matters of principle that we would not agree to:

The first principle is that we will not accept any form of two Chinas or one-China–one-Taiwan, or one-and-a-half-Chinas, or any formula like that. It can only be the Japan model.

The second principle is that after the United States abolishes the defense treaty it signed with Chiang Kai-shek, the Taiwan problem should be left to the Chinese people themselves to solve; it is an internal matter for China, in which no one has the right to interfere.

The third principle is that in the course of the solution of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves, there should be no other country which should be allowed to interfere in the solution of the problem. Any kind of reviewing or guarantee or any kind of involvement in the process we will not accept.

And if the United States feels the time is not yet ripe for the solution of this problem and you still need Taiwan, we can wait. A so-called transitional period is too complicated. So we can wait until the time is ripe and then solve the problem in one gulp, like with Japan.

On this issue, the Doctor also mentioned that you have some domestic difficulties, the so-called Taiwan lobby or pro-Taiwan elements. Actually, as far as we know, the Taiwan lobby is much stronger in Japan than in the United States. But still, as I said before, if you have domestic difficulties, we can wait.

The second question is the method by which we are going to liberate Taiwan, and also includes the time of the solution.

I just wish to sum up the comments I made yesterday.

I wish to say the reason why the problem can't be solved as we visualize it should be solved is that on your side you have difficulties. It's not that we don't want to solve it.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand that.

Vice Premier Teng: This is all I want to say. I believe we've touched upon all the problems.

The Doctor took 18 days to tour 18 countries. I just took two hours to tour the circle [of global problems on the agenda for discussion]. [Laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: But you talked more sense. [Laughter]

Ms. T'ang: This shows the advanced technology of the Chinese!

Secretary Kissinger: Let me think about your last remarks, and I'll answer while I'm here in a general way. [Teng spits again into his spittoon.]

Vice Premier Teng: I don't think we can finish our talks on this issue this time.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think so either.

Vice Premier Teng: So, shall we stop here? And you'll have a little rest, and I'll invite you to taste the well-known Peking mutton [at a restaurant for dinner].

Secretary Kissinger: I'm looking forward to it. I've never had it. Let me do a draft of what we discussed this morning, and then I'll bring it to dinner. It will give the Foreign Minister a whole night to tear it to pieces. Or do you have one [draft of your own]?

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I'm entirely with your suggestion, but only don't give me such a draft that it upsets my appetite for the mutton. [Laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: No more than ten pages. [Laughter] And you won't know whether we're going up or down until the last sentence. [Laughter] It's a brief statement, in the spirit of our discussions.

Vice Premier Teng: You don't want meetings tomorrow? Some rest, or some work to do?

Secretary Kissinger: We'll decide tonight.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: In the morning, or tonight?

Secretary Kissinger: We can do it tomorrow morning.

Vice Premier Teng: You wanted another small group meeting. Should we do it in the morning or afternoon?

Secretary Kissinger: It really makes no difference.

Vice Premier Teng: Shall we say 4:00 in the afternoon? [It is agreed.] So I hope you can sleep more in the morning.

Secretary Kissinger: I will see you at dinner.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I'll come fetch the communiqué.

98. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, November 28, 1974, 4:00–6:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Chinese
Teng Hsiao-ping, Vice Premier[2]

American
The Secretary
Mr. Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Ambassador Bush, Chief of the Liaison Office
Mr. Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs
Mr. Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Miss Christine Vick, Secretary's office (notetaker)

Teng: Have you have a good rest this morning?

Kissinger: It was kind of the Foreign Minister to go with us to the Temple. Our Ambassador told me what is going on in China. Then I showed Mr. Rumsfeld the Forbidden City and the German Ambassador who is an old friend, called on me to tell me what is going on in China too.

Teng: What do the Germans think is going on in China?

Kissinger: Frankly, he wanted to hear from me what is going on.

Teng: You can tell him we are digging tunnels here.

Kissinger: And storing grain.

Teng: Right. Three sentences—dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony. These are the three things we are to note.

Kissinger: As Chairman Mao said last year.

Teng: This, I think, will be our final session here. We will hear you first.

Kissinger: The last word will be the Foreign Minister's tonight and I will have no possibility to reply. I wanted to cover a few odds and ends of yesterday's discussion. First, with respect to our relations with the Arab countries, we have not been inactive, as I told you yesterday, we have 250 million for Egypt and in addition we have given them 150 million for other kinds of various assistance, primarily in the agricultural field and we have asked the World Bank to give them

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, November 25–29, 1974, Kissinger's Trip. No classification marking. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People.

[2] None of the participants on the Chinese side was listed except for Deng Xiaoping.

250 million. So altogether they have received about 650 million. And we have given even Syria 100,000 tons of agricultural products. In the military field, which the Vice Premier correctly mentioned, it is true that the Soviet Union has cut off Egypt and there has not yet been any replacement. We have a massive domestic problem about giving military aid to Arab countries. What we are doing, on a very confidential basis, is we have a rather substantial military assistance program to Saudi Arabia beyond the needs of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, after the next step in the Egyptian/Israeli disengagement agreement, we plan to permit the acquisition of military equipment by Egypt, and Saudi Arabia has already set aside 500 million for that purpose. Again for your information, the Israelis will run out of credits in March and we will link new credits to Israel for the right to sell arms to Egypt. In the meantime we are encouraging the Federal Republic to also sell arms to Egypt and France needs no encouragement as long as cash is involved. We would also encourage Britain to develop helicopter production in Egypt. I wanted you to know these things on a very confidential basis.

As for the negotiations—given the Soviet pressure on the radical Arab countries, we believe it is best to conduct the new negotiations rather quietly and then to surface them suddenly. We are discussing with the Israelis a withdrawal of something like 75 kilometers toward the East and about 150 kilometers toward the South, which would return the oil fields to Egypt and would withdraw Israeli forces beyond the passes in the Sinai.

To be quite frank, the schedule we have is to have progress in this direction before the visit of Brezhnev to Cairo, but have disclosure only afterward to discourage enthusiasm. But the Egyptians will know that it is substantially achieved before Brezhnev gets there. But if they move too far toward the Soviet Union, they will jeopardize it. So, after that we will turn to Syria.

This is our strategy, but it will be pursued without great visible signs until it is practically completed and then I might follow Brezhnev to the Middle East until it is finished. I wanted you to know this.

A word about Iran. I had some long talks with the Shah about our relationship and about Afghanistan and Pakistan. I urged the Shah to establish closer relations with the People's Republic. In my judgment he is very prepared to do this.

Interpreter: Closer relations between the United States and the People's Republic?

Kissinger: I talked to him about the U.S. relations with the People's Republic, but because he takes the lead from us, I told him we would favor closer Iranian relations with the People's Republic.

My understanding is that he is very prepared to establish much closer relations with the People's Republic and our impression is that his trip to the Soviet Union was not very reassuring to him.

My understanding is that he would be very glad to visit the People's Republic but since the Empress has been here he would appreciate a visit by a senior Chinese official first so that he would have a good excuse to come here. I say this to you for your information.

I think his basic attitude with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan and India is one which is consistent with what we discussed yesterday.

Also, you should know that we are establishing—well there are two other things. First, that we are establishing co-production with Iran in various advanced military fields which will put Iran in a position to be more immediately helpful in surrounding areas. Secondly, with respect to Iraq. Our information is that the Turkish offensive against the Turks[3] is going very badly, partly because a great deal of Russian equipment has been supplied recently to the Turks.

Teng: You mean by the United States.

Kissinger: Yes, through Iran. Our information is that the Iraqi Army is quite demoralized and very unhappy with its Soviet ally. This is again, for your information. And our information, which you also probably know, is that Bhutto's feeling is that he has substantially defeated the Baluchistan problem.

Those were the major foreign policy issues which I wanted to discuss. I have one or two other items which I wanted to raise with you, if I may.

One is we are always under great pressure by the families of individuals who were Missing in Action during the Vietnamese War. We greatly appreciate the information that was given us in the last trip with respect to some American servicemen—that were lost over China. It would be a great help to us and very much appreciated if any additional information that comes available be passed to our Liaison Office. Secondly—

Teng: We don't presently have any further news. If we do we will pass it.

Kissinger: Well, we can say that you have no further news and if you have you will pass it.

Teng: All right.

Kissinger: Secondly, our Liaison Office will submit any question we have and we would be grateful for a report on these specific

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[3] Kissinger is most likely referring to the Kurds rather than to the Turks.

questions about individuals that come to our attention that may have been missing.

Teng: I don't think they have received anything yet.

Kissinger: No, but we have been given some additional queries and we will raise it in the next day or so.

Teng: All right.

Kissinger: And finally, we would be very grateful if the remains of any of those who crashed over China or died in China could be returned to the United States, if they can still be found.

Teng: If they cannot be found then it will be very difficult.

Kissinger: We have made many unreasonable demands, but we have never asked for the return of unfound remains.

Finally, in connection with the Missing In Action—this is not your direct responsibility or under your responsibility at all, but we have found great difficulty in getting any answers from North Vietnam, as is called for by the Paris Agreement and any influence or advice you could give to Hanoi we would greatly appreciate.

Teng: I thought you had direct channels with the North Vietnamese.

Kissinger: We have direct channels but our persuasiveness does not seem to be adequate. Sometime when we have time I will tell you about North Vietnamese negotiating methods. But we will save it for a social occasion. They are unique in diplomatic history. But in this connection, I would like to say one thing. The North Vietnamese have been in total violation of the Paris Agreement in building up forces in the South. We hope that there will not be a major offensive because that would produce serious consequences. We will certainly prevent any offensive on the part of the South Vietnamese.

Teng: From what we have heard, it is the United States and Nguyen Van Thieu who are not abiding by the Agreement.

Kissinger: I think your information is not accurate. President Thieu has recently offered negotiations which implement all the provisions and we are only replacing the equipment that has been lost and therefore it is easy for North Viet Nam to control the rate of loss and our deliveries.

Teng: We feel that this issue is one to be discussed only between you and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the People's Revolutionary Government of South Viet Nam. As to the piece of information when we discussed Cambodia. I remember saying to you that if you listen to the information from Lon Nol it won't be accurate. As for the information provided by Thieu, we think it is also unreliable. We think the fundamental question is this. It is good that you have withdrawn your armed forces, but you have not really disengaged. Your feet are still bogged down there and probably all these specific issues all stem from the fact that the fundamental issue has not been completely

resolved. I should think that that is true about the entire Indo-Chinese issues too.

Kissinger: I finally want to say one thing about normalization. Secretary Habib has informed me of his conversations here.[4] On the claims/assets agreement, I understand the principal Chinese concern and I will, when I return, see whether our lawyers can come up with a definition compatible with Chinese principles.

My impression is that the other aspects are soluble and I will try to find a way of solving that aspect.

Interpreter: That . . .

Kissinger: That particular one.

Teng: I hear that he has placed great emphasis on matters of United States law.

Kissinger: That is what I will look into when I return.

Teng: How can U.S. laws govern China? That is not logical.

Kissinger: Mr. Rumsfeld was a Congressman, he can explain that. I can't.

Teng: How you explain the matter is your business, but our explanation is that U.S. law doesn't govern China.

Kissinger: But there are some Congressmen who think that China is a suburb of Chicago.

Teng: I think that you have touched precisely on the essence of the matter. Perhaps the negotiator on your side reflects that mentality.

Rumsfeld: I could explain it but it would take a great deal of Mao Tai.

Teng: It is not important anyway.

Kissinger: I understand your problem. I owe you an answer and I will try to find a solution. I will talk to the lawyers, for me I could not care. But about the issue here, for me, this is primarily a political and symbolic matter. So I don't want an acrimonious negotiation. I will see whether we can find a formulation we can submit to you.

Teng: This is an issue of which one hundred years lack of a solution will not be of great consequence.

Kissinger: We will certainly accept the principle that American law does not apply to China.

Teng: I think this is a point that must be confirmed.

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[4] See footnote 7, Document 92. A record of another counterpart discussion on the morning of November 28 is in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Report on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 2, China Memcons and Reports, November 25–29, 1974, Kissinger's Trip.

Kissinger: That is the easiest problem we have between us. On other things—like exchanges, Congressional visits and so forth. I would like to suggest the desirability of changing the pattern a little bit, so that every year is not like the last year. And not expose our relationship to unnecessary speculation in the U.S. to see if any special progress has been made. So if our experts could find some slight variation in the pattern, it could be quite helpful.

In practice with the Congressional visits—there is one Subcommittee that votes the State Department budget, that has a great interest in coming here. I say this for your consideration.

Teng: We can think that over.

Kissinger: You will be visited in the next few weeks by Senator Mansfield.

Teng: We expressed our welcome to him long ago.

Kissinger: And we have supported it and we appreciate your inviting him. It will be helpful. Senator Mansfield is the majority Leader of the Senate and a former professor of political science at the University of Montana. On foreign policy problems, he is here in his capacity as former professor of political science at the University of Montana.

Teng: We would welcome him in any capacity. And we will see to it that he is taken to a dinner of Hot Pot.

Kissinger: We really favor a very friendly reception for him. But you should remember that what I said to you about foreign policy reflects the views of President Ford and of the United States government.

Teng: And we have understood with regard to the views of various Senators and Congressmen, and their various views do not all represent the government's view, but their own. We won't sign any agreements with them.

Kissinger: This was especially fortunate with regard to the visit of Senator Magnuson.[5] Mao tai left a lasting impression on him.

Teng: (Laughter)

Kissinger: Now perhaps a word about normalization. We have paid serious attention to what the Vice Premier said yesterday and we shall study it very carefully. We believe that the three principles mentioned by the Vice Premier are not insurmountable obstacles. And we have one problem, which the Foreign Minister summed up well in one of our earlier meetings, which is that we do not ask to be a guaranteeing power but we do prefer the solution of the reintegration to be peaceful. We shall think about specific proposals with respect to the three points and we shall submit them to you for your consideration.

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[5] See footnote 3, Document 41 and footnote 7, Document 43.

In the meantime, we shall undertake a substantial reduction of our remaining military forces in Taiwan. We will give the precise figures to your Liaison Office in Washington before the end of the year.

And we shall also, over the next eighteen months, bring about a reduction in the size and in the status, or at least seniority, of our diplomatic representation. This is independent of whatever we agree on the other three points. These are unilateral steps. These are the major points that I wished to discuss. We will have to discuss something about the Communiqué.

FMinister: You will remember that I have promised to think up a few simple sentences to bring to your attention. But simple sentences are not easy to conceive and it is much more difficult to write a brief rather than a long Communiqué.

Kissinger: Bernard Shaw said I didn't have time to write a short letter, so I wrote a long one.

Teng: I think that is a question to be discussed between you and the Foreign Minister.

FMinister: I will inform you when we are ready to discuss. I think it is not possible to solve it here at the table.

Kissinger: Do you mind if two of my associates join us now? We are not going to discuss the Communiqué.

Teng: It is up to you.

Kissinger: One point that Ambassador Bush raised that I was going to raise. We were considering whether it would be desirable to increase the Liaison Office by a few spaces. We would transfer some of our functions from Hong Kong to Peking. That would be most appreciated.

Teng: A few spaces.

Kissinger: To handle functions here in Peking.

Teng: You would like to add to the present building.

Kissinger: The first thing is to add to the number of personnel, which in turn would mean we would have to add some additional space.

Teng: We will study that. We have noted what the Dr. has told us and we don't have very much else to say. So let's begin from the final issue that the Dr. mentioned, that is the question of Normalization. The Dr. has mentioned again the question of the time table and I remember that I said last time, what is the need to complicate the matter in such a way. Wouldn't it be better to do it more briskly and to solve the matter briskly. So the pace is not a very important matter. Whether you cut down your forces by a little bit or increase them by a bit, or when you do it; whether you raise them by a bit—that isn't very important. And since you have already sent your Ambassador there, whether or not it is necessary to lower the seniority is not a very important issue either.

So, if the solution is not to be brisk, what is the reason to drag the Taiwan issue like the question of the Vietnam and Cambodia issues into such an untidy mess. What is the need to drag along such untidiness, because that is not necessary to solve these issues.

And with the question of the three principles that we mentioned in our three previous meetings. There cannot be any other consideration about these principles. And we have also said that if you need Taiwan now, we can wait. This in no way means that we do not want to solve this issue as early as possible between the United States and China. It does not mean from a moral and political point of view that we have no right to demand or ask an early solution.

As I mentioned in our earlier discussion on this issue, it is you who are not deflecting to us. Because it is U.S. troops who are occupying Taiwan. Just now the Dr. mentioned certain reductions or certain actions which would be unilateral measures on the part of the United States. What bilateral measures can be called for?

Kissinger: There aren't any called for.

Teng: There is a Chinese saying that it is for the one who has tied the knot to unfasten it. And to sum it up, since you believe the time has not yet come to solve the issue, then we can wait. We can wait until you have thought this out clearly and then it can be solved briskly. It can be written off at once. We can wait say for a few years. We won't even have to ask you to hurry up. But if it is to be solved, it must be on the basis of the three principles.

Kissinger: I understand this and I believe it can be solved in connection with these three principles. I appreciate the opportunity to do some more thinking about it and I recognize that there is great wisdom, generosity and self restraint on the Chinese side in taking the position which the Vice Premier has outlined here. Because this is something basic in our previous conversations and observations that we owe to you.

If I may say one thing in this connection with the three principles. The principles are accepted. In all of them, the only practical problem we have is how to implement it. The phrase that Chairman Mao quoted that Normalization can be achieved before reintegration is completed . . . how to express that in practical terms.

Teng: As for the establishment of diplomatic relations, I think we have expressed it clearly in severing diplomatic relations, withdrawal of troops and abolishment of the treaty. And as for how and when the Chinese settle these issues between themselves, that is our own affair and belongs to Chinese internal affairs.

And we cannot undertake any commitments or make any promises in internal affairs like when and how we will do or establish things that pertain to internal affairs.

Kissinger: But theoretically, you could make a general statement of your unilateral intentions. Not to us, but just as a general statement.

Teng: What are we to say in it. Anyway, we think this is something that we are bound to discuss again.

Kissinger: Yes, that is the only remaining issue. The other problems are soluble and let me think about the last question.

Teng: As for the other specific issues, we don't have anything more we think needs to be said. We believe in our discussions these few days, we have had a wide range of views in the international situation. I would like to take this opportunity to make clear our basic concept of this whole question. As Chairman Mao has said repeatedly to visiting guests, the present world is not tranquil.

And the Foreign Minister also mentioned that there is great disorder under heaven. And yesterday, that was just what I was coming to—then the Dr. mentioned the talk between Chairman Mao and the Danish Foreign Minister.

Kissinger: I agree with Chairman Mao.

Teng: That there is the existence of the danger of a war. No matter how this war might be brought about and if the peoples and countries of the world are not prepared against this, they will suffer. Last time we discussed the Soviet strategy. Of course, we have different opinions on that. But our general view and impression is that the Soviet Union is making a feint in the East to attack the West. We think this is more in conformity with reality. It is not a purely theoretical matter. Chairman Mao has actually discussed this before with the Dr. He did not put it in such words in that talk, but it can be summarized to this phrase: "The polar bear is after you."

Kissinger: And it is about equal distance whether he comes East or West, to the United States, I mean.

Teng: That's geographically. As for us, to be honest, our character is to fear neither heaven or earth and we fear neither isolation or embargo. As for nuclear weapons, they are not of any use. Since to speak of nuclear weapons is of others attacking us with nuclear weapons and in this sense, we fear nothing. And Chairman Mao has even mentioned to the Danish Foreign Minister, to this effect, if a war should truly come, would it necessarily be a bad thing?

Kissinger: This is what shook him a little bit.

Teng: And we Chinese believe that if a war should come, it might not be so formidable; it might not necessarily be so bad. There is the possibility that bad things can turn into good things. He also told the Danish Foreign Minister there is no use to be afraid. If it is to come, what can you do to prevent it. Anyway, we are going to make preparations. As for preparations, they are just what we have said before.

Tunnels, millet and rifles. Do you know when we began to put forth that slogan, millet, _____[6] rifles?

Kissinger: In the sixties.

Teng: No during the Anti-Japanese War. When we were still in the S_____, in essence, we _____ rifles the only shortcoming was that in S_____, they didn't grow millet. Once we got to _____,[7] the main staple found was millet. That is why the main staple is millet and rifles. You can say we met millet by accident.

Another matter is that which the Dr. has repeatedly mentioned, the question of firing cannons. It seems the Dr. is very concerned about cannon fire.

Kissinger: I dig tunnels very deeply.

Teng: I am in favor of that. Cannons must be fired. And the Dr. has mentioned that the frequency and accuracy of the cannon fire has been raised and since the accuracy has been raised, it is quite clear that cannon fire cannot afford to cease. We think there might be a necessity to study the matter of whether or not the cannon fire is reasonable. And, therefore, I think it might be of some use to raise this point to your attention. That is, that in many issues now, the United States is in the forefront. The Dr. has mentioned many times here the energy question and the food issue. The United States is always in the forefront. You mention the fact that it is Western Europe and Japan and other countries that are most affected by the crises, but they are not in the forefront.

Kissinger: They are also not in the forefront of military defense.

Teng: Of course, it isn't in all issues that the United States is in the forefront, but in the recent period of time, you have been in the forefront on many important issues. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has been hiding behind. For instance in Cyprus and the Middle East, you have also been in the forefront. And no matter how you look at the issue in the Middle East, for the U.S. to foster Israeli expansionism, which is what it is, in essence against 120 million Arab people—from the political point of view, you are bound to be in a weaker position. Of course, the Dr. has repeatedly explained that this is because of domestic issues. No matter out of what reason, so long as the Arab countries are not able to regain their lost territory, the principal issue remains unsolved. Tactics will not be able to settle the problem, the Communiqué will not be able to solve the issue. There is already some similarity between this

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[6] Omission is in the original. The missing word is probably "tunnels."

[7] Omissions in the original. Deng may be discussing his experience at Yenan, in Shensi. The Chinese Communist Party reached Shensi at the conclusion of the Long March and it regrouped there before fighting the Japanese.

and the Indochina issue and the Korean issue too. I don't think that the Dr. will take these views to be ill-intentioned.

Kissinger: No. Mr. Vice Premier, I have summed up our views on many of these issues. The Vice Premier was finished, I understood?

Teng: Yes.

Kissinger: I have summed up the U.S. view on many of these issues. If I could perhaps say one or two words. First of all, I agree with the Chairman, who, I believe, is a very great man. In any event, that it is important to be prepared for war and it is our policy to prepare for all eventualities and not to rely on the words of others or their assurances for peace. And in this analysis and in the manner of the quotation you just mentioned to me, we agree with his analysis of the overall situation.

Whether the attack comes in the East or the West is a subsidiary issue in this respect because wherever it comes it is ultimately intended for us and in this analysis I agree. If it comes first in the West, it still will affect the East and if it comes first in the East, it will still affect the West. And in either case it will affect us, but this is not a difference between us. The practical consequences for us—we have to do the same things in either case.

With respect to the United States being in the forefront. That is imposed on us by the particular necessity of the various analyses you have made. The Vice Premier has correctly pointed out that neither Europe or Japan is in the forefront of the energy problem, even though they are the primary victims. They are also not in the forefront of the defense problem, even though they are the primary victims according to your own analysis. For a variety of reasons it would be interesting to discuss sometime, neither of these societies are in a position to take a leading role for their own survival without strong American support. This is a historical reality. And if they were to separate from the United States, they would very soon become impotent and what one could call synthesized(?) or Finlandized. And therefore, they are not capable of being a second world under the present circumstances by themselves. It would be much more convenient for us if they could be. And in any event, we believe in what the Vice Premier said earlier—an equal partnership. And therefore, on the energy problem—I wanted to report our view that neither Europe or Japan can play a strategic role in which you and I agree—if at the same time they are demoralized by economic pressures which are beyond their capacity to solve. This is why we are in the forefront.

On the Middle East, I have explained to you our tactics which are complicated. I agree with you that unless there is a fundamental solution, a tactical solution is not going to be permanent. So, on this we are agreed, and I have explained to you what our strategy will be and their

strategy will lead inexorably to a radical solution. The Vice Premier knows himself, from his own experience in political and military warfare that if one accumulates enough minor changes, sooner or later a fundamental change becomes _____.[8]

As for Cyprus and the Middle East and the Soviet role, the Soviet Union will not be able to create anything. It can only make noise. We would prefer not to be in the forefront on these issues, and in Cyprus we tried to push Britain into the forefront and that produced its own complications. As to firing cannons, we recognize the necessity and we have our tunnels and you will consider that you should not hit your own fortifications.

Teng: They haven't.

Kissinger: I am not saying they have, so we rely on you for this.

Teng: You can study our cannons.

Kissinger: We generally do not do any counterbatting fire. But more fundamentally, I think we have had a very useful, very beneficial exchange and in what I consider a friendly spirit of many subjects of common interest. We have always known that we stood for different principles and neither of us have asked the other or will ask the other to transcend the difference.

Teng: That's right.

Kissinger: But both of us have been able to work jointly on these matters which we have understood represent common views. And I believe that this has been fortified by our exchange and I would like to thank the Vice Premier for the warm reception we have had here, the frankness of the exchange; the constructiveness of the dialogue and I believe it has been a very positive contribution to the relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Teng: Do you think that will be all for our talks.

Kissinger: Except for . . .

Teng: And we should like to take this opportunity to thank the Dr. again for his seventh visit.

Kissinger: . . . for our encounter after the banquet tonight.

Teng: But that has nothing to do with me.

Kissinger: If I may ask a question about releasing whatever we agree on tonight. Our President is giving a press conference tomorrow night at 8:00 Washington time, which is 9:00 Saturday your time. So if we could release it Saturday morning your time, it would enable him to answer questions not only on his trip but on my trip too.

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[8] Omission is in the original.

Teng: You can solve that.

Kissinger: You are very optimistic. It usually take three nights to settle things with the Foreign Minister.

Teng: (Laughter) Well, that means that the press release will come out next February.

Kissinger: You tell me when you are ready.

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99. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Beijing, November 28, 1974, 9:45–11:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lin Ping, Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Notetaker

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Amb. George Bush, Chief, USLO Peking
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Lora D. Simkus, Notetaker

SUBJECT

Drafting of Communiqué of Visit

Kissinger: You are outnumbered tonight.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But we have 800 million.

Kissinger: But if they are not here, you are outnumbered.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: This morning I told you about our basic thinking. And our thinking is to try our best to avoid superfluous words and to inquire and to put main things in the most prominent place. Of course, our assessment of these talks is they have been very beneficial.

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports, Box 2, November 25–29, 1974, Kissinger's Trip. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Meeting Room of Guest House Villa 18. All brackets are in the original.

This wide range of exchange of views has been very good. That is one thing. And, of course, the important substantial part of what you will want to say is that both sides have decided that your President will visit China.

Kissinger: This is what we did in July, 1971.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: So we made up a few words. It took me a whole day to compose three sentences! It shows that our effectiveness is very low. But because this morning you insisted I make a try, I could only do so.

So the three items we will be thinking of putting into the announcement would be three main thoughts:

The Secretary of State visited certain places from when to when—the two sides had pleasant talks. The formal wording is:

"Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China from November 25 through November 29, 1974. The Chinese and U.S. sides held friendly and useful talks. Knowing of the expressed desire of President Gerald R. Ford to visit China, the Government of the People's Republic of China has extended an invitation to President Ford to visit China in 1975. President Ford has accepted this invitation with pleasure."

Kissinger: At any rate . . . well, for one thing, I don't know whether President Ford had expressed a desire that you could know of to visit the People's Republic of China.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Through you.

Kissinger: I think, frankly, we should use a frankly different formulation from the 1971 communiqué.[2] This quite candidly is my view on the subject. I have two suggestions. I have no great . . . One is—and I have to do it in light of our opinion—to say only that in two previous visits we accomplished two pages on the talks and to deal with these four days with six or seven words is going to be noticed. I think we should at least say, "and reaffirmed the principles of the previous communiqués" or something like this. Now, as far as the invitation is concerned . . . this point can be made with an additional sentence. It does not require a paragraph. With respect to the invitation, I think it would be best to relate it to the statement in our communiqué last year of the desirability of frequent exchanges at authoritative levels. And say, "in the light of the decisions in the year 1973 of the desirability of

[2] President Nixon read the 1971 communiqué during his televised "Remarks to the Nation Announcing Acceptance of an Invitation To Visit the People's Republic of China." The text is in *Public Papers: Nixon 1971,* pp. 819–820.

frequency of exchanges, the Government has extended an invitation to President Ford." Those are may two suggestions except to express protest for my associates whose names are not being mentioned. But that is a question of internal policy.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: There is no question the names have been published in the Chinese press numerous times.

Kissinger: I am sure Rumsfeld's wife has read it in the *People's Daily.*

Those are my two suggestions.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Now on the first point, our idea is that since during this visit of yours, both of us have made two speeches respectively, so I think we have said quite a lot. So we don't think it necessary to keep on repeating the same words. Of course, you told me about your thinking this morning. Nevertheless, we would still be willing to see the sentence you would be willing to produce. That is one thing. And the second point which I think all the friends here on your side know is that the actual sequence of events was our side first invited your Secretary of Defense, Mr. Schlesinger, and your side suggested President Ford.

Kissinger: Were you very surprised?

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Were you surprised?

Kissinger: I was surprised by the invitation to Schlesinger, but I understand its significance. [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: And on our side, of course, we believe that your proposal of President Ford's visit is very important, too, but to be frank, perhaps we weren't so surprised as you to the previous invitation to the Secretary of Defense.

Kissinger: Since you made it, you should not be surprised.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: My surprise did not equal your surprise. [Laughter] But I must remind you that the invitation stands—it is a standing one.

Kissinger: I know. That is understood.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Actually, the 1973 statement was a redirection of the Shanghai Communiqué about the authoritative levels.

Kissinger: [To Mr. Lord] Have we got the Shanghai Communiqué here? [Mr. Lord produces a copy.]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Because in . . .

Kissinger: We can refer to the Shanghai Communiqué, too. The 1973 communiqué—the Shanghai Communiqué—says they will stay in contact. "The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time." In the [November] 1973 communiqué we said, "The two sides agreed that in present circumstances it is of

particular importance to maintain frequent contact at authoritative levels in order to exchange views." It is a better formulation.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But I should think the basic thinking is consistent.

Kissinger: Oh, yes, it is consistent.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But the sequence of events was we first invite your Secretary of Defense and then you proposed inviting your President. Do you have any wording?

Kissinger: We could say the Chinese invited the Secretary of Defense to the United States. [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: I agree. My idea was we don't on this issue—we would not need to quote any communiqué, because you are authoritative, too. Isn't that true?

Kissinger: You knew you would get me at my weak point. I want to thank you on behalf of my father for mentioning me first here tonight. [Laughter]

We could use a more neutral formulation. For example, I don't have the exact . . . Let me give you the idea.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: So maybe for your convenience, we could have a short break and you could discuss it and then you could give us your wording.

Kissinger: Why don't we have 15 minutes? Will you be in this building? Will you stay here?

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: You can drive us off—out of this room. [Laughter]

Kissinger: There are more of us.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: [Turns back as he leaves room] Including both of your points?

Kissinger: Yes. It will be about two pages, but only four sentences. I will draft it in German. [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: If so, are you going to change Soochow to Hangchow? [Laughter]

[There was a break between 10:02 p.m. and 10:21 p.m., during which the new draft communiqué was typed.]

Kissinger: We have . . . Why don't I give it to you? We have added one sentence and changed one a little bit. We picked up the adjectives you had used and mentioned the atmosphere because it was mentioned in every previous communiqué and should be noted.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: So my initial reaction beginning from the end . . . shall we work from the end upwards?

Kissinger: I think you accept the first sentence.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Our feeling is that the phrase "to deepen contacts at authoritative levels" would, quite on the contrary, lower the

importance of President Ford's visit, because I recall when I was in New York and we toasted each of you, we specifically mentioned President Ford, and when you met with the Premier at the hospital, he asked you to give his regards; and in this evening's toast, we also mentioned President Ford.

Kissinger: We can take that out. We don't need that sentence. You are saying something extremely offensive—you know that. You have said I am an authoritative level and by mentioning the President at my level, we are lowering it. Old friends can speak frankly.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: It is a good thing knowing each other for a long time.

Kissinger: Let's take it out.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: And as for the formation of the rest of the sentence, we would also suggest some changes. That is . . .

Kissinger: We can take the word "President Ford" out. [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: That is what you said.

Kissinger: [Referring to Rumsfeld] He is not used to this method of negotiation.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: We think it might be better to say the two sides agree that President Ford would visit the People's Republic of China in 1975." In Chinese, it wouldn't seem useful to mention it more.

Kissinger: What adjective would be useful?

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Because to us the visit of such a person of high rank as the President to the People's Republic of China would be a very important event, and to characterize it as being of use or not of use is not the question.

Kissinger: I would say this. In English, to say President Ford would visit the People's Republic of China in 1975 is too stark. Can we say "to deepen contacts—and leave out authoritative—President Ford will visit the People's Republic of China in 1975."

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: It also would give the impression that the purpose of the President's visit would be merely for the sake of deepening contacts.

Kissinger: It is a good point.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: My school of thinking is it would be better to say less than to say too much.

Kissinger: I understand your point. I just don't want to make you overconfident. [Laughter]

Let me provisionally accept it. Let's see what else we have got.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: So, let's go up a sentence. So my view of the Shanghai Communiqué and subsequent joint statements is that between parent and child. So, in both your toast and mine, we only men-

tioned the Shanghai Communiqué. That is a well-known document in the world.

Kissinger: You want to drop the word "subsequent?"

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: So perhaps for the sake of brevity we could just mention the Shanghai Communiqué.

Kissinger: I would like to see an artist at work. Now that you knocked out the end of the sentence, are you going to take out the beginning? [Laughter]

All right. Shall we go up one more? All right, we will take it out. We have agreed on the word "Announcement" though? [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: We are working from the bottom up. [Laughter]

Kissinger: This is nothing . . . the Shanghai Communiqué was negotiated in Chinese. I never saw the English text.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But later on, they were all published in both.

Kissinger: I have to say something to you that impressed us very much. We trusted you to produce the Shanghai Communiqué. Wherever you had a choice, you picked the Chinese word that we used on the draft that gave us a slight advantage.

We accept that sentence.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: The term "wide-ranging" . . .

Kissinger: That was last year; in a conversation with Chairman Mao this word was used.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: We can consider characterizing the talks as frank, wide-ranging and beneficial. As for the atmosphere, I don't think it was used in any other communiqué. That was in the press release.

Kissinger: It was . . . Here it is with the Chairman.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But that was just the news.

Kissinger: And in 1973, we said "in an unconstrained atmosphere." The danger of eliminating it makes, in reality . . . We know what occurred. It is because the two previous communiqués had this reference.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Perhaps I could explain it a bit. Because the meeting with the Chairman would be one meeting in itself. So the atmosphere characterized the atmosphere of that meeting. This here would characterize the whole set of talks.

Kissinger: You don't think they were friendly? [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Would that indicate that all of the words used to characterize the talks did not happen? So, frankly, my views are that the question of whether or what the atmosphere was like—actually, the characterizing of atmospheres in communiqués is a foreign influence and we don't think it is very necessary. So our thinking is to conduct it in a more straightforward way. Atmospheric things are not substantial.

Kissinger: Could we say "in a straightforward atmosphere?" In 1973, I want to point out, we said all these talks were conducted in an unconstrained atmosphere. Frankly, I don't think what we say about atmosphere . . . For example, I don't think *The New York Times* would say the talks in Peking were conducted in a friendly atmosphere. It is simply that the China watchers will notice there was an unconstrained atmosphere in 1973, then there was a friendly atmosphere, and now nothing. That is the only point.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But "frank" also is an atmosphere. Only friends can talk very frankly.

Kissinger: In that case, let's drop "frank." [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But if we are ready to talk about atmosphere, it might be more accurate to characterize these talks as being frank and unconstrained.

Kissinger: Why don't we say frank, unconstrained, wide-ranging and mutually beneficial? [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: And add "constructive."

Kissinger: Let's leave out the word "atmosphere."

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Shall we conclude an agreement that we will never talk about atmosphere in the future? [Laughter]

Kissinger: I think that would be tremendous news all over the world.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: I would like now to solicit your opinion as to whether we should cut off the head of the announcement?

Kissinger: You mean the word "Announcement?" [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: No, the first sentence.

Kissinger: My father wouldn't stand for that. [Laughter] I will leave the heading to you.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: It doesn't really matter.

Kissinger: We don't really need a heading.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: We can cut off the head; that is the "announcement." We will not be cutting the head—we will refrain from discussing the questions of outer space.

Kissinger: You just don't call it anything?

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Call it a News Release or a Press Release?

Kissinger: There are three options: To say nothing and just put it out—it speaks for itself—or, call it a Communiqué, or call it an Announcement. If we give the heading in English, "Communiqué" or "Joint Statement" is better.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: "Communiqué" would also be accepted.

Kissinger: We will call it "Communiqué." Are we then agreed on the heading?

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: So let's read it again.

Kissinger: "Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, the U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China from November 25 through November 29, 1974. The Chinese and U.S. sides held frank, wide-ranging and mutually beneficial talks. They reaffirmed their unchanged commitments to the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué. The two sides agreed that President Gerald R. Ford would visit the People's Republic of China in 1975."

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Actually, you don't need in the final sentence: "The two sides have agreed."

Kissinger: If we played chess with each other, it would be an interesting game. Because I can predict your moves. It looks better in English to have it in. However, it is improbable that we would come here without an invitation and technically extremely difficult.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But you, yourself, come here for the seventh time. Everytime the announcement of your visit is "Both sides have agreed . . ."

Kissinger: But I am only an authoritative level. We don't consider it appropriate for our President to travel without an invitation.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But it actually would be an agreement between the two sides where they consulted with each other and agreed upon the following. Of course, we had also thought it possible to say, "The two sides agreed through consultation."

Kissinger: Oh, unanimously! [Laughter] We went through this in July 1971. It is a little bit embarrassing for me to sort of say I make President Ford come to China, which is the implication, and therefore we would like some implication of decision by him. That is why we wanted the word "accepted."

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Then what about "The two governments agreed . . ." or "the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States agreed," to avoid the impression that you were the one who decided the matter. It doesn't stand very logically as it is now: "The two sides agreed . . ." Of course, when the President comes, it will be on invitation. That is normal procedure. This is just an agreement now.

Kissinger: Okay, we will accept it. It doesn't make any difference.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: What is the meaning of the agreement? It is that the two sides consulted each other. One side made a proposal, the other side accepted it and that is an agreement. In the winter of 1971—November—the announcement issued then was "The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United

States agreed that the visit of President Nixon would begin on the date of February _____."[3]

Kissinger: Okay. We will drop the last sentence.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Would you want to change "the two sides" to "the two governments?" We don't have any definite opinion on that. If you want to avoid the possible misunderstanding that you just now mentioned, you could use "the two governments."

Kissinger: Okay. Let's say "the two governments agreed." Okay, you got it down to three sentences again. No, four. [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: So, it took you one hour to write three pages, and it took me a whole day to write three sentences. And now it took you an hour, and with your assistance, it has been increased to four sentences.

Kissinger: Now those of you present know why it took a week to do the Shanghai Communiqué. [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: All the new colleagues will understand. But I must also say here that I have to report this to our government first, before it can be finalized. You are very fair about our procedures.

Kissinger: Oh, yes. I am experienced.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: And I will tell you if there are any suggested changes.

Kissinger: When will you do that?

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Can I jump from this to the time of release? I don't think there will be any question about that.

Kissinger: It is now short enough that President Ford could read it at the beginning of his Press Conference which is 9:00 a.m. Saturday, Peking time.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Well, I will give our reply on whether there are any other changes as soon as possible. But anyway, in any case, it won't be when you are just entering your plane.

Kissinger: Tomorrow morning? Tomorrow evening? I have this practical problem. Given the differences in time now, it is still the working day in Washington. Whatever happens tomorrow, all day tomorrow is night in America. Moreover, I don't have communications in Soochow; I won't until I get to the plane in Shanghai. I tell you what I will do. I will send this to Washington. If I can get any changes tomorrow morning—they will not be major, I am sure—they can work with this and then we can change it. We will not consider it official until we have heard from your government.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: And we will try to give a reply as soon as possible. If possible, tomorrow morning.

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[3] Omission is in the original.

Kissinger: Yes. It is not a decisive matter because we have 34 hours. I have communications on my plane so as soon as I reach Shanghai, we can make any corrections needed, and we can make preliminary arrangements on the basis of this text. I have worked with you before. Your suggestions will be mine. If you could get Mr. Lord's name in it, his mother would appreciate it. [Laughter]

Do you wish us to type it and give you the correct version? Can you wait five minutes?

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Yes.

[The new draft Communiqué was typed][4]

Kissinger: Can we make an agreement that when President Ford is here we will not negotiate an agreement? We will do it ahead of time.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Of course! Otherwise, the visit would be prolonged.

Kissinger: Very long. Actually, the last time, we had two-thirds done before we came here. Three-fourths, even. All right, you let us know.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: [As he was leaving the meeting room] Dr. Kissinger, you will visit before the President?

Kissinger: I think probably I will have to come here two months before he visits. Mr. Foreign Minister, again, thank you for your cooperation.

[The meeting concluded at 11:15 p.m.]

[4] For text of the joint communiqué issued on November 29, see *Public Papers: Ford, 1974,* p. 662.

100. Letter From President Ford to Republic of China Premier Jiang Jingguo[1]

Washington, January 8, 1975.

Dear Mr. Premier:

Thank you very much for the kind sentiments expressed in your letter of September 20. I particularly appreciate your thoughtful comments on our current relationship.[2]

As you observed, the depth and breadth of our ties is indeed impressive. We have both shown a determination to overcome problems. We can take mutual pride in our present relationship. I would like to express appreciation for the cooperative spirit displayed by your government through the years.

I also wish to mention my continuing admiration for the remarkable achievements of your government and your people. These are due in large part, I am convinced, to the extraordinary leadership of your distinguished father and yourself. During my visit to Taiwan in 1953, I was able to see many of the challenges which have confronted you. I therefore find your subsequent accomplishments all the more impressive. I am particularly gratified by the productive use your government has made of economic assistance provided by my government in earlier years. We continue to cite your achievements as an outstanding example of what a determined people can accomplish if given help when they most need it.

Upon assuming office, I stressed the continuity of American policies throughout the world. I also reaffirmed our worldwide commitments, including our commitment to the security of the Republic of

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, 1974–77, Box 1, China, Republic of. No classification marking. A typed note on the letter indicates that it was "dispatched" on January 9. On January 6, Kissinger sent the President a draft of this letter under a covering memorandum that stated, "I believe a specific reaffirmation of the Mutual Defense Treaty would not now be wise as the overall direction of our China policy is to seek to sustain Taiwan's security by political rather than legalistic means. We have not specifically affirmed the treaty over the last six months, and we will want to move away from it over the long run as the process of normalizing our relations with the People's Republic of China progresses." (Ibid.)

[2] Jiang's post-inauguration letter to Ford, delivered by Ambassador Shen on October 9, praised Ford's willingness to uphold U.S. commitments, discussed the importance of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, and affirmed the value of the relationship between his country and the United States for the well-being of East Asia. (Ibid.) Smyser and Solomon agreed with the Department of State that a response to Jiang should be delayed until after Kissinger's trip to Beijing, when they could better formulate a reply appropriate with the overall context of the administration's China policy. (Memorandum from Smyser and Solomon to Kissinger, December 12; ibid.)

China.[3] I can assure you that we do not forget our friends. We will continue to value our cordial and constructive relationship.

Our policies throughout the world are designed to construct a framework for peace that will allow mankind's intellectual and physical resources to be devoted increasingly to meeting our common challenges. We realize that this will not be an easy task and that firmness as well as conciliation will be required. I am sure that we can count on your cooperation in achieving this difficult goal desired by both of our peoples.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

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[3] A Department of State draft reply to Jiang suggested that "we appreciate your needs and interests, including your concern for Taiwan's security." (Ibid.) Kissinger, on the advice of Smyser and Solomon, strengthened this language to express a stronger American commitment to Taiwan's security. In his covering memorandum to Ford, Kissinger argued, "This would not violate the spirit of our efforts to normalize relations with the PRC. It would also help to sustain the confidence of the Republic of China, which we need to do."

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101. Memorandum From Richard H. Solomon and W. Richard Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger[1]

Washington, January 15, 1975.

SUBJECT

Calls by ROC Ambassador Shen

We have received reports that ROC Ambassador Shen is demoralized over our turndown of a successor.[2] In this context, we also need to decide about Shen's expressed desire to pay calls on Vice President Rockefeller and General Scowcroft.

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files, Box 4, East Asia, ROC. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action.

[2] Shen's request and the U.S. Government's planned refusal of this request is described in telegram 2686 to Taipei, January 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

[*3½ lines not declassified*] it is becoming known to embassy employees that Ambassador James Shen is demoralized about the State Department's turndown of his recent proposal that he be replaced by a new man. The ROC [*less than 1 line not declassified*] officer was aware of the details of Shen's démarche to Deputy Secretary Ingersoll and its outcome. He also seemed aware that Chow Shu-kai was the man likely to be Shen's replacement. The [*less than 1 line not declassified*] officer commented [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that Shen now believes President Ford's trip to Peking later this year will result in some major development unfavorable to ROC interests.

This exchange [*less than 1 line not declassified*] indicates that the news of the Department's turndown of a replacement for Shen is beginning to circulate rather widely. It seems likely that before long this development will become public, or at least will come to Peking's awareness through private contacts.

ROC reaction to the turndown also indicates that substantial demoralization is taking place within the Nationalist bureaucracy. The same ROC [*less than 1 line not declassified*] officer noted in late December that you had not been willing to receive Ambassador Shen after your November trip to Peking—as you had after previous trips to the PRC—and that you had not made a public reaffirmation of the U.S.–ROC defense relationship.[3] The Nationalist official indicated that he thought this was an indicator of a major shift in our relations away from Taipei toward Peking.

In this context, we need to consider how we should deal with Ambassador Shen's request to meet with Vice President Rockefeller and with a dormant but standing commitment for Brent Scowcroft to meet with Shen.

Shen's request to see the Vice President was included in his congratulatory letter (Tab A) to Mr. Rockefeller.[4] We recommend that the Vice President decline because such a meeting could create needless problems with the PRC and could give Shen a false impression of our intent on access. The Vice President could reply that he does not meet with Ambassadors.

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[3] Kissinger cancelled a meeting with Shen scheduled for December 3, 1974. Shen instead met with Ingersoll and Habib. (Telegram 266817 to CINCPAC Honolulu, December 7; ibid.) The briefing memorandum for this meeting noted that Shen had last called on Kissinger on November 29, 1973. (Memorandum from Hummel to Kissinger on November 27; ibid., Subject Files of the Office of ROC Affairs, E5412, Box 15, Lot 76 D 441, POL 17[d]-Amb. Shen's calls on State, W.H. Officials, 1974)

[4] Dated December 20, 1974, attached but not printed.

Our commitment to have Brent Scowcroft meet with Shen arose when we declined Shen's request to meet with the President before the President's trip to the Far East. Jack Froebe told Shen at that time, under instructions, that the President could not meet with him but that Brent Scowcroft would be pleased to do so after the President's return. It was not made clear whether we were to call Shen or he was to call us, but we are on the record as suggesting a Scowcroft/Shen meeting. Such a meeting, in the present context, might represent a convenient way to boost ROC morale slightly after the several blows Shen has received recently. It would also enable Brent to reinforce the message that the President gave Premier Chiang Ching-kuo in his recent letter.[5]

Recommendations:

a. That we inform Vice President Rockefeller's office that we recommend against a meeting with Shen.

b. That General Scowcroft invite Shen in for a brief call, citing our earlier statement that we would do so after the President's trip.[6]

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[5] Document 100.

[6] Kissinger initialed the Approve option under both recommendations.

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102. Letter From President Ford to People's Republic of China Premier Zhou Enlai[1]

Washington, January 23, 1975.

Dear Mr. Premier:

Please accept my congratulations on your appointment by the Fourth Session of the National People's Congress as Premier of the People's Republic of China.

I look forward to meeting with you later this year to discuss matters of common concern and interest. While, as you noted in your report to the Congress, fundamental differences remain between our two

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, 1974–77, Box 4, People's Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai. No classification marking. Solomon hand-delivered the letter to the PRCLO on January 23. On January 20, Solomon sent a draft to Kissinger with a recommendation that he send it to the President. (Ibid.) Kissinger sent it to the President on January 23 under an undated covering memorandum with the recommendation that Ford sign it.

countries, I remain hopeful that through common efforts we can overcome these differences and advance the cause of normalizing Sino-American relations and thus fulfill the joint commitment expressed in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972.[2]

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

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[2] Kissinger, in his undated covering memorandum, wrote, "Your reply is intended to convey the implication that it will take joint efforts to overcome these differences if we are to make further progress in normalizing Sino-American relations. I believe this is the most effective posture for you to adopt in advance of your trip to Peking later this year."

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103. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford[1]

Washington, January 27, 1975.

SUBJECT

China's National People's Congress Formalizes the Continuity of the PRC's Recent Policies: But Where is Mao?

Following is an analysis of the results of Peking's recent National People's Congress which I thought you might find of interest.

Peking's long-delayed National People's Congress was held secretly between January 13 and 17. Prior to the session the Chinese Communist Party convened a three day Central Committee Plenum which gave formal approval to the list of Congress delegates and the basic documentation, and elevated Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing to membership in the Politburo's Standing Committee and to a Party Vice Chairmanship. Premier Chou En-lai delivered a political report in person to the Congress in which he confirmed continuity of Peking's foreign and domestic policies of the past several years. As well, senior

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Advisor, Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 13, People's Republic of China. Secret. Sent for information. All brackets are in the original. Ford initialed the memorandum. On January 21, Solomon sent Kissinger a draft of this memorandum. (Ibid.)

leaders we have been dealing with since 1971 have, without exception, been reaffirmed in high state positions. Civilian control over the military has been strengthened, and the organization influence of the left wing of the Communist Party has been further attenuated. The one curious note in these proceedings has been the absence of Chairman Mao as a direct participant. His policies, however, are strongly represented in the Congress documents.

Continuity in Key Personnel

The Congress reappointed Chou En-lai as Premier of the State Council. One senses that Chou is now resuming a more active political role after a period of illness. He not only delivered the political report to the Congress but also left his hospital to participate in the funeral of a long-time associate a few days before the leadership meetings began. How much of his old work load Chou will reshoulder remains to be seen. My own guess is that he will continue to delegate much of the day-to-day business to Teng Hsiao-p'ing and other deputies, and increasingly play the role of a Mao—arbiter of key political decisions and above the play of administration and bureaucratic politics.

Yeh Chien-ying was formalized as Minister of Defense, thus confirming Teng Hsiao-p'ing's hint to me during my November trip that such a development was in the offing. The elderly Yeh represents continuity for Mao's national defense policy, although his appointment probably is a reflection of continuing problems with the military, from which the Party was unable to draw a younger candidate. The Congress explicitly named Mao as Commander-in-Chief of China's armed forces, thus reasserting Party control over the military.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua was formalized as Foreign Minister. He was not, however, made a Vice Premier (as was his long-term predecessor Chen Yi). This suggests Ch'iao's domestic political base remains rather narrow, or that he is somewhat controversial. Mao, for example, has contemptuously referred to the Foreign Minister on several occasions as "Lord Ch'iao"; and Teng Hsiao-p'ing needled him in front of the Fulbright Congressional delegation by referring to himself [Teng] as a "rural bumpkin" and then characterizing Ch'iao as a "foreign bumpkin."

PRC Liaison Office Chief Huang Chen, who was a delegate to the Third National People's Congress in 1964, was—for unknown reasons—*not* a delegate to the present session. Huang left Peking for Washington while the Congress was in session, although he did presumably participate in the Central Committee Plenum which preceded it.

Attenuation of the Political "Left"

The list of Ministerial posts confirmed by the Congress indicates that the left wing of the Chinese Communist Party, which we have hypothesized has been on the political defensive during the past three

years (despite their polemicizing in the press), was further attenuated in its organizational influence at the Congress. Mao's wife Chiang Ch'ing, the young Shanghai leader Wang Hung-wen, and the propagandist Yao Wen-yuan, are noticeable in their absence from posts in the state administration. None of the three were even made members of the permanent presidium of the NPC; and it is difficult to identify newly appointed state officials who represent the Party's left wing.

Conversely, there are a number of appointments which clearly go against the influence of the left. The Minister of Education, for example, is a professional bureaucrat who was criticized and removed from office during the Cultural Revolution for supporting a "bourgeois" educational line. The left has attempted to repoliticize the Chinese educational system since the summer of 1973, but these efforts have apparently failed. The Secretary-General of the Congress, in addition, is a man who was under attack from the left in 1974 for having allowed the performance of a play in 1973 which was a veiled ridicule of Chiang Ch'ing.

In policy terms, however, there are several areas where compromises with the left appear to have been made. The Revolutionary Committees of the Cultural Revolution era—through which the left and military exercised administrative power—are given permanent status, although they are clearly placed under Party and state control. Similarly, the new state constitution affirms the legitimacy of mass debates via big character posters, which the left used during the Cultural Revolution to attack Party "revisionists." As well, Chou En-lai—known for being a balancer of political factions—made several verbal bows in the direction of policies supported by Mao's wife, but these seem unlikely to have a major influence on the otherwise moderate program approved by the Congress.

Implications for the Succession

We have assumed for some time that the 63 year old Shanghai leader Chang Ch'un-ch'iao—who hosted President Nixon in that city in 1972—is a good bet as one of the more likely leaders for a successor to Party and state leadership after Mao and Chou leave the scene. Chang appears to have eclipsed his younger protégé Wang Hung-wen at the Congress by reading the delegates a report on the new state constitution. (Wang delivered the report on the Party Constitution at the 10th Party Congress in 1973.) Chang appears to be situated in both the Party and state systems as a key "organization man," positioned to be able to build a national political following over the long run. At the same time, the overall list of ministerial appointments indicates that the generation of leaders in their 50s and 60s has yet to take the reins of national leadership. The Congress returned administration of the state apparatus to men in their 70s who were removed from power during the Cultural Revolution. China remains a gerontocracy.

The new state constitution does *not* provide for a chief of state. Thus the post which Mao held concurrently with his position as Party chairman until 1959, has been abolished. This is a victory for Mao in that Lin Piao had tried to gain the post of state chairman in 1970. Mao objected to there even being such a post at that time as a way of undercutting Lin's efforts to consolidate his power. The fact that the new constitution is consistent with Mao's view of 1970 can be seen as evidence of the Chairman's continuing influence, as well as the leading role of the Party over the state bureaucracy.

Continuity of Foreign and National Defense Policies

The Congress documents express support for "Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs" and assert that "we [Chinese] should ally ourselves with all the forces that can be allied with." As well, the key Congress documents reaffirm Mao's national defense policy when they express support for his "principle" of "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony."

At the same time, the Congress communiqué calls on China to ally with the Third World and to support the Second World in their struggle against "superpower control, threats, and bullying." The document also asserts that "the contention for world hegemony between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, is becoming more and more intense. The factors for both revolution and war are increasing. The peoples of all countries must get prepared against a world war."

Chou En-lai's political report makes it clear that the *Soviet Union* remains China's primary security problem, and that Peking has not relented in its political feud with Moscow, which he predicted will continue "for a long time." The Premier asserts in his speech that the "Soviet leading clique has betrayed Marxism-Leninism" and indicates that Peking's intransigent stand on the border negotiations has not changed: "We [Chinese] wish to advise the Soviet leadership to sit down and negotiate honestly, do something to solve a bit of the [border] problem and stop playing deceitful tricks."

Chou makes a brief and low-key statement on *Sino-American relations* that seems intended to convey to us the message that Peking looks to the U.S. to "earnestly" follow through on the terms of the Shanghai Communiqué:

> There exist fundamental differences between China and the United States. Owing to the joint efforts of both sides the relations between the two countries have improved to some extent in the last three years, and contacts between the two peoples have developed. The relations between the two countries will continue to improve so long as the principles of the Sino-American Shanghai Communiqué are carried out in earnest.

Regarding *Taiwan*, the Premier's report asserts in familiar terms, "We are determined to liberate Taiwan! Fellow countrymen in Taiwan and people of the whole country, unite and work together to achieve the noble aim of liberating Taiwan and unifying the Motherland!"

Economic Policy: How to Control a "Rightist" Line?

The Congress approved an economic policy line which allows for contract labor, private plots, and the continuity of the commune system as it was in the early 1960s. This is the same set of policies which was criticized heavily during the Cultural Revolution, and for which men like Teng Hsiao-p'ing were removed from power. This indicates that PRC leaders remain concerned about their economic base, and will attempt to make a big push in economic production in the coming year. Premier Chou indicated in his speech that the PRC leadership sees the coming decade as "crucial" for consolidating a viable economic system.

The "rightist" economic line approved by the Congress is very likely the subject of controversy within the leadership, however. Chou En-lai's political report revealed, for example, that China's recent policy of importing foreign technology has drawn criticism from the "left" as representing "servility to things foreign." He indicates all the same that imports will continue, but stresses the goal of developing an independent economy. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's report on the constitution contains the one overtly threatening political note of the Congress when he warns that "in some [economic] enterprises the form is that of socialist ownership, but the reality is that their leadership is not in the hands of Marxists and the masses of workers. The bourgeoisie will seize hold of many fronts if the proletariat does not occupy them." Chang seems to hint at political pressures on economic managers to counteract the otherwise rightist economic line.

Where Was Mao?

Mao Tse-tung was conspicuous by his absence from both the Central Committee Plenum and Congress. Ill health does not seem to be the issue, inasmuch as the Chairman received Maltese leader Dom Mintoff on January 9, and West German leader Strauss on January 16. Both meetings appear to have taken place in South China, where Mao has been for more than six months.

It is difficult to conclude from the Congress documents that Mao's political influence has diminished. The new state constitution reaffirms that "Mao Tse-tung thought" is one of the "theoretical bases guiding the thinking of our nation"; and the speeches of Premier Chou and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao make repeated references to the "principles" and policies of "our great leader Chairman Mao." Indeed, except for agricultural policy, the decisions of the Congress—designating the Chairman as commander of the PRC's armed forces, accepting Mao's

personal proposal that the constitution contain a provision ensuring the freedom of workers to strike, and abiding by Mao's view that there should be no state chairman—are unquestionably Maoist positions.

We would just note that in past periods of diminished power and conflict over policy Mao has "retreated" to the provinces and has absented himself from formal leadership conclaves. We do not know if Mao's current aloofness represents such a situation. There is tenuous evidence in the Chinese press that the Chairman wants to carry the struggle against political dissenters and military renegades through to the end. It is possible that while Mao accepts the consolidation of the bureaucratic organs of state power, as was accomplished by the National People's Congress, at the same time he wishes to avoid personal identification with this development as he has more disruptive political objectives in mind—such as purging remaining dissidents from the military. We do not know if this is the case, yet the questions raised by Mao's absence from the Party Plenum and Congress will be worth watching in the months ahead.

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104. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, February 8, 1975, 10:30–10:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

PRC
Amb. Han Hsu, Deputy Chief of Liaison Office
Mr. Chi Ch'ao-chu, PRC Liaison Office
Mrs. Shen Jo-yun, First Secretary of Liaison Office

United States
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff

Secretary Kissinger: I wanted to talk to you for a couple of minutes. I understand that Messrs. Habib and Lord have already talked to you about my trip. About the Gromyko visit, I don't know whether you know American football, but the Soviets act as if they were playing American football and they know only one play and are always

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Offices Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, China, unnumbered items, 2/5/75–2/28/75. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

running it. Their play is for Gromyko to see me so that they can pretend that they are part of the process. I am seeing him at the end of my discussions so it is clear that they are not part of it. We will have a meaningless conversation on the Middle East with him. They have told us that they want to raise other issues. We will not raise other issues. We will let you know when we return what we discussed.

In addition to visiting the people already announced, I plan to see the Shah in Switzerland on this trip. This is really all I need to add about the trip to what my colleagues told you.

Ambassador Han: As Vice Premier Teng told you in Peking, on the Middle East question we support the Palestinian Arabs at the same time that we support the way you are dealing with the Russians.[2]

Secretary Kissinger: There will be no results on this trip. We are planning for results in March, not now. We are trying to create the objective conditions on this trip for results in March.

Now I would like to say a word to you about Cambodia. We hear many Chinese views through the French Ambassador [in Peking],[3] but we are not always sure that the French Ambassador's emotions are in tune with his reason. I want to make clear that we are prepared for an outcome of a government which will be headed by Prince Sihanouk, as I already indicated in November, with the idea that some elements of the existing structure in Phnom Penh, but not Lon Nol, might be integrated into the government of Prince Sihanouk. If Prince Sihanouk wanted to hear from us rather than the French Ambassador, we would be glad to authorize a member of our Embassy to explain our position to Prince Sihanouk or to a person designated by Prince Sihanouk.

So this is the message I wanted to send to your Foreign Minister. I am sure you are fully authorized to answer it immediately (laughter).

Ambassador Han: As I have said to Mr. Habib, the Chinese position on this matter is that we wish that the United States not interfere in Cambodian internal affairs and that the Cambodian people should be left to solve their problems by themselves. The Chinese position is to give complete support to the just struggle of the Cambodian people and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Cambodia. Just recently Prince Sihanouk and GRUNK reiterated their determination to continue the struggle and not engage in peaceful negotiations, and we support their position.

Secretary Kissinger: I would appreciate your passing this message to your Foreign Minister, and you can communicate the answer to Habib, or to me after I return.

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[2] See Documents 93 and 97.

[3] Brackets in the original.

Ambassador Han: I will report this. I don't know if there is anything new, though.

Secretary Kissinger: I am not surprised by your answer but I would appreciate your reporting this for the record, and since this is an official communication I am assuming that your government will give us an answer.

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105. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford[1]

Washington, March 3, 1975.

SUBJECT

Chou En-lai's Message of Appreciation to You

On February 21, I called in Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China, for a brief review of the results of my recent trip to the Middle East and the discussion with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva.[2]

During the meeting Ambassador Huang asked me to transmit to you a letter of appreciation from Premier Chou En-lai in response to your letter to Chou of January 23 congratulating him on his reappointment as Premier of the State Council by the Fourth National People's Congress.[3]

Chou's letter, at Tab A, conveys a friendly if somewhat reserved air.[4] It expresses welcome in anticipation of your visit to Peking later this year, and expresses the hope that there will be continuous improvement in U.S.–PRC relations on the basis of earnest implementation of the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué.

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, 1974–77, Box 4, People's Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai. Confidential. Sent for information. Ford initialed this memorandum. On February 24, Solomon sent a draft of the memorandum to Kissinger with a recommendation that he sign and pass it on to the President. (Ibid.)

[2] A memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which lasted from 6:45 until 7:05 p.m., is ibid., Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, China, unnumbered items, 2/5/75–2/28/75.

[3] Document 102.

[4] Tab A, dated February 19, is attached but not printed.

I received a similarly worded note of appreciation from Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, who also expressed interest in the discussions which will be held later in the year.

We will, of course, be taking a hard look at the various political issues which might be put on the agenda of your discussions in Peking some months in advance of the China summit meeting, perhaps in a trip which I might make to the PRC shortly after the anticipated Brezhnev visit.

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106. Memorandum From W. Richard Smyser and Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger[1]

Washington, April 11, 1975.

SUBJECT

Again, on the Leadership of the Chiang Kai-shek Funeral Delegation

We understand that Chief Justice Burger is unable to accept the responsibility of heading up the delegation to Chiang Kai-shek's funeral. We feel very strongly that we will be making a mistake of the most serious proportions if Secretary Butz heads up the delegation. We now have ample indication in reporting from Taipei that if the Secretary of Agriculture were the leading figure it would generate a major outcry from Americans friendly to the ROC and engender great bitterness in Taiwan.[2]

Let us emphasize the following arguments (which lead us to the conclusion that the Vice President remains the best choice to head up the delegation):

—Having repeatedly reassured Peking on the direction of our China policy (most recently in the President's speech of last evening),[3]

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 4, People's Republic of China. Confidential. Sent for Action. Scowcroft initialed this memorandum.

[2] As reported in telegram 1864 from Taiwan, April 10, the Embassy received many complaints from Chinese and Americans in Taipei over the "insulting" selection of Secretary Butz to represent the United States (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

[3] In Ford's April 10 address to Congress on U.S. foreign policy, he declared, "we are firmly fixed on the course set forth in the Shanghai communiqué," and noted that he would visit China later in the year in order "to accelerate the improvement in our relations." (*Public Papers: Ford, 1975,* vol. I, pp. 469–470)

if the PRC domestic political situation will turn against us on the symbolic matter of the Vice President attending the funeral, an argument can be made that our relationship with Peking is so fragile that it is no relationship at all. PRC leaders are in the political big-leagues, and they should be able to put their priorities in proper perspective. Moreover, they are more likely to respect us if we behave with dignity and a sense of self-confidence in difficult times; and to humiliate an old ally by sending an obviously insulting funeral delegation will not engender respect in Peking. It will be seen as a sign of weakness.

—The outcry we will get from Americans friendly to the ROC, and the press, if Secretary Butz heads the delegation, will significantly complicate our domestic political problems later this year if we wish to fully normalize relations with Peking. As Barry Goldwater's letter to the Secretary indicates, our decision on this issue could mobilize the ROC's supporters in a serious way.[4]

—We will engender great bitterness in Taiwan if Butz heads the delegation, which also will make it much more difficult to elicit compliance from ROC officials if we wish to alter our status with them later this year. We have clear indications that Taipei is already disturbed about the aloof quality of the official condolence messages that have been sent to them on behalf of the President.

Recommendation:

For these reasons, we (including Win Lord), strongly urge you to choose one of the following options—which are in decreasing order of desirability:

(1) Have the Vice President head the delegation.[5]
(2) Reclame on the Chief Justice.
(3) Have Secretary Morton head the delegation.

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[4] Goldwater's letter was not found. Communications questioning the selection of Butz from Senator Strom Thurmond, Representative John Myers, Senator Jesse Helms, Senator Hiram Fong, and the Reverend Billy Graham are in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 4, People's Republic of China.

[5] None of these options is marked, but the decision was to send the Vice President. Habib met with Han Xu to inform him in advance of the public announcement about Rockefeller's attendance at Jiang Jieshi's funeral: "I explained that this action, which had no international political meaning, was purely in response to our internal requirements and regular custom. I emphasized that our policy continued to be governed by the Shanghai Communiqué and Peking could be confident the Vice President would make no international political comments in Taipei." (Memorandum from Habib to Kissinger, April 12; ibid., NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 39, Solomon Subject Files)

107. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib) to Secretary of State Kissinger[1]

Washington, April 22, 1975.

Vice President Rockefeller's Attendance at Chiang's Funeral

The attendance of the Vice President at Chiang's funeral served our China interests well. His presence reassured Taiwan that America continues to act responsibly and with dignity in dealings with it. Instead of a brooding and distrustful ROC complicating the already difficult Taiwan problem, by sending the VP we gained credit which can be useful in moving the ROC in desired directions. This has been achieved without a public sound from Peking on the subject.

The VP carried out your suggestions without deviation. He did not discuss China issues with the press and his public remarks while on Taiwan were confined to arrival and departure statements which you earlier reviewed. The VP resisted suggestions by Senator Fong to incorporate greater warmth and a personal note in his arrival statement references to President Chiang. In his substantive meeting with the Premier, he read from his talking points and avoided mention of commitments. A report of this meeting is attached.[2]

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[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, E5412 Lot Files 77 D 255, Subject Files of the Office of ROC Affairs, 1951–75, Box 16, Letters, Memos, Etc., Pres. Chiang. Secret. Burton Levin, Director of the Office of ROC Affairs, drafted this memorandum on April 18.

[2] This report, White House telegram 50708, April 17, is not attached, but a copy is in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Box 4, People's Republic of China.

108. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Gleysteen), the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord), and Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger[1]

Washington, May 8, 1975.

SUBJECT

Your Tour d'Horizon with Huang Chen on Friday, May 9, 1975, at 5:00 p.m.

You requested this meeting with PRC Liaison Office Chief Huang Chen for a general review of international developments. The Chinese interpreter for this session is likely to be Miss Shen Jo-yun. Mr. Chi has returned to Peking. We mention this in part because Miss Shen's English is not up to Mr. Chi's standard, and hence some of the more elliptical ways of discussing the delicate issues which will be covered in this session may not get through to her. In addition, we have always wondered about Miss Shen's particularly close association with Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing. She (Shen) has not presented herself as open and flexible on political issues, or as sympathetic to the American connection, as Mr. Chi.

The following memorandum has been put together with two purposes in mind. Primarily it is to brief you for your meeting with Huang. However, we also use the tabbed sections on the various topics for discussion to review developments since your November, 1974 visit to Peking, inasmuch as you indicated an interest in covering a wide range of topics with Huang. We are concerned about the length of the memo, but feel it is the best way to bring you up to date for your tour d'horizon.

The Objectives of the Meeting

This will be your first major substantive discussion with a PRC official since your last trip to Peking in November, 1974. In the interim, developments in Indochina and elsewhere have radically transformed the political context within which both we and the Chinese are operating. (We review changes in this context in some detail below.) We see four primary purposes to be served by the meeting:

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, China, unnumbered items (12), 5/8/75–5/9/75. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Solomon initialed for Habib, Gleysteen, and Lord. A handwritten notation indicates that a copy was sent to Scowcroft. The memorandum is on National Security Council stationery.

—*Global:* To project firmness and purposefulness regarding the Administration's foreign policy; a sense of determination to persist in efforts to influence world events in order to attain the primary goals of our foreign policy—despite the developments in Indochina and our domestic political mood. In this regard, you should outline the state of play and our objectives in various key areas, including: the Soviet factor in world affairs; the President's trip to Europe and our relations with NATO and Japan; prospects for the Middle East and Persian Gulf, etc.

—*Asia:* To caution the Chinese about the threat to our shared interests if recent developments in Indochina heighten tensions in other parts of Asia. You should, in particular, indicate concern about possible developments in Korea in the wake of Kim Il-song's visit to Peking. At the same time, you should mention the problems we both now face in stabilizing the region so that the Soviets are impeded in their efforts to seek greater access to Southeast and Northeast Asia. In effect, you should imply possible linkage between Chinese cooperation on third-country issues and further progress in our bilateral relations.

—*Bilateral:* To further position ourselves for the dialogue in coming months on normalization. Bilateral relations should not comprise a major element in this particular discussion. However, you should obliquely indicate to Huang that the domestic political forces which have been mobilized in the wake of the collapse of the American position in Indochina will not be helpful to the evolution of U.S.–PRC relations. At the same time, you should state that we continue to adhere to the normalization process, and perhaps make some low-key reference to the question of the timing of the President's visit to Peking. You may also wish to indicate an interest in sustaining a visible political relationship over the coming months, as by raising the question of the timing of a Congressional visit to the PRC in the next four months (as was agreed to in principle last November), or by responding to Huang's request that his wife have an opportunity to call on the First Lady.

You should assume that the Chinese are somewhat confused, and perhaps actively disturbed, by apparently contradictory statements on China policy made recently by the President, yourself, and Secretary Schlesinger—particularly Mr. Ford's statement in his press conference of May 6 that he intends to "reaffirm our commitments to Taiwan."[2] You should not initiate a defensive comment on these apparently contradictory statements, but wait to see whether Huang raises any questions about them. If he does not, at the end of the session you might

[2] A transcript of this press conference is printed in *Public Papers: Ford, 1975,* vol. I, pp. 641–652.

conclude by stating that our commitment to normalization is unchanged, and that particular attention should be paid to the President's speech to the Congress of April 10, and your press conference of April 29, as authoritative expressions of our constant position.[3]

—*Chinese views:* To seek to draw Huang Chen out on PRC perceptions of recent developments and their immediate intentions in the Asian region and elsewhere. In preparing for this discussion he will have received some new substantive guidance from Peking. Conceivably you will be able to gain some insight from him regarding Chinese perspectives on recent developments—rather than just conducting the kind of monologue that has characterized most of your sessions with Huang.

The Altered Political Context

The rapid erosion of the American presence in Indochina and other developments (e.g., southern NATO and the Middle East) has substantially altered the political climate within which we and the PRC will operate over the coming year. For the U.S. the collapse of friendly governments in Saigon and Phnom Penh has initiated a period of retesting our relationships with other governments in Asia. Inevitably the prospect is one of some further reduction of our ability to project American influence in the region.

Recent developments have also substantially complicated the political context which will affect the normalization process. Domestic critics of normalization will assert the need to hold to all existing security relationships to prevent the further erosion of trust in our intentions and the credibility of our commitments. Friendly foreign governments which still look to the U.S. for security assistance will interpret our actions over the coming months as indicators of how we are reordering our priorities and coping with Congressional constraints on foreign policy.

As far as Peking's reaction to recent devents is concerned, we have received multiple indications from diplomatic and CAS reporting that the Chinese hope for a sustained, if consolidated, American role in Asia and the world—principally in countering the Soviets. As Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua (perhaps posturing somewhat for his audience) told a group of British journalists in late April, "The Communist victory in Vietnam has unloaded a burden off the back of the United States, and now they can maybe play a more positive role in the Pacific. Certainly, the Soviets will expand anywhere they are able."

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[3] See footnote 3, Document 106. The text of Kissinger's April 29 press conference is printed in Department of State *Bulletin,* May 19, 1975, pp. 625–633.

For Peking, the stunningly rapid insurgent victories in Vietnam and Cambodia have generated substantial new forces which will require the PRC to play a more active role in the Asian region. The Chinese already face increasingly difficult policy choices between their ideological pretentions, the interests of neighboring allies, the PRC's own national objectives, and the maneuverings of the Soviets. As was most vividly revealed in Kim Il-song's visit to Peking, China's ideological and geographical neighbors are pressing (in the face of an uncertain American presence in the region) to pursue their own interests in ways which cut across Peking's foreign policy objectives. Both Pyongyang and Hanoi have shown considerable skill in influencing Peking through a combination of dealings with the Soviets and cultivation of China's would-be "third world" constituency.

The Chinese are undoubtedly more concerned than ever now about the Russians finding openings in areas on their immediate periphery. This might come about through diplomatic maneuvering, as Hanoi, Bangkok, and other states in the region seek greater security and political flexibility through balanced big-power pressures. It might also come about as a result of the development of new areas of instability—as seems most likely in Korea. By all evidence, Peking continues to see its interests served by further developing its relationship with the U.S. and does not desire to push the American presence totally out of Asia. The Chinese do, however, seem to look toward further consolidation of our military presence, limited perhaps to Japan, Okinawa, and Guam.

Our problem, in this regard, is how to develop a positive working relationship with the Chinese on regional issues of mutual concern (as should be the case, in particular, in Korea). We are increasingly faced with a situation where the Chinese expect our help in areas of high concern to them where their ability to act is limited (as in their repeated requests for aid to Pakistan, their diplomatic support for your negotiating efforts in the Middle East, and—most generally—their encouragement of our efforts to counter the Soviets) while they remain aloof and generally uncooperative in areas central to their security (as in Indochina and Korea).

While one can explain away this situation in terms of the complicated game Peking must play in maneuvering between the interests of its small peripheral neighbors and Soviet pressures, it nonetheless creates a situation where people increasingly ask, "What are we getting out of our relationship with the PRC?" In short, the Chinese must understand (as perhaps they do) that the domestic political consensus which thus far has supported normalization is changing—and with it the prospects for developing the kind of a relationship which would enhance the security of both the PRC and the U.S.

Specific Areas for Discussion

At the following tabs are brief summaries of recent developments in the specific areas we believe you should cover in the discussion. The summaries are followed by suggestive talking points. We present the various topics roughly in the order we think they should be raised.[4] As noted above, we believe bilateral issues should be downplayed, and left for the end of the discussion, although some low-key clarification of the President's May 6 press conference remarks on Taiwan is in order.

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[4] Attached but not printed are briefing papers and talking points prepared by the NSC Staff on Indochina, Korea, the Soviet Union, Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and U.S.–PRC bilateral relations.

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109. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, May 9, 1975, 5:35–6:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office in Washington
Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter
Yang Yu-yung, Notetaker

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT

Tour d'Horizon with Huang Chen

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, I haven't seen you for a long time.

Ambassador Huang: You must be very busy.

Secretary Kissinger: We have had an active period.

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Offices Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, China, unnumbered items (12), 5/8/75–5/9/75. Secret; Sensitive. This meeting took place in the Department of State. All brackets are in the original.

I thought it would be useful if we had a review of the international situation, and Indochina.

We've had Prime Minister Lee Kuan-yew here the last two days. Now I know so many Chinese proverbs that you had better be careful.

Would you like to start?

Ambassador Huang: I would like to hear Mr. Secretary's views.

Secretary Kissinger: I know you are a great believer in counter-attack.

Ambassador Huang: Soldiers are used to all kinds of attacks.

Secretary Kissinger: I will make a few observations. I read an editorial in the *People's Daily*; there was one comment I didn't fully agree with. It said that the United States is in a period of strategic passivity. The chief victim in the editorial was not the U.S., so I am not complaining. There are many points in the assessment with which I agree, especially regarding your northern neighbor, who was the chief target of the attack.

My main point is that we are not in a period of strategic passivity, and we will not remain passive. We now need a brief period of reassessment, but in many respects we are in a psychologically stronger period as we don't have to debate Vietnam every week.

So, my main point is that we have absolutely no intention of remaining passive. There is absolutely no change in our assessment of the dangers of hegemony as they are expressed in the Shanghai Communiqué. That will be the guideline of our policy.

With regard to specifics: Our relationship—we maintain fully the principles and objectives of the Shanghai Communiqué. Occasional statements which may not be fully in accord with these objectives are purely due to inadvertence.

Secondly, with regard to our general approach, we will maintain close relations with Japan, and with some of our friends in Southeast Asia. We believe that we now will see an evolution of the Soviet's Asian Security System, which we do not favor. It is up to other countries to consider their views about hegemonies within their region. On the whole we don't favor it. But we will cooperate in preventing it where there is a reasonable chance of preventing it—but we won't do other people's work for them.

With respect to Korea, I want to make clear that under no circumstances will we tolerate a military attack on Korea, and a military attack on Korea will involve the certainty of American involvement. We will support peaceful evolution on the Korean Peninsula. We are prepared to discuss measures which would bring about the dissolution of the United Nations Command. And we will work to create

conditions for coexistence on the Peninsula. But we are not prepared to accept another attack on the American presence.

In the Middle East, I see two main dangers: one, the danger of Soviet domination; the other is the danger of diplomatic stagnation. The one is related to the other. We will not accept a diplomatic stalemate. You should not be deluded by our public debate at this moment. We are organizing ourselves to have a confrontation with special pressure groups, and will insist on territorial concessions by Israel.

We have not decided whether to adopt a step-by-step approach, or to work towards an interim solution. In any event, we will maneuver so as to make it clear that a solution will have been achieved substantially through American efforts.

We will discuss—we may discuss some of these issues with the Soviet Union, but always from a position of prior agreement with the Arabs and Israel, so that the Soviets will be in a position to ratify, not to create, terms.

Your government might like to know that on the opening day of the Suez Canal a U.S. ship will be the only warship to traverse the canal—it probably will be an aircraft carrier.

So, after we have met with President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin, you can expect significant American initiatives in the Middle East.

With respect to NATO, to Europe: As you know the President is going to NATO in order to strengthen our relations with the allies. There will be no American withdrawals from anywhere—except Thailand—during this Administration, but especially from Europe—except for Taiwan. I am not talking about total withdrawals—

Miss Shen: What did you mean about "total withdrawals?" Did you mean Taiwan?

Secretary Kissinger: No—we will proceed as we have told you, and we will keep you informed as we proceed. This is just a general discussion.

Ambassador Huang: The sounds of "Taiwan" and "Thailand" are rather similar and are confusing to us.

Secretary Kissinger: That also happens with our public statements. (Laughter)

In Europe we have two objectives: To strengthen the defense; and to strengthen the left—as we discussed—no, to *prevent* the shift to left-wing parties.

Miss Shen: I got that.

Secretary Kissinger: I will meet with Gromyko in Geneva on the 19th and 20th. The purpose will be three-fold; there will be three major items: the European Security Conference, in which our basic strategy

is to remain two steps behind our allies; the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, in which we are trying to get agreement this year; and the Middle East. We will have nothing to tell him [about the Middle East situation] until after we talk to Israel and the Arabs.

There will be no other initiatives discussed [with Gromyko].

Now we expect the Brezhnev summit at the end of September or the first week in October, but the basic outline of our policy [regarding the Soviets] is as I have discussed it many times in China. Our assessment of the Soviet Union has not changed. The major point I want to make to the Ambassador and to your leadership is that we are determined to try to emerge from this period to rally all the forces opposed to hegemony.

So one problem we will have is that—I have noticed that with respect to India your relations have cooled, as have ours.

With respect to Iran, our relations are close and will become closer.

One problem we have, as I have said before, is that we think that when we pursue parallel objectives, we should avoid peripheral confrontations. The President has asked me to tell your leadership that he is determined to pursue the course that we have discussed in the past.

Your Foreign Minister told a group of foreigners that he thought we could emerge stronger from this period. We believe this also.

So these are the main things. We would like to hear the current views of your leaders on the President's visit to Peking, [your views] as to timing, agenda, and preparations.

Ambassador Huang: Are you through?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador Huang: As for you last point, we will welcome him [the President]. This point was covered in your discussions in Peking with the Vice Premier. As for us, any time will be convenient.

Secretary Kissinger: At some point, we would appreciate some concrete suggestions from you regarding timing, topics to be discussed, and what you expect to emerge [from the visit].

Ambassador Huang: Is there any plan from your side that I can report to Peking?

Secretary Kissinger: As to date, or to substance?

Ambassador Huang: The points you just covered. Have you envisaged anything regarding your President's visit to China?

Secretary Kissinger: Originally we thought about the period mid-November through the first week in December. And our thought, in terms of preparation was that we would work out a communiqué substantially in advance of the visit, to avoid complexities during the visit.

We would be delighted to welcome the Foreign Minister to Washington for that purpose.

Ambassador Huang: As for your plan, I will mention this to Peking. As for the Foreign Minister visiting Washington, it is inconceivable that he can come. We have stated the reasons why several times. Before you left Peking you said that you would visit again for that purpose.

Secretary Kissinger: We can arrange it that way also.

Ambassador Huang: It would be better if you come to Peking.

Secretary Kissinger: What is the view from Peking?

Ambassador Huang: Just now you have covered quite a few issues; we have learned of your views. I would like simply to put things this way: We have been consistent in our principled stand on various international issues. These principled positions are clearly stated in the Shanghai Communiqué, and in Dr. Kissinger's many conversations with Chairman Mao.

Just now Mr. Secretary has covered the Indochina question. We think it was a gross mistake for the U.S. to have its feet mired in the quagmire of Indochina. We have urged you to disengage yourself, and not to dilly dally. Now the U.S. has disengaged, and shaken off this burden. It should learn correct lessons from this experience.

Secretary Kissinger: Everyone should learn lessons from this.

Ambassador Huang: You should learn correct lessons from this.

As for the Korean question, our consistent position, all along we have consistently and resolutely supported the Korean people in their struggle for the independent and peaceful reunification of their country, for termination of the United Nations Command, and for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Korean Peninsula.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not asking you to change that position, but military action on the Peninsula would have grave consequences.

Ambassador Huang: And our position is consistent. As far as we know, the South Korean side, the Pak Chung-hee clique, has made provocations against the North, made attacks against them. And Chairman Kim Il-song has repeatedly stated his intention to carry on the struggle for the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea.

Secretary Kissinger: Just so he doesn't define "peaceful" too generously. We will not permit South Korean attacks against the North.

Ambassador Huang: And Chairman Kim Il-song has repeatedly stated his position on the independent and peaceful reunification of his country. We wouldn't necessarily accept your definition of peace. Kim Il-song's proposals were warmly received by all the people in Korea, and the Pak Chung-hee clique has disrupted them. The fact that the South Korean side has repeatedly made provocations and attacks is inseparable from their consideration that they have the support of the U.S. side.

Secretary Kissinger: We will do our utmost to prevent that [any actions by the South against the North]; but when war starts on the Korean Peninsula, it will be clear on which side of the line the troops are, and when that is known, we will take actions accordingly.

But we will take seriously what you have said.

Ambassador Huang [somewhat agitatedly]: I did not intend to come over here to have a conversation on Korea, but as you raised it, I intended to clarify our position.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand. We should understand your position. We are not objecting to your government's position in general; we are not asking you to change it.

Miss Shen: Ambassador Huang just said to me that we are not in a position to discuss these questions on behalf of the Koreans.

Ambassador Huang: Just now you have touched on relations between our two countries . . .

Secretary Kissinger: China and the United States?

Ambassador Huang: Yes. Our leaders have discussed [this issue] clearly during your visits to China, in the Shanghai Communiqué, and in your talks with Chairman Mao. Our relations can only develop if the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué are carried out in earnest.

Just now you touched on the European Security Conference, the SALT talks, and your visit with Gromyko. I have nothing to say about these points. But we appreciate the statement of a senior U.S. official not too long ago that [it was] in the spirit of Camp David, the spirit of Glasboro, and détente that the Soviet Union has expanded its power.

Secretary Kissinger: Who said that?

Ambassador Huang: You should know that!

Just now Mr. Secretary mentioned your relations with your allies and with Japan. We think this is very good. We think a powerful Europe and Japan are good. But I would like to ask how you intend to strengthen your relations with Europe and Japan?

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to say something about senior officials: There are only two who make policy, the President and myself. There are many who talk on the fringes. But I happen to agree with this assessment [of the official Ambassador Huang said he was quoting].

Ambassador Huang: You have only *two* senior officials in your government?

Secretary Kissinger: No, only two who make policy regarding the Soviets.

Now, how will we strengthen these relationships: First, we will sustain our policy of encouraging the Japanese to strengthen their ties with the People's Republic. We will work closely with them in developing

common policies on such issues as energy and food, and give them a sense of involvement in our policy making.

With Europe, we will assure them that we will not withdraw any forces during the remainder of this Administration. We will try to settle some arguments still existing between us and our European friends.

Again, for the information of your government, the French President will come to Brussels to have dinner with his colleagues. Afterwards he will meet with the President. This will be the first time a French President has participated in a NATO event.

We also want you to know that after my meeting with Gromyko, I will go to Berlin, Bonn, then Turkey, where we will have a meeting of the CENTO organization—Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey—and if the President goes to the European Security Conference, he will also stop in Berlin. This is for your private information. He also plans to stop in Warsaw, Belgrade, and Bucharest on the way back from the European Security Conference.

Ambassador Huang: Just now you are having a meeting with the foreign ministers of the Organization of American States. How are your relations with these countries?

Secretary Kissinger: Actually they are very good. This has been a positive meeting. Recent events—contrary to what the press is saying—their relations with us are important, they are improving.

Ambassador Huang: Africa. The other day I attended a reception given by the Ambassador of Senegal. I met your Assistant Secretary, Mr. Davis. He said that that afternoon you had received all the Ambassadors from Africa. How are your relations with these countries?

Secretary Kissinger: We will strengthen our relations; we will become more active. Mr. Davis is now in West Africa. In Angola, we hope that the group backed by the Soviets will not become dominant.

Ambassador Huang: I wouldn't like to take up too much more of your time. You must have much preparing to do.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. My schedule is that I will see Gromyko in Geneva on the 19th and 20th. Then I will be in Berlin on the 21st. I go to Ankara on the 22nd and 23rd. I come home on the 23rd, meet three days with the President, and then go to Europe for two days before the President for a meeting with the Energy Agency and the OECD. Then, I will go to Brussels to meet the President.

Ambassador Huang [as he rises to depart]: You are very busy.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, I am glad you came over and that we had this exchange of views.

(At this point the conversation concluded and the Ambassador and his party were escorted from the Secretary's office to the elevator.)

110. Editorial Note

On the morning of May 12, 1975, United States officials in Washington learned that the Khmer Rouge government of Cambodia had captured an American merchant ship, the *Mayaguez.* Because the United States did not have diplomatic relations with Cambodia, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll transmitted a message to the Cambodian Government through Huang Zhen, Chief of the People's Republic of China Liaison Office. Ingersoll declared that the seizure of the ship was "an act of international piracy" and stated, "the Government of the United States demands the immediate release of the vessel and of the full crew. If that release does not immediately take place, the authorities in Phnom Penh will be responsible for the consequences." (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, China, unnumbered items (13), 5/11–5/30/75)

According to telegram 110673 to Beijing, May 13, Huang refused to relay Ingersoll's message and replied, "This is your matter. It has nothing to do with us." The Department informed the Liaison Office that "Huang Chen will of course report to his govt in Peking, and we assume Chinese will inform Cambodians of our approach and their reaction." (Ibid.) The Department also asked that the Liaison Office deliver the same message to both the Chinese Foreign Ministry and the Cambodian Embassy in Beijing, an action accomplished on May 13. (Ibid.)

The same day, Deputy Premier Deng Xiaoping, while on a visit to Paris, received a question from a journalist about how his government would respond if the United States intervened to recover the *Mayaguez.* Deng laughed and said, "If they intervene, there is nothing we can do." (AP report from May 13; ibid.) The next day, the Chinese Foreign Ministry informed the Liaison Office, "it is not in a position to pass the U.S. message on to the Royal Government of the National Union of Cambodia and hereby returns the May 13 note of the U.S. side." (Telegram 925 from Beijing, May 14; ibid.)

On May 16, the Liaison Office reported that the *People's Daily* had quoted a Chinese official, Li Xiannian, as saying that the *Mayaguez* had been in Cambodian territorial waters at the time of its seizure. (Telegram 950 from Beijing, May 16; ibid.) In response, U.S. officials in Washington communicated to the Chinese Government their displeasure with anti-U.S. statements during the *Mayaguez* crisis. Richard Solomon informed Kissinger, "Per your instructions, Win Lord, Bill Gleysteen, and I met with Han Hsu of the PRC Liaison Office Friday afternoon to convey the points you authorized about the unhelpful impact of their public statements regarding the *Mayaguez* on our rela-

tionship." ("Welcome Home" Book Submission, May 23; ibid, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Convenience File, Box 40, Solomon Chronological File)

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111. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Liaison Office in China (Bush) to President Ford[1]

Beijing, May 23, 1975, 0758Z.

91. Brent, please pass the following to the President. I hope it will be shared only with SecState and not be passed to NSC Staff or Department. It is pure politics, but I feel strongly about it.

"Dear Mr. President:

After talking to Rog Morton when he was out here about domestic politics, I have a better feel for what is happening at home. It is his impression and mine that there is little focus in the U.S. on the political aspects of your trip to China.

The Taiwan issue is on the back burner right now as it relates to domestic politics. I am very concerned that as your trip to China approaches this will change dramatically. Your own personal interests dictate that serious thought be given to what is possible from a purely political standpoint.

Answers to the Taiwan question that may have been possible before the collapse in Cambodia and Viet Nam may no longer be any answers at all. I would strongly suggest the following:

(A) An in-depth poll be taken to measure public opinion on various solutions to the Taiwan question (the last poll, I believe, was by Gallup late last year). The poll should probe into opinion of conservatives and liberals and should sound out attitudes towards various solutions. Obviously this polling should be done in great confidence and commissioned by outside sources.

(B) An in-depth research job be done on what the conservatives in the U.S. have said and are likely to say on this issue. A similar study

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, China, unnumbered items (13), 5/11–5/30/75. Secret; Via Voyager Channel. Sent through Scowcroft.

should be undertaken on what the leading Democrats have been saying. N.B.: It seems to me that your political problems arising from this issue are quite different pre-GOP convention compared to post-GOP convention.

(C) Thought be given as to how to keep this issue from building into a major weapon for your opponents be they Republican or Democrat. Some will try to paint a China visit without a final solution to Taiwan as a diplomatic failure, an inability to solve the tough problems. Others, particularly the right wing, will soon start criticizing the visit itself and will be on guard to immediately criticize any concessions as a sell-out of Taiwan.

In this communication I am not attempting to go into the foreign policy merits of China options. I firmly believe, however, that your coming to Peking this year, whatever the concrete results, is the right thing to do. What is done at this stage to assess the politics of the visit should be separate from the foreign policy machinery and not in any way inhibit the thinking and planning which undoubtedly is going forward at the State Department and NSC. I an suggesting that a trusted confidant who would not be involved with this planning be encouraged to think out the domestic political implications of your China visit.

I have already discussed with the State Department my concern that work need be done fairly soon to minimize expectations. Many journalists are saying, 'the President can't possibly go to China without solving the Taiwan problem.' It is to your advantage to have this talk dampened, so that expectations be realistic not euphoric and that a visit that does not solve the big Taiwan problem will not, post facto, be considered a diplomatic failure.

Pardon my intrusion on your busy schedule, but, based on my own political past, I worry that this issue can build into a political nightmare unless a lot of pure political thought gets into it soon.

Barbara and I are happy out here. We feel we are most fortunate to be in this fascinating job in this fascinating land.

Warmest regards to Betty.

Sincerely, George"

112. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Habib), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Gleysteen), the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord), and Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger[1]

Washington, July 3, 1975.

SUBJECT

U.S.–PRC Relations and Approaches to the President's Peking Trip: Tasks for the Rest of 1975

Our China policy at present straddles two very contradictory trends: In one direction we are postured toward the objective established by the Shanghai Communiqué. The President, in his April 10 speech to the Congress, reaffirmed his interest in visiting Peking later this year in order to "accelerate" the normalization of relations.[2] In your May 9 session with Huang Chen you raised questions about the timing and agenda of the Presidential trip, and expressed interest in Peking's views on these issues.[3] Thus, publicly and privately we have sustained the expectation both for Chinese leaders and our own public that there is still momentum in the normalization process.

In the other direction, however, there are domestic and international political forces enhanced by events in Indochina, and sustained by developments elsewhere abroad, which raise new obstacles to change in our relationship with the Republic of China on Taiwan. Senator Goldwater's public challenge to the Administration at the time of the Chiang Kai-shek funeral[4] is but the most visible indicator of a range of pressures on the President to avoid or delay the modification of our legal and security relations with Taiwan which are at the heart of "normalization" with Peking. As a reflection of these pressures, the President has now publicly (if inadvertently) reaffirmed our commitments to Taipei, and you have stated both privately (to the Japanese Foreign

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience File, Solomon Chron File, Box 40, July 1–3, 1975. Top Secret; Sensitive; Completely Outside the System. Sent for action. The memorandum is on National Security Council stationery. All brackets are in the original.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 106.

[3] See Document 109.

[4] Goldwater's challenge was, "If they want to change our relationships with Taipei, as I told the President and I told Kissinger, they've got a helluva fight on their hands." As quoted in Lou Cannon, "Goldwater Warns President Against Abandoning Taiwan," *The Washington Post*, April 15, 1975, p. A2.

Minister) and publicly (in *U.S. News and World Report*) that the President's trip to Peking will not necessarily lead to full normalization.

Underlying these contradictory trends, of course, is the continuing importance to the U.S. of normalization with the PRC for the longer term restructuring of great power political and military relationships. This objective is now in conflict, however, with the immediate need to reassure key allies (and warn possible adversaries) in the wake of our Indochina setbacks. It is further complicated by the domestic political factors the President must consider as he faces re-election in 1976.

This memorandum seeks to give you a sense of several very different ways we might proceed in our relationship with Peking during the remainder of this year. We assume that the actual decisions the President will make on China policy this fall will be shaped by a combination of international developments during the next several months (particularly those associated with Middle Eastern diplomacy and Soviet-American relations) and his own judgment about the impact of possible further moves with Peking on both his foreign policy and domestic political future.

In order to give you a range of approaches to our dealings with the PRC during the remainder of 1975, we explore in the following sections of this paper the problems and issues associated with three ways of handling the Peking summit:

—An indefinite postponement.
—A "sustaining" visit.
—Full normalization.

• In addition, we review the issues which must be addressed if you wish to at least explore with Chinese leaders the terms for a comprehensive normalization agreement.
• We summarize the tasks which remain for this year in our dealing with the PRC irrespective of the type of summit you and the President wish to organize.
• We suggest some problem areas and themes relating to our official dialogue with the Chinese, and their relationship to your forthcoming discussions in Peking.
• In an appendix (Tab A) we review the PRC's current orientation toward the normalization process.[5]

Our own judgment is *not* that there should be "normalization at any price," but that long-term American foreign policy interests will be served by a consolidation of our present, if limited, relationship with Peking, and that we can *avoid* future problems with the PRC at a relatively low price as well as posture ourselves in Asia favorably for the

[5] Tab A, "Peking's Current Posture Towards Normalization," is attached but not printed.

future if an acceptable normalization deal can be worked out now. We believe that at minimum there are important reasons for making a serious attempt to explore with senior PRC leaders the terms for a comprehensive agreement on full normalization, even though the President will ultimately have to decide how far he can go. The Chinese—in the wake of Indochina developments—appear to be more anxious than ever to have a visible relationship with the U.S. for security reasons. Thus, they probably are as likely as they may ever be to accommodate our political needs; and while Mao and Chou still live there is the authority in Peking to strike a deal and implement it. The exact degree of Chinese flexibility on the most sensitive issue of Taiwan's future security, however, will only be known through direct negotiations.

At the same time, senior PRC leaders in recent days have publicly indicated that they will accept a Presidential visit which does *not* lead to full normalization. This gives us greater flexibility in planning for the President's trip, although there remain risks (primarily in China's domestic political process) in trying to sustain our relationship with Peking at its present level for several more years. Thus, we believe that if you can get substantial assurances from the Chinese on the Taiwan security question, and if other political and economic elements of a package agreement on normalization are positive, that our interests will be served by consummating a deal in association with the President's trip.

Three Approaches to the Peking Summit: Indefinite Postponement; a Sustaining Visit; or Full Normalization

We assume, without a review of all the arguments, that it is still a basic American foreign policy commitment to work toward the full normalization of U.S.–PRC relations, and to complete the process in as short a period of time as is politically feasible. The questions which remain are the precise terms for a normalization agreement, and the timing of their realization.

We also assume (as you indicated to Huang Chen on May 9) that whatever type of a Presidential trip you wish to organize will be preceded by an advance visit by yourself to negotiate the political issues. This advance could be scheduled either before or after the Brezhnev summit, although we feel there are political advantages to such a trip beforehand. A visit to Peking sometime after your July meeting with Gromyko (in August, or the second half of September) would presumably build additional heat on the Soviets in advance of the Brezhnev visit; and while the Chinese might be inclined to be less forthcoming on terms for normalization as a price for being played so obviously against the Russians, they would be concerned that a stalling of the U.S.–PRC relationship would incline us toward a closer relationship with Moscow.

From another perspective, Chinese uncertainty about the exact outcome of the Soviet summit (as will be the case prior to Brezhnev's visit to Washington) could provide a better context for your discussions in Peking than a post-summit situation where we might appear to PRC leaders to have moved toward greater "collusion" with Moscow. All the same, however, it can be argued that even substantial movement in Soviet-American relations will just motivate Peking to want to "keep up" with us rather than back away (as appeared to be the case last November after the Vladivostok summit meeting).

Our summary judgment of these considerations is that an advance visit to Peking by yourself before the Brezhnev summit would be most useful and timely. If you were to go to Peking in October or early November there would be the additional disadvantages of having minimal lead time before the President's visit to permit technical planning and preparations related to possible political developments. Such a late advance might force a delay in the President's trip until December or the early winter of 1976.

Indefinite Postponement of the Peking Summit

Inasmuch as we now have a fairly clear sense of the likely elements of a normalization agreement, you and the President may decide that the time is not ripe to consummate a fully normalized relationship with Peking, and that as a consequence the PRC summit should be postponed indefinitely. Such a determination presumably would be crystallized by the discussions you will hold during your advance trip, although if you do not wish to formalize the Chinese or American negotiation positions you might work out a postponement indirectly through contacts with the PRC Liaison Office.

The impact of an indefinite postponement of the Presidential trip would be substantial on both the future of the U.S.–PRC relationship and on our other international dealings. A major source of pressure on the Soviet Union would be called into question (although this might be of lessened short-term importance in the wake of a successful Brezhnev summit), and there would be a general sense abroad that the U.S.–PRC relationship was stalling out. Indeed, we assume that a decision on our part to postpone the President's trip to Peking would effectively freeze any substantial movement in the relationship until after the elections in the fall of 1976, presumably well into 1977.

In such circumstances, while the leaders in Peking that we have been dealing with will—by all currently available evidence—seek to sustain the relationship in its present form, we would be gambling that a number of developments would not occur which could close off the prospects of attaining a stable, fully normalized relationship with the PRC: Mao and/or Chou are quite likely to die in the next two or three

years. As a result there could well be a diffusion of the policy consensus and leadership coalition which now gives Peking's politics a coherence unknown for two decades.[6] Pressures which we have seen reflected in PRC media for a moderated policy toward the Soviet Union—a line which seems to emanate from the military—might find expression in a succession struggle. And the possibility of a change of Administration in Washington after 1976 could confront Peking with a new cast of characters they might well view without sympathy, and with whom they would have to build a dialogue de novo.

In short, delay risks the intervention of political forces which could substantially complicate efforts to normalize—a consideration which of course has to be weighed against the factors on the other side of the equation which should continue to make it in the national interests of both the PRC and U.S. to complete the process which you and President Nixon, Chairman Mao and Premier Chou initiated in 1970.

Based on the above considerations, we frankly assume that indefinite postponement of the Presidential trip is a non-option. The political rationale which led to the onset of the normalization process still holds true; and despite some cooling of the atmospherics in our dealings with the Chinese, the importance of a stable U.S.–PRC relationship for the larger structure of the Administration's foreign policy would make the virtual termination of the political dialogue with Peking and the elimination of even the optical aspects of our relationship more costly than, for example, a cosmetic Presidential trip. Furthermore, the Chinese are now signalling to us—in Teng Hsiao-p'ing's remarks to a group of American newspaper editors in early June, and in other official guidance which reaches us via CAS reporting—that they want the Presidential visit to be held whether or not it leads to full normalization.

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[6] There is increasing uncertainty, however, about the physical health and political standing of both Mao and Chou. Indications persist that the Chairman's relations with other senior leaders, particularly in the military, are somewhat strained; however, since his return to Peking in mid-April after a ten month absence, Mao has resumed an overtly active role in political affairs, as by receiving foreign visitors. At the same time, the Chairman's health (as always) appears to be deteriorating. Chou's health and role are also uncertain factors.

We find it very difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the impact of the current leadership situation on our bilateral relations with Peking, although we do have a general sense of Mao and Chou fading from the scene. Day-to-day affairs are ever-more firmly grasped by a "successor" group led by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao (on the Party side). We see no evidence, however, which would indicate that Mao and Chou will not continue to influence major foreign policy decisions, or that their foreign policy line of the past five years is being modified. [Footnote is in the original.]

A "Sustaining" Summit

If you and the President were to decide that Peking's terms for normalization are politically unacceptable, but that you wish to sustain a visible relationship with the Chinese, we believe that Peking would see its own interests served by an optical summit meeting which did not produce a major breakthrough to establishment of diplomatic relations. As senior Chinese leaders have repeatedly told you, while they wish to move on the Taiwan question, they are prepared to wait if the U.S. "needs Taiwan." The world press carried Teng Hsiao-p'ing's comment on June 3 that President Ford will be welcome in China even if there are no agreements on any major questions between the two countries [i.e., Taiwan].

We do not even totally rule out the interpretation that PRC leaders may *not* want to move on normalization at this time, either because they know our price is unacceptable to them in terms of their domestic politics or because they do not wish to induce further political changes in their region in the wake of Indochina developments which would give the Soviets additional openings that China might have to counter with limited assets. At least one can say that the present state of U.S.–PRC relations, and the American "holding" position on Taiwan, represent an acceptable minimum position in terms of PRC interests at this time.

We see two problems, however, with a cosmetic summit meeting designed just to sustain our relationship with Peking at its present level—each related to problems of constructing a meaningful agenda. There will be problems in formulating a significant outcome short of full normalization which would clearly justify a second Presidential visit to Peking. A trip merely to "exchange views on issues of common concern" could be criticized in the press as unworthy of the occupation of so much of Mr. Ford's time and an unnecessary commitment of Presidential prestige to a second visit to the Chinese capital. It would encourage cynicism about the U.S.–PRC relationship.

What agreements might we reach with Peking short of full normalization which would justify to our public a second Presidential trip? Thus far the Chinese have been unwilling to move with us on certain economic and exchange issues (solution of the claims/assets problem, or a more active cultural exchange relationship) in the absence of progress on the key political issue of Taiwan. The Chinese would have to re-evaluate this posture and be willing to show more flexibility in solving secondary issues than they have done to date. Thus, we might seek a final resolution of the claims/assets problem. Maritime or air transport agreements, or a governmental trade agreement, might be worked out "in principle" (although considerable time will be needed to negotiate the details of such arrangements). Or certain visible

cultural programs might be worked out, such as exchange of students or permanent press representation. In return, we might "give" Peking virtually full withdrawal of our military presence from the island (except for a residual intelligence and liaison cadre of a few hundred men), or a reduction of the level of our diplomatic representation.[7]

Based on Peking's position up to now, however, we have limited expectation that the Chinese will agree to further increments of the above sort without some fairly specific commitments to progress on the Taiwan issue. The problem the President faces, of course, is that any commitment he might make on the political issues really requires implementation in conjunction with his trip to Peking or its immediate aftermath. It will be difficult, for domestic political reasons, to reveal or institute substantial changes in our relationship with Taiwan during the 1976 campaign season; and the President presumably would not want to offer (and the Chinese would probably not accept) a political deal which is contingent upon his re-election—or left to the discretion of his successor.

A related agenda problem is reaction on the PRC side to a second summit meeting that does not solve the Taiwan question. Even though we believe senior PRC leaders wish to have a Presidential visit which may not produce a breakthrough, they may be faced with growing domestic pressures for some visible benefit to China from the Washington connection. A case can be made from a Chinese perspective that Peking has made all the compromises thus far while receiving little in return. Not only has Taiwan not been "liberated," but the U.S. has a new senior Ambassador there and the ROC has two additional consulates in the U.S. Trade is substantially in America's favor, is weakening China's "self-reliance," and is inducing PRC scientists to "worship foreign things." The cultural exchange program is exposing Chinese intellectuals to disturbing foreign ideas; while the American journalists and intellectuals who visit the PRC return to the U.S. to publicly criticize what they see in China, especially domestic political problems.

While the above sort of argument can be overdrawn, there is good evidence from CAS reporting that our bilateral contacts with the PRC have generated the above sorts of criticism, especially from China's political left. The argument that China increases her security against the Soviets by dealing with the U.S. is a very sophisticated rationalization accepted by a limited few. Indeed, China's military seems to be

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[7] See a more extensive check-list of possible areas for agreements which would sustain or broaden the relationship at Tab B. [Footnote is in the original. Tab B, a "Checklist of Possible Areas for Bilateral Agreements Which Would Strengthen U.S.–PRC Relations," is attached but not printed.]

a continuing source of pressure for a less hostile attitude toward the Russians (although we have no direct evidence of their opposition to dealings with the U.S.).

Given these considerations, the strategy of a "sustaining" agenda should be to include developments which will enable PRC leaders to hold the commitment of the "left" and military to our present relationship. Unilateral security actions we might take (such as further troop reductions from Taiwan), or proposals in such areas as technology transfer or military cooperation which would enhance PRC defenses, will be helpful in minimizing resistance to the relationship from the Chinese military. Unfortunately some of the things we need in order to cope with conservative American opinion, such as future sales of military equipment to Taiwan, will probably antagonize the PLA. Similarly, the kinds of cultural and scientific exchanges which will hold the interest of our intellectuals and journalists in the China relationship are exactly the programs which are seen as threatening by China's political radicals. Such contradictory factors will have to be balanced out in almost any trip agenda, but particularly in one which seeks to sustain the U.S.–PRC relationship in its present, semi-consummated condition.

A Normalization Summit

We believe that despite certain signs of a hardening in Peking's foreign policy orientation (such as increasing unwillingness to be cooperative with us on certain third country issues, their pressuring Japan on terms for a peace treaty, and somewhat more visible support for certain Maoist insurgent movements abroad) that the Chinese continue to see U.S.–PRC normalization as in their own interest. Developments in Indochina have sharpened PRC concerns about the Soviets having new political openings on their periphery; and we interpret the heightened visibility of Chinese support for North Korea and the new government in Cambodia as an effort to preempt Soviet access by presenting themselves to these and other countries in the region as a more reliable political ally than the Soviet Union. CAS reporting in recent weeks has revealed active concern among Chinese officials that President Ford might cancel his trip to Peking. Evaluated solely from the perspective of Peking's mood, the current context may be as favorable as we may have for some time (in terms of the motivation of the Chinese leadership, and the state of the PRC political system) for a move to full normalization.

If there is one crucial point of concern in Peking about their dealings with us, it is uncertainty about how far we will go with Moscow, and new doubts about how actively we can and will work to counter the Soviet presence in their region. While the Chinese will not be in a position to pressure us on our dealings with Moscow as they are now

attempting to do with the Japanese, there is no question that developments in Soviet-American relations in the coming months will be a major factor affecting the mood of the Peking summit.

The Chinese cannot demand that we give up "détente" as a price for normalization with them; but to the degree that we appear to be casting our dealings with the PRC solely in terms of our Soviet policy, we will heighten their fears about being exposed on security and political issues by their relationship with us. As Chou En-lai indicated to you as early as February, 1973, there are high-level concerns in Peking that we are dealing with them merely to get at the Soviets "by standing on China's shoulders."[8]

The implication of the above line of reasoning for the President's trip is that our approach to resolving the Taiwan question and finding terms for a fully normalized relationship—along with the outcome of the Brezhnev summit—will be an important test for the Chinese of how seriously we take our relationship with them. If we are correct in the assumption that the Chinese see normalization as much in their interest as ever, the effort to negotiate an agreement on your next advance trip should expose their maximum degree of flexibility, especially on the issue of Taiwan's security. Even if you are unable to achieve terms acceptable to the President, you will at least have put on the record for discussion at some future time as accommodating a position as the Chinese are likely to find acceptable. Moreover, we will be able to say to our own people (as well as to the Chinese) that we made a determined effort to reach agreement, and that we expect peaceful assurances on the Taiwan question before any future normalization deal can be made. In sum, we believe a serious effort should be made now to determine if agreement is possible.

Where do we now stand on the specific issues which must be addressed in negotiating a package normalization deal? Without reviewing in detail all the elements of such an agreement (which are discussed in the October, 1974 analysis, at Tab C),[9] following are the major points which remain at issue:

—*Recognizing the PRC as the "sole legal government"* of China, exchanging ambassadors, and upgrading our liaison offices to embassies. These developments will require working out arrangements to the following associated problems:

• Agreeing with Peking on some verbal formula by which we go beyond the Shanghai Communiqué statement that the U.S. "does not

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[8] See Document 8.

[9] Tab C, "The Operational Issues Associated With a Normalization Agreement," is attached but not printed.

challenge" the assertion of "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait" that Taiwan is part of China to *a more direct formulation implying or expressing support for the principle of the unity of China.* This could be an indirect approach stressing continuity with past American policy by reaffirming our commitment that Taiwan be returned to Chinese control as was expressed in the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, or it could draw on the precedents of other recent recognition formulas in which various states have "taken note of," "acknowledged," "recognized" or expressed "understanding and respect for" Peking's assertion that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. (Our specific position on this issue might be linked in negotiations to the degree of Peking's assurances on the future security of the island.)

• We will have to develop an understanding with Peking about *a residual (official or semi-official) presence on the island* to replace the withdrawal of our embassy. Peking has now rejected the notion of such a presence being called a "liaison office" or a consulate. We will presumably have to find some new verbal formulation (possibilities range from a broad formulation such as a "U.S. Representative's Office" or "Sino-American relations society" to a more narrowly conceived "trade office") and institutional arrangements which will make it possible for seconded State Department and other governmental personnel to handle our contacts with the authorities on Taiwan.

Undoubtedly Peking would prefer that our remnant presence in Taipei be formally unofficial—on the Japanese pattern. Such an arrangement, however, will be undesirable with regard to its impact on Taiwan and here at home. Furthermore, a preliminary analysis of such a non-governmental arrangement indicates there would be significant problems related to USG funding, the handling of consular matters, and management of a military sales program, if our Taipei embassy operation were to be taken over by a private American association. In addition, unless we maintain a government consulate in Taipei (by whatever name), the need for Congressional legislation to enable us to fund and conduct USG business through a private association would open up the Administration to the complicating political effects of legislators on the Hill shaping the process of institutionalizing a normalized China policy. These aspects of the situation are being thought through in a separate analysis which will give you options on how to retain a USG presence in Taipei.[10]

• We will have to negotiate with Peking an understanding that *the U.S. will maintain its present economic and social ties to the island,* including the ability to sustain investment in the island's economy and

[10] This analysis was not found.

physical access to Taiwan via air and sea communications. (In this regard, the playing out of the negotiations between Peking and Tokyo in 1973 on Japan's air service with the PRC, in which the Japanese acceded to the Chinese demand that they cease treating the Republic of China's flag airlines as a national airline, has set a difficult precedent for Taipei, and for us.)

—*The future security of Taiwan* remains the core issue to be negotiated. The Chinese may ask us for an explicit, public declaration that we are abrogating the U.S.–ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. They also will probably want a constricting limit—and perhaps a rapid cut-off—in sales of American arms to the island. (Their counter concern will be that too-rapid a removal of the entire American security relationship with Taiwan might stimulate the ROC to turn elsewhere for weapons and political support. CAS reporting indicates that PRC officials see such a possibility enhanced now that Chiang Kai-shek has passed from the scene.) Chinese leaders also have not encouraged us to believe that they might make a public commitment of some sort expressing the intention to "liberate" the island by peaceful means only. Not only has Teng Hsiao-p'ing repeatedly emphasized to you privately that the PRC will permit no foreign interference in the process of Taiwan's eventual reincorporation into the mainland, but in his June 2 interview with American editors he implied that force might have to be used, "as in removing dust from a floor with the aid of a broom" (a Mao quote). While past public and private statements to you by Chou En-lai suggest some hope for a Chinese statement of peaceful intentions regarding Taiwan, we are not overly optimistic that an acceptable unilateral formulation will be forthcoming.

State Department lawyers, in contrast, have urged that you seek from Peking a joint statement expressing a mutual commitment not to use force in settling the Taiwan question. Such a statement, they say, would at least enable us to plausibly claim that the U.S. retained a legal basis for assisting Taiwan in its defense if it were ever attacked from the mainland. We have no expectation, however, that Peking would agree to such a joint statement; indeed, the Chinese would very likely see a proposal for such an arrangement as a provocation or an unacceptable demand designed to stall negotiations. Other proposals for dealing with the security question (which we have not explored as they seem impractical) include an agreement between the U.S. and PRC to treat Taiwan and the Strait as a demilitarized zone, or to encourage Peking and Taipei to negotiate a mutual renunciation-of-force agreement.

Your own approach to this problem, since you first raised the idea during your October, 1971 trip to Peking, has been to seek from Peking a unilateral and general statement of intention—presumably to be included in a normalization communiqué—expressing the willingness to

strive for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. Last fall you had us draft parallel, unilateral American statements (which could be either included "back-to-back" with a Chinese statement in a communiqué, issued separately in a press conference, or embodied in a Congressional resolution) expressing a residual interest in Taiwan's security, the desire that the island's future be resolved peacefully, and perhaps linking the maintenance of our fully normal relationship with Peking to the assumption that force will not be used against Taiwan.

Teng Hsiao-p'ing hinted to you on the last day of your November, 1974 talks that he assumes he will be discussing some arrangement of this type with you at a later date.[11] Exactly how far Peking will go in this direction will not be known in the absence of direct negotiations. *We believe you should negotiate for a unilateral statement by Peking expressing the idea that the PRC does not contemplate the use of force in resolving the Taiwan question.* We assume that we will have to accept language which qualifies the circumstances under which Peking would exercise restraint (see suggestive alternative formulations which were drafted for your November, 1974 trip, at Tab D).[12] We also assume we will parallel Peking's statement with a unilateral statement of our own, as is noted above.

A less favorable alternative would be a statement by Peking which merely expresses the "hope for" and a willingness to strive for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. A further fall-back would be a statement from the PRC side expressing a willingness to exercise patience and restraint in seeking settlement of the island's future (see alternative formulations at Tab D).

We assume that the exact content of the parallel, unilateral statements which we and Peking might make about the future security of Taiwan will be linked in the negotiating process to agreement on a residual program of sales of American military equipment to the island (i.e., the more forthcoming a statement from the Chinese, the more limited our sales program might be). As noted above, the PRC will probably see its own interests served by having a gradual trail-off in U.S. arms sales; but you may wish to relate an understanding with Peking about the level and duration of such sales to the specific language of restraint that the PRC is willing to agree to, as part of a package agreement on normalization.

(An additional aspect of the modification of our security relationship with Taiwan will be further withdrawals of our residual military

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[11] See Document 98.

[12] Tab D, "Conceptual Approaches to Formulating U.S. and PRC Statements on the Security of Taiwan," is attached but not printed.

(and intelligence) presence on the island. While this will not be an issue you would *negotiate* with Peking, it will constitute one element of your discussions with PRC leaders. As such, further troop withdrawals directly relate to the consummation of a normalization agreement. You have been sent, via NSC channels, two options papers on reduction schedules for our remaining troop and signal intelligence presence on the island, and a residual program of military sales.)[13]

—Thus far in your approach to a normalization agreement, you have not linked third-country issues to consummation of the process—except for the matter of troop withdrawals from Taiwan being related to "reduction of tensions in the area." For reasons that we detail on pages 25 and 26 below, you may want to consider relating increased PRC cooperation on issues like Korea to the evolution of a fully normal bilateral relationship.[14]

If the above issues are the key bilateral questions to be resolved through negotiation, it must be said that at this point in the evolution of your discussions with PRC leaders *the room for maneuver on a normalization agreement does not seem great.* If there is to be full normalization, we will have to recognize Peking as the sole legal government of China, and imply or express in some verbal formulation acceptance of the view that Taiwan is part of China. We will maintain some type of "private-but-governmental" office in Taipei staffed by seconded State Department personnel, and—on the Japanese pattern—we will maintain our trade and social contact with the island. At the time of normalization we will indicate tacitly or explicitly that the U.S.–ROC Mutual Defense Treaty is no longer operative, but that the end of this formal relationship will be compensated for by a Chinese statement of peaceful intent, by our own unilateral expression of concern (perhaps expressed in a Congressional resolution) for the future security of Taiwan and the expectation that its differences with the mainland will be resolved peacefully, and by a residual program of American arms sales to the island.

[If Peking proves unwilling to agree to *any* package of arrangements relating to the future security of Taiwan (including such elements as parallel public statements, a residual American arms supply

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[13] On May 23, the NSC staff sent Kissinger a memorandum on U.S. force reductions and future U.S. military assistance for Taiwan. (Memorandum from Solomon, Granger, and Froebe to Kissinger, May 23; Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–32, NSSM 212) [*text not declassified*] The Department of Defense also produced a study of options for changing U.S. force levels on Taiwan. (Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements to Scowcroft, November 20, 1974; Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–77–0063, Box 3, China, Rep. of, 1974, 0001–320.2)

[14] Reference is to the paragraphs at the end of the paper immediately preceding the Recommendation.

arrangement, and a paced withdrawal of our remaining military presence) it seems likely that the President would find it impossible to reach a normalization agreement. Indeed, we would recommend against a deal on such a basis.]

We will have to answer those who criticize a normalization agreement on the grounds that we denied the people of Taiwan the option of self-determination with the argument that self-determination has never been an element at issue in America's China policy, and that those Taiwanese intellectuals who have advocated independence (primarily as residents of the U.S. or Japan) have been unable to evoke a substantial response from the people or authorities on the island.

For those who would criticize normalization on the grounds of our having sold out an old ally, we will have to respond that even our recently deceased "old ally" maintained that Taiwan was part of China, and that our national interests require recognizing—belatedly in comparison with the rest of the world—the enduring reality of Peking's control over the preponderance of Chinese territory. We will point to those aspects of the Asian political and military balance which are likely to stay Peking's hand from a direct military effort to gain control over the island, and mention our continuing economic ties and program of military sales as a way of helping to preserve for Taiwan the reality of its present status. And we will presumably have a sufficiently direct statement of peaceful intent from Peking to reaffirm our own concern that the people of the island be able to work out in a peaceful manner the nature of their future relations with the mainland.

And for some, there will be the question of what, if anything, the U.S. has gained from Peking in return for normalizing on the PRC's terms. This is a question that can only be answered in terms of the strategic value to us of a non-confrontation posture with the PRC, the impetus it has given the diplomacy of "détente" with the Soviets, and the long-term benefits to the U.S. of having eliminated one front of the Cold War battle lines of the 1950s and '60s. (One additional reason for seeking greater PRC cooperation on third-country issues, of course, is to be able to justify normalization on broader international grounds than just gaining leverage over the Soviets.)

Tasks for the Remainder of 1975

In view of the above discussion and analysis, the following tasks remain for 1975 if you are to at least explore with PRC leaders the possibilities for further steps toward a fully normalized relationship:

—*Preparing a negotiating package.* If you will give us guidance on your preferred approaches to further negotiations with the Chinese on the question of normalization, we will prepare a negotiating package for use during your advance trip to Peking later in the year. In addition to the bilateral questions which must be considered in such a pack-

age, there is the related issue of how you might wish to coordinate negotiations with the PRC with the evolution of our contacts with the Soviets during the year—specifically whether you want to schedule an advance trip to Peking before or after the Brezhnev summit. As well, there is the question of whether you want to begin to link [lack of] PRC cooperation on third-country issues (such as Korea) and perhaps international questions (food, energy, etc.) to further steps in our bilateral relations.

—*Planning further force withdrawals from Taiwan.* On February 8, Mr. Habib informed PRCLO that by mid-1975 we will have drawn down our military manpower level on Taiwan to about 2,800 men, put Taiwan airbase on caretaker status by mid-year and Ching Chuan Kang airbase on caretaker status by the end of the year. The PRC was also told that they would be informed later about an even lower manpower level to be reached by the end of 1975.[15]

Two major inter-agency studies relating to the U.S. military manpower presence on Taiwan and our military sales program have just been completed and sent to you and the President for decision via NSC channels. The NSSM 212 response provides you options on general policy guidelines for future sales of military equipment to—and U.S. force levels in—the ROC.[16] The second study is an Intelligence Community staff analysis of our signal intelligence presence on Taiwan (which is oriented largely toward the PRC). This study presents options for further reduction of the approximately 715 military SIGINT personnel who will remain on the island after July 1975.[17]

—*Preparing our public.* Thus far our relations with Peking have evolved with the government shaping public opinion through various official initiatives. You or the President have acted; the public has responded—with a substantial degree of support. We are now at a point in the evolution of U.S.–PRC relations, however, where difficult decisions are less likely to evoke a generally favorable public response. If there is progress toward a fully normalized relationship, certain issues (particularly those related to Taiwan) are likely to provoke a negative reaction from some members of Congress, the media, and private citizens. And if there is no progress, there are likely to be questions about why not. "Why has the relationship stalled" may become an issue in the 1976 campaign.

The PRC in recent months has initiated more active efforts to shape opinion on the normalization question. These include the encouragement and covert funding of the "U.S.–China People's Friendship

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[15] Telegram 29717 to Beijing, February 10, summarized this meeting. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files, East Asia, Box 14, People's Republic of China, DOS telegrams from SECSTATE–NODIS (5))

[16] See Document 90.

[17] Not printed. See footnote 13 above.

Association" to tout PRC political views, cultivation of the Chinese-American community through the cultural exchange program and trips to the PRC, and various efforts to stimulate sympathetic Congressmen and the American press on the normalization issue. The Nationalist Chinese, for opposite reasons, have similarly sought to project their views on the growing U.S.–PRC connection in the Congress and the media. In the early months of this year Taipei's diplomats embarked on an active effort to convince important opinion groups in the U.S. that normalization has proceeded as far as necessary to serve American interests, particularly by calling on the support of influential Americans like Senator Goldwater. Since the Gimo's passing ROC public relations efforts have flagged, but we can anticipate more activity as the President's trip to Peking approaches.

The question we now face is how to try to shape with greater purpose from the Administration's perspective public attitudes on the remaining issues associated with U.S.–PRC normalization.

There is a basic problem to such an effort. Until you have made your advance trip to Peking and sounded out PRC leaders on the prospects for an agreement, it is obviously in our interest to prevent the build-up of a positive mood of anticipation about the Ford trip.[18] This would only constrain your room for maneuver in negotiations with Peking, and might also mobilize groups hostile to further progress. At present we should project an attitude of "we would like to see further progress, but we have significant problems which have to be resolved—and which will require PRC accommodation—before further progress can be made."

Depending on the results of your advance trip, our public relations effort could go in several directions: If you see a strong possibility of full normalization associated with the President's trip, you will have to build support for the terms of an agreement with the Congress (which may have to assist by passing a supporting resolution, or enabling legislation as we move to a "private" relationship with Taiwan) and prepare public opinion for anticipated developments. If your advance trip implies limited prospect for further progress, or perhaps a postponing of the President's trip, we will be faced with the task of ex-

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[18] Teng Hsiao-p'ing's comments of June 2 to the American newspaper editors has already helped to deflate expectations that there must be a major outcome from the trip. We believe Teng made his remarks precisely because PRC leaders are concerned that the President might back out of the trip. They are well aware of pressures on him which make it difficult to bring about further change in the relationship. (This interpretation is supported by collateral CAS reporting.) We are also receiving indications of recent date that Chinese officials at PRCLO and in Hong Kong are sustaining Teng's relaxed attitude about the need for progress on Taiwan, and their desire for a Presidential visit under any circumstances. [Footnote is in the original.]

plaining to the Congress and public why the relationship has "stabilized" at its present level.

At this point we will not go any further into the public relations aspects of our dealings with Peking other than to flag the issue as one which will have to be considered in greater detail as the year progresses.

—*Preparing Taiwan for normalization.* Should the results of your advance trip imply strong prospects for a normalization agreement, there will also be the need to begin more active measures to prepare the authorities on Taiwan for the further evolution of our relations with both Taipei and Peking. There is obviously some danger in giving ROC authorities the kind of advance notification which might enable them to work against further progress with the PRC. At the same time, there are dangers in being totally passive about preparing the leadership in Taipei for moves on our part which will affect their basic interests (although they clearly anticipate that sooner or later we will recognize Peking and break with them).

The recent passing of Chiang Kai-shek has removed one major constraining, and stabilizing, factor which has held Taiwan to a "one China" course for more than a quarter-century. There is *no* evidence as yet that the elder Chiang's death has destabilized the situation on the island, or is inclining the Nationalists in some other direction. But as Peking, Taipei, and Washington adjust their policies to the new political and international context in the months ahead, we should be sensitive to new possibilities in the Taiwan factor, and seek to actively influence the evolution of the island's policies consonant with America's larger interests. (We are now preparing a separate paper for you on the Taiwan situation.)

—*Preparing Japan.* While the Japanese, at some level of perception, assume we will eventually normalize with Peking, there still lingers the hope (particularly in the business community, and among Foreign Ministry officials) that the U.S. will sustain its present "two China" position. Our enduring relations with Taiwan give the Japanese a sense that their interests on the island are protected; and the measured pace of our diplomacy with Peking has given Tokyo greater freedom of action in dealings with the Chinese. Should we recognize Peking this fall, for example, the Japanese would feel under greater pressure to conclude a peace and friendship treaty with the PRC on Peking's "anti-hegemony" terms.

For these reasons, as well as to avoid recriminations on the basis that the U.S. never learned the lessons of the first "Nixon shocks," we should make an effort to at least inform the Japanese in good time of any further developments in our relations with the PRC.

—*Preparing the PRC.* While your advance trip to Peking will be the primary vehicle for developing the basis for further developments in U.S.–PRC relations, you may also want to take certain unilateral steps in advance of the President's trip to generate an appropriate mood in Peking. These might include symbolic measures (such as having the President, or yourself, give a major speech on China in the fall, or having Mr. Ford receive at the White House the major PRC trade and scientific delegations which will visit Washington in September), or certain unilateral actions such as communicating to Peking further U.S. troop reductions from Taiwan, or perhaps an initiative in the economic area.

Some Final Thoughts on a Negotiating Posture

By way of conclusion, let us suggest several problem areas relating to the pace and orientation of our negotiations with Peking on the normalization issue which could significantly affect the future evolution of U.S.–PRC relations:

—*To Move or Not to Move to Full Normalization?* As noted in the above analysis, the short-run costs of moving to establish diplomatic relations with Peking are substantial for the President, particularly in the wake of developments in Indochina and in the context of the approaching 1976 election campaign. All the same, we remain convinced that there are strong reasons for attempting to negotiate a normalization agreement within the coming five months which would help to stabilize a non-confrontation relationship with PRC. Without reviewing all of the arguments about the long-term value to us of such a development, we would like to emphasize three arguments for such an effort:

First, by following through on the diplomatic momentum we have established since 1971 *we would complete normalization at our own initiative* and on the basis of a relatively cooperative relationship with Peking. If we let this momentum lapse, however, our relations with the PRC could deteriorate as internal pressures in Peking about being strung along by the Americans intensify. This could then mean that Peking would revert to pressure tactics to get us out of Taiwan and recognize the PRC as the sole legal government of China. Obviously in such a situation "normalization" would be much more costly for an Administration to carry out, for we would be doing it in a reactive way. Recall that in 1969 the Administration was concerned about the PRC playing on our domestic politics. This could become a problem again.

Secondly, the other side of the first argument is that if the Mao/Chou initiative toward the U.S. appears to have been successful from China's perspective, we will have maximized the possibilities of the Chairman sustaining an anti-Soviet foreign policy line within China—with all its obvious benefits for our own foreign policy.

Thirdly, there remains the complex of international factors which make normalization basic to stabilizing the structure of the Administration's foreign policy: maintaining one of our primary levers over the Soviet Union; preventing American isolation on the China issue in multilateral forums (such as the U.N.) and in our bilateral diplomacy; and maximizing the possibility of sustaining if not enhancing parallel foreign policy moves with Peking in a number of third-country areas (Europe, the Middle East and Subcontinent, Japan, and—hopefully—regarding Korea and Southeast Asia).

—*What Negotiating Themes to Emphasize?* In reviewing the evolution of our negotiations with Peking on the normalization issue, we are concerned about the manner in which the Chinese have attempted to box us in on the themes of the "Japanese model" and Teng Hsiao-p'ing's "three principles." This is obviously a good tactic from Peking's perspective; but at the same time we believe the Chinese have given us an opening on a more flexible general theme which could be used to structure the final phase of negotiations. In the November, 1973 Communiqué,[19] Premier Chou En-lai explicitly gave you an apparently more flexible "condition" for full normalization—on the basis of "confirming the principle of one China." We never really responded to Chou's opening. *It seems notable that the Premier repeated this formulation as the only condition which Chairman Mao had set for normalization* in the unpublished version of his speech to National People's Congress delegates in January of this year.[20] It is possible that the Premier (and perhaps the Chairman), in using this phrase both publicly and privately, are indicating the basis upon which they would attempt to sell a compromise normalization agreement to their own cadre. In preparing for your next round of talks in Peking, you could structure your discussion of the normalization issue around this theme and avoid being boxed in on the question of whether or not our terms strictly meet the "Japanese model" or Teng's "three principles"—although obviously at this point in the discussions we will have to take these aspects of Peking's private negotiating position into account.

Similarly, we may find it in our interest to press the Chinese to make good on Mao's comment to you about not needing direct control of Taiwan for "a hundred years." While this statement may very well have been intended by the Chairman only as a symbolic formulation, it is one of the few points on which we can seek to box in the Chinese with the sacred words of their own leader. Similarly, past public and private statements by Premier Chou about a willingness to strive for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan situation should be cited as

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[19] See footnote 7, Document 60.

[20] See Document 103.

precedents for a forthcoming unilateral statement by the Chinese on the issue of the island's security.

—*Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Bear?* While the Soviet factor has obviously been central to the evolution of our relations with Peking over the past five years, we are disturbed by signs that the Chinese feel they are being manipulated by us with the Soviet threat. There were a number of statements in 1974 by Vice Premier Teng and Foreign Minister Ch'iao to the effect that they were not certain they were getting the straight story on the Russians from the U.S.; and beginning as far back as the winter of 1973 Mao and Chou shifted from a posture of emphasizing the Soviet threat to China to the view that the Russians had *only* a million men on their border (which was not enough for defense, much less an attack) and that Moscow was "feinting toward the East while intending to attack in the West." This led to some rather unproductive exchanges with the Foreign Minister over whether China or the U.S. was the party more threatened by the Soviet Union. Obviously the Chinese have attempted to create the impression that our leverage over them because of what we presume to be their fear of the Russians was not as great as we might wish it to be.

Whatever the realities of the Russian threat to China, there are several difficult psychological dimensions to the way we might play the Soviet issue. To the degree that we appear to be emphasizing the Russian threat to "scare" Peking, we make the Chinese feel they are being manipulated, and thus erode whatever credibility we have built up with them. Moreover, in an ironic way we may be increasing the pressure on Mao to be more flexible in China's dealing with Moscow. We know that in the wake of the 1973 U.S.–Soviet agreement on preventing nuclear war that Chang Wen-chin, one of your interlocutors in drafting the Shanghai Communique, and now PRC Ambassador to Canada, wrote a paper in the Foreign Ministry calling into question the value of China's relationship with the U.S. in the context of our increasingly active dealings with the Soviets. The suspicion that we are manipulating them with the Soviet threat must also increase the inclination of "pragmatic" politicians like Teng Hsiao-p'ing (and perhaps even the Premier) to give greater flexibility to China's foreign policy by a limited accommodation with the Russians (and to concurrently reduce our own maneuverability).

How to be straightforward with Peking about our assessment of Soviet capabilities and intentions while not appearing manipulative in our use of this factor is a difficult problem in negotiating tactics.

Furthermore, to the degree that the Chinese assume that our dealings with them are largely a function of our efforts to gain leverage over the Russians, the more they will probably assume that we will accommodate them on bilateral issues in order to sustain our position

vis-à-vis Moscow. We believe such a situation would create substantial problems for the evolution of U.S.–PRC relations. Not only would it engender cynicism in Peking about their dealing with us, but it would increasingly tempt the Chinese to pose us with difficult choices about whether to accommodate their interests on particular bilateral issues or risk visibly damaging the Sino-American relationship—and by extrapolation, our leverage over Moscow. And to the degree that decisions on our part begin to convince our press, the Congress, and academic community that we are being "soft" on the Chinese, we will erode support for our China policy among important vocal elites whose patience with PRC game-playing is already wearing thin. (It was precisely for this reason, among others, that we urged a firm position on the Taiwan "liberation" song issue.[21])

In short, for tactical reasons if nothing else, we should approach Peking with a greater sense of concern about the evolution of our *bilateral* relationship. If we do not appear to take the Chinese seriously on their own grounds, we are unlikely to build a relationship with the PRC that will gain sustained support in Peking and the U.S.

—Link U.S.–PRC Normalization to Cooperation on Third Country Issues. While the Shanghai Communiqué linked our military withdrawal from Taiwan to the reduction of tensions in Indochina, in general our relationship with Peking has evolved without much effort to directly relate further progress on bilateral issues to cooperation in international affairs. This is as it should have been, inasmuch as to press Peking for visible cooperation with us in areas where China's own security interests would have been compromised (as in Indochina) very likely would have overburdened the fragile beginnings of normalization. Moreover, a review of Peking's behavior on Vietnam and Cambodia over the past four years indicates that while the Chinese have not been positively cooperative, neither were they actively obstructionist in a situation where the trend of events was clearly in the direction of their allies, where our own ability to act was increasingly constrained by domestic factors, and where to actively resist the trend would have exposed them to serious political pressures from the Russians, who would have tried to embarrass them with their "third world" claque. Moreover, Peking was helpful to us on an issue like Korea as late as the fall of 1973—but pulled back from such "collusion" precisely when Moscow undercut their position at the UNGA on the basis of their cooperation with the U.S.

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[21] On March 20, Habib informed Han Xu that the United States "cannot allow the tour [of a PRC performing arts troupe] as long as the song about [liberating] Taiwan remains in the program." (Memorandum of conversation, March 20; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, Box 5, China Exchanges, unnumbered, 3/13/75–3/27/75) As a result, the tour was cancelled. See "U.S. Bars Chinese Troupe," *The Washington Post,* March 28, 1975, p. A1.

At the same time, more recent PRC behavior on a range of international issues—Korea and the U.N. Command, Indochina, the food and energy conferences—has been such as to give us little prospect that after normalization we might expect to work positively with Peking in coping with a range of third country questions. There is now some grumbling both within the USG and in public to the effect that we are really getting very little out of our relationship with Peking.

There are major limitations on the leverage we might develop with the Chinese which might induce them to be cooperative on a range of international issues (Korea being a prime example); but at the same time you may wish to consider laying the groundwork for some linkage between further steps toward full normalization and more cooperation on third country questions. Just as important leadership groups in this country will ask what we are getting from Peking in bilateral affairs in return for our concessions on Taiwan, there will also be questioning about "normalization" if we cannot point to some degree of Chinese cooperation on international problems.

Recommendation:

That you convene a meeting with us at an early date to discuss the issues explored in this paper, and to give us instructions on how we should proceed in preparing for your advance trip to Peking.

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113. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, July 6, 1975.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary, Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant Secretary Habib
Mr. Winston Lord
Deputy Assistant Secretary Gleysteen
Mr. Richard Solomon, NSC
Jerry Bremer, Notetaker

SUBJECT

China

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, China, unnumbered items (16), 7/6/75–7/23/75. Secret; Sensitive.

The Secretary: I don't really have that much to say. I have read your paper and I just won't do it that way.[2] It's exactly the same paper you presented me last year.

Lord: No, it isn't. The question is: On your advance trip do you make some serious effort to find their security requirements?

The Secretary: For political reasons it's just impossible for the U.S. to go for normalization before '76. If there's any one thing that will trigger a conservative reaction to Ford, that's it.

Lord: We recognize that and felt that if the terms were decent enough perhaps it's less of a political problem.

The Secretary: I've got a problem with Panama and China. I don't even agree with your intellectual thesis—that this is the right time to force it.

Lord: The last time they didn't want to discuss it.

The Secretary: Even if they did, what they said to the Professor was for domestic consumption. You can't hold a government to what they say for domestic consumption.[3]

Lord: Presumably we would make our own statement.

The Secretary: What is our legal basis for defending part of one country?

Gleysteen: There is none.

The Secretary: If that's the case, we can't afford to have it in a campaign.

Solomon: They have clearly indicated in seven or eight places recently their desire to be flexible. They're afraid Ford will cancel his trip.

The Secretary: The trip is clear. They are anxious for it but I see no flexibility on Taiwan.

Lord: We recognize there is not much room for maneuverability. The only issue is whether you try to see the terms.

Habib: It's difficult to avoid discussing during your trip.

The Secretary: But suppose they give us generous terms? What do I do then? Pocket it and say, "We'll have no deal for two years." Anyway can they go beyond what they've told this guy?

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[2] See Document 112.

[3] Professor C.P. Li, after meeting with Chinese officials, informed Bush that President Ford was welcome in Beijing regardless of progress on Taiwan. Li had also asked whether, as a step toward normalization, the United States would be satisfied with a PRC statement "for domestic consumption" that would declare the PRC's intention to use only peaceful means to reunite with Taiwan. (Telegram 155344 from Beijing, July 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

Gleysteen: No, the question is what kind of relationship would they permit.

The Secretary: We can consider that when we have to sell this to Congress. What do we say then, by the way? Are we going to continue to send arms?

Gleysteen: You have to be able to say yes.

The Secretary: But do we have a legal basis?

Gleysteen: There is no legal barrier if the host government tolerates it. That's the most crucial aspect.

Habib: They would have on a sales basis. No credit.

The Secretary: But then it is essentially within their power to stop it at any point.

Lord: We have always had this dilemma from the time we started this relationship. You have to make it clear in your unilateral statement.

The Secretary: I'm wondering where we'll be if we go down this road. I'll try to raise it with the President but I know the answer. Those guys over there won't even take on Panama right now.

Lord: The paper argues the importance of doing this from our international position, and also argues that there is a need for some serious discussion when you go there in August.

The Secretary: Who said I was going in August? I am certainly not going in August.

Lord: If they give you a bad deal in return, your position would be strengthened. But if it generates an offer then I agree we have a bind.

The Secretary: What if they go to the limit?

Gleysteen: I think the chances are not very high they'd go that far. I think the terms in the pre-visit will be very tough.

The Secretary: I think we're better off saying we don't think we're quite ready. We've told them what we need.

Lord: I think we can be more concrete and say that we cannot do it without satisfaction on security.

Habib: I don't think they'll give you their last position when you are there. Won't they hold that out for the President?

Lord: No.

The Secretary: It is not their way of negotiating.

Solomon: They might make the Presidential trip conditional on something.

The Secretary: No. How would they react if he visited other countries in Asia do you think—like the Philippines and Indonesia?

Habib: If he did in on the way back, it would be no problem at all. I think that's a good idea.

The Secretary: Then it's not a special trip to China. What about Malaysia?

Habib: I think the essential ones are the Philippines and Indonesia.

The Secretary: How about Australia?

Habib: It depends on what's happening there.

The Secretary: Can they do Australia and not New Zealand?

Habib: It's difficult. The New Zealanders wouldn't understand.

The Secretary: They are the worst bores in the world.

Habib: That's because we never have any problems with them. All they ever talk about is cheese and butter.

The Secretary: And mutton. What do I want from them this evening?

Lord: Do you want to discuss your trip?

The Secretary: They have to make a proposal to us.

Lord: Since the last time you've seen them, they are more nervous.

The Secretary: I noticed that whatever you said to them about Schlesinger didn't get through. They told a group of Iranians that they thought Rumsfeld's and Hartmann's influence was rising over mine. That's just stupid. Rumsfeld I can see, but Hartmann I don't understand at all.[4]

Solomon: They're fed by third countries.

The Secretary: Hartmann is slipping in the White House and certainly has no relation to me.

Lord: It should be up to them to suggest something on your trip. (Secretary is interrupted for a phone call.)

Habib: On the visit, you did put some suggested times for the President's trip and they answered that any time was all right. I suppose you could mention a specific time now.

The Secretary: Why can't they raise the visit?

Habib: I think they probably think that they've already replied to you.

Solomon: If you really want to raise their anxieties, don't mention it at all. Otherwise, you could just mention your trip which will make them only slightly less nervous.

Lord: Or ask if they've had any further word from Peking.

Habib: His answer will be—"It's up to you."

The Secretary: I won't go next time unless they understand that I am to see Mao. I will not go through that BS again with our press.

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[4] Robert T. Hartmann was a Counsellor to President Ford and supervised the writing of the President's speeches.

Lord: I agree that we should not explore normalization unless we're prepared to go through with it.

The Secretary: My experience with the Chinese is to tell them exactly what our position is. Be frank with them.

Lord: Our concern is that the relationship is apt to unravel if nothing happens in the next two years.

The Secretary: I don't know. In my view, the relationship is based on their fear of the Russians.

Gleysteen: It is, but our people interpret it differently.

Habib: Another problem is your relationship to the process itself and to the understandings they've developed with you. You're the only one left. And that has meaning to them.

Gleysteen: One point that is not made in the paper is that the period of six months to a year now is a good one in Taiwan where the people are braced for a change.

The Secretary: If we could find a step toward normalization, I'd be receptive to it. But what kind of steps are there?

Lord: Things like lowering Taiwan to a Chargé level and lowering our arms supplies.

Gleysteen: You could get into some domestic problems with that.

The Secretary: Perhaps you could strengthen the unity point and find some formula to do that.

Solomon: That is always the strongest card with them. That's the core of normalization. I think they could be playing Teng as the front man.

The Secretary: If that's what they want, then we can do something along those lines.

Habib: I think you want to start this afternoon anyway with a review of what you're going to say to Gromyko and then go on the trip.

Solomon: There's only one argument for doing something and that is that if their situation dissipates so badly there, that they were to turn to the Soviets. Doing something might enable Chou and Mao to hold their domestic constituency for our relationship.

The Secretary: Well, I'm willing to find some step short of normalization.

114. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, July 7, 1975, 5:35–6:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office in Washington
Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter
Yang Yu-yung, Notetaker

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT

Discussion of the Secretary's Forthcoming Trip to Europe; the President's China Trip

Ambassador Huang: You will be leaving again!

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, Wednesday morning—for Paris, Geneva, Bonn, and London.

We are going to announce tomorrow that I will see the Israeli Prime Minister while I am in Bonn. So it will be a very hectic trip.

What is the news from our friends in Peking?

Ambassador Huang: (pointing to the staff present): Some of you read our newspapers in Peking, or our broadcasts. (To the Secretary) Your colleagues must know [what the news is].

Secretary Kissinger: You have no secrets? You must be following our practice. (Laughter)

Ambassador Huang: What needs to be broadcast will be broadcast; what needs to be published will be published.

Secretary Kissinger: So you have nothing to add?

Ambassador Huang: According to Dr. Kissinger's usual arrangement, I will be pleased to listen to your views.

Secretary Kissinger: I know that as a good general the Ambassador doesn't commit his reserves too early.

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 39, Solomon Subject Files, PRCLO (3). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Department of State. All brackets are in the original. On July 3, Habib, Lord, and Solomon submitted a memorandum to Kissinger containing suggested talking points. (Ibid.)

There were no especially urgent matters to discuss. It is just that as we have not met for several months I thought it would be useful to have a general review.

We have read a number of statements by your leaders to our journalists and others. We have paid attention to these.

As you know, I am going to see Foreign Minister Gromyko on Thursday evening, and Friday. He will want to discuss with us the Middle East, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the European Security Conference to a limited extent.

On the Middle East: As I told you last time, our effort is to gain some control over events and reduce the possibilities of some other power increasing its influence in the region. Since we last met, we have restored some momentum to our diplomacy. Therefore, I won't have very much to discuss with Gromyko in the way of concrete steps that the U.S. will be prepared to take with the Soviet Union [regarding the Middle East].

We still want to leave open the possibility of agreement between Israel and Egypt, and therefore we are not prepared to assemble the Geneva conference until that possibility is exhausted. So, for the time being, we will still pursue a separate course in the Middle East.

On the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Soviet Union owes us an answer, and I find it hard to predict if there will be some movement. But as I stated publicly, we will not have a summit meeting in Washington if there is no agreement on Strategic Arms Limitation.

Then, the European Security Conference will meet at the end of July. I was never a great enthusiast for it. At this moment we think it will produce mediocre results.

Beyond that, as I have said, whether Brezhnev comes or not depends on where we make significant progress—and there are no areas where this might happen other than those you know about.

In other parts of the world, our relations with our European friends are better than they have been in many years. If there is a European Security Conference, the President will probably stop in Bonn on the way—and he will also visit Warsaw, Belgrade, and Bucharest [on the way back] to make it clear that we do not accept a dividing line—a sphere of influence—that ends in the middle of the continent.

On other areas, in India, we notice not without interest Madame Gandhi's recent actions.[2] I do not think I will be attacked in the U.S. for being hard on her, as I was several years ago.

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[2] On June 26, Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency and had many of her political opponents imprisoned.

In Indochina, we are not playing any particular role at this moment. We hope that other countries won't use it for military bases—but we are not active in any way.

We have noted that your government has restored relations with the Philippines and with Thailand. We believe that this is commensurate with present realities.

I am sure you are familiar with the proposal we made with respect to Korea in the United Nations.[3] (Mr. Lord hands the Secretary a piece of paper, which he pauses to read.)

With respect to Japan, we are pursuing compatible policies. You know that Prime Minister Miki is coming here in August; and the Emperor will come in October. But we won't discourage Japan from pursuing its friendly relations with China.

These are the major areas I wanted to cover. You know our friendly relations with Pakistan, our desire to help them. So these are the major trends in our foreign policy right now.

Ambassador Huang: I would like to put this question to Mr. Secretary: We know that you started your reassessment of your Middle East policy for a long time. Has anything come out of it? We know that Mr. President, and the Secretary, met with Mr. Sadat [in Europe in June]. We have also learned from the press today that the cabinet of Israel will wait a week before deciding [on their position regarding the negotiations with Egypt]. And Mr. Secretary has just now told us he will also meet Mr. Rabin in Bonn.

Another question, which is related to the first, is what prospect do you see for your step-by-step diplomacy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we will never formally announce the conclusion of the step-by-step approach, as it is too much fun answering press questions. But as you no doubt are aware, being located here in Washington, this [Middle East diplomacy] is partly a domestic question. You know that we have moved to a much more impartial position [between Israel and the Arabs] than several years ago; and we are urging very strongly progress on all parties concerned, especially Israel. But I think that the chances of making some further step forward have improved in recent weeks.

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[3] According to Kissinger's talking points, the United States sent a letter to the UN Security Council on June 27 announcing U.S. willingness to see the UN Command for Korea dissolved on January 1, 1976, if the Governments of the PRC and North Korea agreed to uphold the armistice by accepting the United States and the Republic of Korea as the "successors in command." (Memorandum from Habib, Lord, and Solomon to Kissinger, July 3; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Convenience Files, Solomon Subject Files, Box 39, PRCLO (3), May–July 1975)

Ambassador Huang: Chairman Mao once said that it is important to follow a policy of two hands in the Middle East, to be even-handed.

Secretary Kissinger: I remember his comment very clearly. This is our policy, with our reassessment, to pursue an even-handed policy more actively.

Ambassador Huang: What prospects do you then see for the step-by-step approach?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it has improved. In fact, I am receiving the Israeli ambassador later this evening. He will give me his government's formal position—we have not yet received the content of their position.

Ambassador Huang: We have learned from the press that the U.S. side is thinking that if a step-by-step approach does not produce results then you will go in for an overall settlement in the framework of the Geneva Conference.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but we would have to put forward our own plan. So we would prefer to hold off for a while as Sadat has invested so much in another step. We will work with him, and later we will work in the Geneva framework.

On our bilateral affairs, have you heard any reflections on the possible Presidential visit to China?

Ambassador Huang: I already discussed this problem the last time we met. Our attitude has been very clear all along. That is—Mr. Secretary also mentioned that our leaders had a discussion with American friends visiting China, with the newspaper editors. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing said that if President Ford would like to visit China we will welcome him. The Vice Premier said that if he comes to discuss matters it is all right; or if he prefers not to discuss matters that is all right too. If their minds meet in discussions that is fine; but if there is no meeting of minds, that is also fine. So on the question of the visit of the President, Vice Premier Teng said that this matter is up to the President to decide.

Secretary Kissinger: So let me ask you frankly if we should consider this statement of the Vice Premier's as official? You have already answered my question. (Huang interjects: Doubtlessly [the Teng statement is official]; without question.)

One possibility is whether there can be intermediate points between a full meeting of the minds and no progress at all.

Ambassador Huang: Perhaps Doctor remembers what Chairman Mao told [Edgar] Snow before President Nixon visited China. Chairman Mao made several statements to the same effect [as the recent Teng statement]. So it is my personal opinion that we will not bring any difficulties on our guests.

Secretary Kissinger: So, I will discuss this conversation with the President. When I return [from the forthcoming European trip] we will further discuss this question more concretely.

Our idea would be that about six to eight weeks before the President goes, I would go to work out preliminary arrangements and understandings. But we will make a concrete proposal to you.

Ambassador Huang: We will wait until you come back, and then have a further discussion. When will you return?

Secretary Kissinger: This will be a quick trip. I leave on Wednesday and will be back Saturday night.

Ambassador Huang: Are there any other points?

Secretary Kissinger: We appreciate the Congressional visits that will be taking place. We will try to prepare them—but then you have handled so many different delegations, and after Senator Magnuson you are prepared for anything. (Laughter)

Ambassador Huang: There will be two Congressional visits in August.

Secretary Kissinger (to Mr. Solomon): Are you going with one of the groups, Dick?

Mr. Solomon: I'll see how busy I am then with other things.

Ambassador Huang: So we will see you when you get back.

[At this point the discussion ended and Mr. Solomon escorted the Chinese party to the door.]

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115. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, July 22, 1975, 6:45–8:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Senator Jacob K. Javits
Senator James B. Pearson
Senator Claiborne Pell
Senator Charles H. Percy
Senator Adlai E. Stevenson, III

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, China, unnumbered items (16), 7/6/75–7/23/75. Confidential; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Madison–Monroe Room at the Department of State. All brackets are in the original.

Representative John B. Anderson
Representative Paul Findley
Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr.
Representative John Slack

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning, Department of State
Oscar V. Armstrong, Director, People's Republic of China and Mongolia Affairs, Department of State
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT

Secretary Kissinger's Briefing of Congressional Delegates Before Their Visit to the People's Republic of China

Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate your coming. Let me give you our impressions of our relations with China, and then I will be glad to answer your questions. None of you have been there before?

Let me give you my experience. When I first met the Chinese I found them the most fascinating, intelligent and charming people I had known. To some extent this is true, but I can add to it now that they are the most self-centered, the most cold-blooded, analytical people I have encountered. I'd say that nothing in my experience matches it. Whether it's talking with a counter girl at the Shanghai Airport, or with Chou En-lai, everything seems to have one grand design. Nothing is accidental. Dealing with them is like one endless negotiation. I don't know if this is true when a Congressional delegation travels but it has been my experience. They make the totally planned appear spontaneous.

Even their sight-seeing is a totally planned activity. For example they will take you out to the Ming Tombs or the Great Wall. You can set your clock on the schedule they follow, but when you are there no one is looking at their watches; there is no sense of pressure. I asked their protocol chief Han Hsu how they did it. He replied: (1) they don't give a detailed schedule to the guests, and (2) they estimate what their guests will do and then segment the activity into eight minute segments. If the guests do more in any given segment then they just take out some of the later segments; if they do less, they just add on some segments. I am not sure what this says about their view of the attention span of foreigners. All this is done without using walkie-talkies.

When I have reviewed the records of my talks in China, in retrospect you can see how it fits into one grand scheme. The first time that President Nixon met Chairman Mao I thought—with my characteristic humility—that it was a "B" conversation; there was nothing spectacular. Mao just seemed to ramble from one subject to another. Two weeks later I reread the record of the conversation. Mao's comments

were like the overture to a Wagner opera. Every theme discussed during the week [of the Nixon visit] had its predicate in the Mao conversation. Every other statesman in the world would say, "I have fifteen points I want to make," and then he would read them. Mao just rambled along. He didn't say, "Remember this point." They are not like the Soviets: "Here are ten points" and a baseball bat. Someday I expect to be in an elevator in the Soviet Union and to push a button and I will over load the whole system.

On the negative side, they [the Chinese] basically don't give a damn about what you think. They truly consider themselves the Middle Kingdom. They have such a feeling of arrogant self-sufficiency.

Those things that they see as essential to their survival they study with meticulous attention. They give the most cold-blooded, amoral attention to the geopolitical factors of containing the Soviet Union. Mao and Chou En-lai have been through the revolution from the beginning, on the Great March. They are men of principle, of great conviction. They combine the ideological level with a cold-blooded pragmatism. Teng might not impress you this way, but if you were to meet Chou, you would see this combination of principle and cold-bloodedness. Their basic reason for moving to us has nothing to do with Formosa. It has everything to do with their fear of the Soviet Union. They don't want to appear to want us, rather they will warn everyone about the Soviet threat. Their basic interest in the U.S. is in maintaining a world balance of power. If they lose this view, they will lose interest in us. I believe the Turkish aid situation has had an impact on them. Everytime I have seen Mao he talks about a tier of states to the south of the Soviet Union. This will affect their perception of our ability to effect our own survival.

Everytime I see Mao he gives a magnificant explanation of the geopolitical situation and talks of the need to take actions to control the Soviet Union—Chou En-lai also. You don't see the bureaucratic factor in Chou.

Formosa: Of course we have discussed it, but it is not central. If they make a list of topics they put it last. They are not eager, partly because they don't want to create complications for us. It is not the central issue in our relationship. As the Shanghai Communiqué says, we have to move toward a new relationship; but whether it is this year or next, or later, it is not critical.

There is one school of thought that says you have to move while Mao and Chou are alive. I don't fully agree with this view as they haven't offered us a better deal. The mistake of many visitors is that they try to solve the Taiwan problem. It is not excessively helpful for people to try to solve it now. The Chinese have said that the President will be welcome regardless of the Taiwan problem. If you raise this question they may be compelled to take some action.

Their overriding concern is with the Soviets having new openings in Indochina. Indochina was a moral defeat for the U.S., but a geopolitical defeat for the Chinese. They now have on their southern border a country of 45 million trying to create an empire of 90 million—if you include the Laotians and the Cambodians. This may spill over into Thailand. The Chinese look at international affairs in terms of power relationships—as De Gaulle did. If they [the North Vietnamese] succeed, China will be in the unenviable position of having a major military power on every border. They know that the Vietnamese historically distrust China. Hanoi leans on the Soviets because of this. The Chinese are the only foreign power active in Cambodia—the only country in Indochina trying to insulate Cambodia against the Vietnamese. They are anxious to keep us in Asia.

They are not interested in—unlike my academic friends—cultural exchanges and trade. They want us to be strong in Asia, strong in the world. They are our best NATO allies. Every European leader [who visits China] gets a lecture on maintaining NATO. Everytime I go there I get scolded for not maintaining good relations with our allies.

They have certain parallel interests with us. They want us to have strong relations with Europe, want to have good relations between the United States and Japan. But we shouldn't delude ourselves. In five years if they become strong they could just cold-bloodedly push us away. Someday they may treat us like the Soviet Union, like an enemy. But for the foreseeable future, their fear of the Soviet Union is the basis of their assessments.

They are endlessly fascinating.

Representative McCloskey: If they want us to maintain NATO, do they not want us in Korea?

Secretary Kissinger: On the one hand they don't want us involved. They have certain obligations to North Korea, as they did in Indochina. They will tell you that they want our troops out. But they would be very disturbed if Japan struck out on an independent and militaristic path—which would happen if we withdrew from Korea. They will restrain North Korea from making an attack, but will support them in the UN.

Senator Javits: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could tell us what their aspirations are for their country; and what is their attitude toward Japan.

Secretary Kissinger: I only know Chinese in their 60s and 70s. I don't know younger people there. It sounds ridiculous to say that I only know Mao, Chou, Ch'iao Kuan-hua and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Very few Americans have conversations with these people outside of their senior officials. Mao, Chou, and Teng have enormous pride in their accomplishments. They remember the Long March. I remember Marshal

Yeh Chien-ying—their acting Defense Minister, now their Defense Minister—on my first trip. He made some comments that sounded spontaneous. He said, "When I joined Mao, I never thought I was doing anything for the present generation. When I joined the revolution, I thought I was joining a teacher, yet here we are and here you are." He saw Mao just as a teacher, not a military man. They want economic advancement, but also an egalitarian society. Mao has a conception that if you have Communism you create a bureaucracy, a new Mandarin class. Mao believes in permanent revolution, that every ten years you have to do away with it all. He is right.

On my first trip to China Chou En-lai talked to me about their Cultural Revolution. I said, "This is your domestic problem." He said, "No, no, you have to understand." They want permanent revolution; this is a major issue of principle to them. If you appeal to their principles they are happy. Not the Soviets. They are happy only when they are chiseling you. My experience is that the Chinese give you an honest position and then stick to it. When we were drafting the Shanghai Communiqué, the Chinese included several sentences we felt were inappropriate to a document that the President would sign. I said to Chou En-lai that if you take out these sentences, I'll give you several of ours that are objectionable to your side. Chou said, "Keep your sentences, I don't want them. You tell me why you find our sentences offensive. If you can convince me, I will take them out." So we talked about them and they later took out those sentences. But the Chinese are very thrifty. A short time later they used these same sentences in a speech that Ch'iao Kuan-hua gave at the United Nations.

Those who knew China before are impressed that visible poverty has been eliminated; it is not like India. There is no squalor, plenty of food. And they have done it without foreign help.

Japan: They are ambivalent. The first time I came they were very hostile toward Japan. Now they want a positive relationship with the Japanese, and they never attack our relations with Japan. In one of my meetings with Mao he asked if I had been in Japan. I said I had been there for a day and a half. Mao said that that was not enough, that I should not offend the Japanese. But they are afraid of a nationalistic Japan. In five years, they might try to move Japan away from us, but not now. They could raise hell by forcing Japan to chose between China and the U.S.

Senator Percy: What are they up to in Vietnam and Cambodia?

Secretary Kissinger: The Chinese are now saying that the Soviets have military bases in Indochina. This is not their governmental people but some of their people in Hong Kong. According to our information that is not correct. I don't believe Hanoi won the war to become a Soviet stooge. They are just playing them both off (the Chinese

and the Soviets). The Chinese are trying to gain a foothold in Cambodia. Hanoi sustains the heritage of Ho Chi Minh. His vision of a united Indochina. The Vietnamese hope to gain control of Cambodia. Le Duc Tho told us this in Paris. So at present there is greater Soviet influence than Chinese in Hanoi, but Hanoi isn't a Soviet stooge.

The Chinese nightmare is of a Soviet security system coming down to surround them. They see India as a Soviet stooge, an extension of the Soviet Union. They have contempt for them. They think India started the border war. This is the view expressed by Neville Maxwell in his book on the border war.[2] In Indochina the Chinese are supporting the Cambodians; they warn the Thai against the North Vietnamese. I have the impression that the Chinese did not urge the Thai to get rid of the United States. This was also the position they took with the Filipinos.

Senator Pearson: Are they likely to have a succession crisis?

Secretary Kissinger: We don't have any idea of what will happen after Mao and Chou die. Anyone who tells you that he does is full of nonsense. For example, Chou En-lai's situation: We don't know whether he is in the hospital; whether he is hiding in the hospital during a purge; or whether he is there masterminding the purge. Mao is slipping. With Chou it is very hard to know. He came out of the National People's Congress in a dominant position. There is evidence that his health is failing. Mao a year and a half ago was intellectually in good shape. Teng Hsiao-p'ing now is the dominant figure. But we don't know what will happen when that age-group goes.

Mr. Solomon: We believe Chang Ch'un-ch'iao may be an important figure in the succession. Teng Hsiao-p'ing has some major political liabilities.

Secretary Kissinger: It's like the guessing when Stalin was alive. No one picked Khrushchev. The military could be influential in a succession struggle.

Senator Pell: What are their objectives regarding nuclear weaponry?

Secretary Kissinger: They say that they have no intention of using nuclear weapons first. They also say they will not accept any limitations on nuclear weapons short of their total destruction. Since this won't happen, they are proceeding with their nuclear weapons program. They are building a submarine and ICBMs.

Mr. Habib: They are having problems with their ICBM program.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets are in range of a number of their rockets. It is a minor number; less than a hundred. But it is growing.

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[2] Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (London, Cape, 1970).

We used to estimate that by 1978 the Soviets would not be able to strike China without suffering unacceptable damage.

Mr. Lord: They are very sensitive to the U.S. nuclear balance with the Soviets.

Secretary Kissinger: They like Schlesinger's tough statements about maintaining our strength.

I would like to meet with you when you get back. They will take seriously what you have to say. I hope you will take full notes. They are likely to drop things into the conversation that they assume will get back to us. They assume that we will see a full report on your conversations.

Senator Stevenson: Whom do you think we'll see? Do you have any suggestions about topics we might raise?

Secretary Kissinger: I think you will find the Foreign Minister—Ch'iao Kuan-hua—more rewarding than Teng.

Anything that your conscience would enable you to say about the United States maintaining a global role in Asia and Europe they will welcome. They don't want us to collapse in the Middle East or to collaborate with the Soviet Union. You could emphasize that we will not collapse; that it's not just that we support Israel but that we will also compete with the Soviets for the moderate Arabs. Their major concern is that the Soviets will inherit the Middle East.

You might convey a sense of continuity in our foreign policy, that if the Democrats win there will be no change in our foreign policy.

Taiwan: It would be helpful for you to push suggestions. They have already rejected a number of them, like our leaving a Liaison Office in Taipei. This is not a question of finding some gimmick. There is one point: If we had some assurance that they would not use force then we could make progress. If they won't, we will have difficulty in turning over 15 million—especially in the year when we lost Indochina. This issue is more important than what we call our office in Taipei.

They told us that the Jackson formula—switching our Liaison Office and Embassy—was unacceptable before we raised it as a proposition. Our representation in Taiwan will not be a problem. Our problem is the future relationship of Taiwan with the mainland. This is the basic problem. If you raise this, this point would be helpful. Stress the desire for a peaceful settlement of this issue, that there be no use of force. Especially in a bipartisan group this might help them move in that direction.

Senator Percy: Han Hsu told me that they want more normal relations with the Soviet Union and are willing to be reasonable, but the Soviets are hostile toward them. Where's the truth?

Senator Javits: Huang Hua says just the opposite.

Secretary Kissinger: All of them say that the Soviets are hostile to China. Some of the issues could be easily settled. But what bothers the

Chinese is the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians in 1960 which paralyzed the Chinese economy. Secondly, they see the Soviets as basically expansionist. If they could concentrate enough force they could go after China. Mao, and to some extent Chou, are psychopathic on this point. I think the next generation may be less hostile to the Soviets; somewhat more accommodating. From the Soviet point of view, there are over 800 million highly disciplined Chinese. There will be ups and downs, but a 3,000 mile border is a geopolitical fact. They will continue to be competitive powers.

Do any of my colleagues want to add anything? Win.

Mr. Lord: They are now stressing that the Soviet threat is directed at Europe. This is partly for tactical effect, but they do see the CSCE conference as weakening Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: The Chinese are against popular front governments in Europe. Phil, did you want to add anything?

Mr. Habib: Regarding Korea, you might reinforce the thought that North Korea should not engage in any adventurism against the South.

Senator Percy: Do you think they will be troubled by the fact that we were recently in the Soviet Union? I took pains to be as open with them about our recent trip as possible. Han Hsu seemed to have been fully briefed on it.

Mr. Solomon: I don't think you will find them upset about this. They seem to have great confidence that they will outshine the Soviets. Virtually every group I have talked to who has been to both Russia and China has found the Chinese much more sophisticated and appealing.

Representative Findley: Have they expressed any interest in getting MFN?

Secretary Kissinger: Some newsmen asked the Chinese what they thought of the Jackson–Vanik amendment. The Chinese responded that they will be glad to export 30 million Chinese to the United States any time we are interested. They are not pushing us on this.

I look forward to seeing you when you get back.

116. Memorandum From Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger[1]

Washington, July 31, 1975.

SUBJECT

"Mood-Setters" in Our Relations With the Chinese

There are a number of opportunities which will present themselves early in the fall for the President to identify himself publicly with the People's Republic of China. You may wish to have him take advantage of one or a number of the following occasions both to signal to Peking his orientation to the current state of U.S.–PRC relations and to set the mood for our own public in advance of his trip to China.

—The Chinese will be sending their official trade delegation (the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade) to the U.S. in September. The President has received a request from the organizers of the Washington leg of their trip that he receive this group for a few minutes if his schedule permits. You may wish to have Mr. Ford meet with this group as an expression of his personal interest in our growing trade with the PRC.

—The Chinese are also sending to the U.S. their official scientific organization which promotes exchanges with other countries, the All-China Scientific and Technical Association. This group will also be in Washington in September. The President might meet with this group as an expression of his support for our scientific exchanges with the PRC.

—The President has received an invitation from the National Committee on U.S.–China Relations, the group that handles our cultural exchanges with the PRC, to give an address to their membership during their annual meeting in late October. As you may have completed your advance trip to Peking by this time, you might want the President to make some form of public statement to this group as a way of setting the public mood in advance of his trip to Peking. Alternatively, the President could just send the National Committee a statement of support, or you might address the group. (Based on our recent discussion, however, you may wish to adopt a lower "China profile" than would be implied by a speech by the President or yourself.)

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[1] Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1969–1977, Box 5, China, unnumbered items (17), 8/4/75–8/31/75. No classification marking. Sent for action. Lord forwarded this memorandum to Kissinger on August 22 under a covering memorandum that advised the Secretary to approve "the following recommendations by number: 1 or 2, 4 and 6, but I would not move on any of them until we hear from the Chinese concerning dates for the two visits." (Ibid.)

—You will recall that last October Huang Chen requested that his wife have an opportunity to call on the First Lady. No such meeting was held, however. The Chinese raised the issue again early in the spring. Again no action was taken because of the conjunction of the request with developments in Indochina. You may wish to consider having the First Lady receive Madame Huang within the new few months (particularly if the First Lady will accompany the President on his trip to Peking).

If you will provide guidance, we will handle the staffing of these requests as you indicate.

Recommendations:[2]

1. That the President receive the delegation from the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade:

2. That the President receive the delegation from the All-China Scientific and Technical Association:

3. That the President accept the invitation of the National Committee on U.S.–China Relations to address their annual meeting (in late October):

Alternatives:

4. That the President send the annual meeting a message (which we will prepare):

5. That you address the National Committee's annual meeting:

6. That the First Lady receive Madame Huang Chen at some convenient time in advance of the President's trip to Peking:[3]

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[2] The recommendations were numbered by hand, presumably by Lord. Kissinger initialed the Approve option under recommendations 1, 2, 4, and 6 and the Disapprove option under recommendation 3. He did not initial either option under recommendation 5.

[3] A note beneath Kissinger's initials indicates that he made this marking on September 3.